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Editorial Note
It is a pleasure to share the 9th Issue of the International Journal of African Development
(IJAD) Vol. 5.1 for Spring 2018. This issue covers seven research papers that entail a wide range
of topics of African development challenges and opportunities. The contributors explore topics
such the danger of tribal identity politics based on case studies, energy transition challenges for
sustainable development, the impact of motivation on employee performance in insurance
companies, whether inclusive growth promote effective regional integration among African
states, the value of indigenous knowledge for development debate, a comparative study of
breaking the poverty trap across African states, and integrating the youth into politics and
economics for the African Development Agenda 2063.
The contributing authors explore African sustainable challenges with case studies from
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and including regional and continental issues for Africa. The origins of
the contributions include universities and research institutions from countries such as Ethiopia,
Nigeria, Germany, Turkey, Uganda, Lesotho, Namibia, and Japan.
With this brief note, I invite our readers from African States and around the world to read
the details of each paper in this volume and share them with your colleagues. I am happy to
report readership of IJAD published papers in past issues are widely read and downloaded by
thousands around the world. At this time, we have a back log of submissions that we plan to
include in future issues after a peer review of the papers.
Finally, I thank all members of the IJAD Team, including our copy editor’s excellent
editing from participants who often have native languages that are not English. As well as the
copy editor, there are others including our ScholarWorks team who work voluntarily including
yours truly. In the future, we invite our readers to kindly donate funding as much as you can to
Western Michigan University to continue both the work of IJAD and African Development
Policy Research. We would also value advice regarding receiving funding from International
Grant Agencies.
I wish you all happy reading of the important papers in this issue.
Sincerely,
Sisay Asefa, PhD, Professor of Economics
Editor in Chief of the International Journal of African Development
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The Tigray Identity and the Paradox in the Securitization
of the Oromo and Amhara Identities in Ethiopia
Anwar Hassen Tsega1, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey
Abstract
Tigray’s ethnic nationality is the minority identity in the ruling Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of four political parties under the
leadership of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). For decades, the ruling party
has governed by pitting the Oromo and Amhara against one another. Accordingly, the
Oromo-Amhara solidarity is the greatest threat to the Ethiopian government. Within the
framework of the Copenhagen school, we analyzed the securitization of the two majority
identities. This essay is split into two sections. The first examines why and how the Oromo
and Amhara identities have been securitized by the dominant force of TPLF within the
governing EPRDF coalition. The second section examines the implications and
consequences of this securitization. I argue that the securitization, while a natural choice
in many respects, has perhaps been detrimental to the overall security of the Ethiopia's
Tigray-dominated government that perceives the Oromo and Amhara as a serious threat to
Ethiopia's leadership.
The TPLF Political Party as the Securitizing Actor
As an authoritarian government and noncompetitively elected party state, the TPLF led
government is deeply concerned with issues of legitimacy, and assert that it has the right to rule
all those within its borders. Although the TPLF established the EPRDF in order to gain a national
base and legitimacy in Ethiopia, it never lost its minority identification, and this has always been
a source of insecurity (Tadesse, & Young, 2003). The EPRDF is therefore left with a dilemma –
being an umbrella of ethno-national fronts of which the TPLF forms 6% of the ethnic portion, but
it is the dominant political force of the country. On such a dubious platform of legitimacy and as
the leaders of a ‘minority,’ the TPLF “either does not have, or has failed to create, a domestic
political and social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force”
(Buzan, 1983, p. 94). If they are to remain in power, the TPLF clearly needs to build on this
position because of the importance of “national identity and social cohesion in terms of the degree
to which the population identifies with the nation-state and to accept its legitimate role in their
lives” (Jackson, 2007, p. 203) The EPRDF therefore has to both appear inclusive while
simultaneously promoting “the ANDM [Amhara National Democratic Movement], OPDO
[Oromo People Democratic Organization] and the SEPDM [Southern Ethiopian People's
Democratic Movement] to the vanguard of the people of the People’s Republic” (Ashine, 2012)
as this is where its main volume of support comes from. However, the EPRDF’s ethnic policy has
empowered some groups but has not been accompanied by dialogue and reconciliation. Real power
in Ethiopia is in the hands of the TPLF. The other parties in the governing collisions are puppets,
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and TPLF is their puppet master (International Crisis Group, 2009). The TPLF, therefore, is the
securitizing actor, as it “securitize(s) issues by declaring something, a referent object, existentially
threatened” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, P. 36)
The Tigrayans as the Referent Object of Security
Referent objects are “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a
legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, P. 36). In this case, the referent
object is the Tigrayan’s ethnic identity, as referent objects “can be collective identities” (Emmers,
2007, p. 172). These minorities fought to liberate their ethnic elites from the oppressive military
regimes. However, due to domestic tensions at all corners of the country, the Tigrayans along with
some representatives from the majority Oromo and Amhara populations formed allies to be called
the EPRDF.
The Reasons for Securitizing the Oromo and Amhara Identities
Why has the TPLF political party as the securitizing actor chosen the Tigrayan identity as
its referent object? Essentially, securitizing the Oromo and Amhara identities is a means to an
end, that end being ethnic dominance and regime security.
Extraordinary measures of securitizing the Oromo and Amhara identities:
The Ethnic Classification Project from the Transitional Government to the Federal
Democratic Republic (1991-1994).
One method used by the TPLF led by the ruling political coalition has been that of naming
and classifying ethnic groups. Meles Zenawi (the former PM) engineered a one-party rule for the
TPLF and his Tigrayan inner circle with the complicity of other ethnic elites that were co-opted
into the ruling alliance, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The
Front promised freedom, democracy and ethnic devolution but became highly centralized and
tightly controlled the economy and suppressed political, social, ethnic and religious liberties.
Ethiopia’s political system and society have grown increasingly unstable largely because the TPLF
has become increasingly repressive, while failing to implement the policy of ethnic federalism it
devised over twenty-five years ago to accommodate the land’s varied ethnic identities. The result
has been greater political centralization associated with ethnicization of grievances. The TPLF has
remained the center of political decision-making in the EPRDF and kept the principles and
discourses of its guerrilla years. This includes Leninist “democratic centralism,” in which the
executive and central committees make all major political decisions, and then transmit orders to
junior officials and administrators. “Revolutionary democracy” that advocates capitalism and free
market is promoted, but at the same time the state and party has retained iron control through fiveyear development plans. Meles’s absolute pivotal role developed during the armed struggle to
overthrow the Derg – the military regime of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam that ruled from 1974
to 1991 – when he was a core member of the TPLF, an ethno-Marxist guerrilla movement founded
in the northern Tigray region (International Crisis Group, 2012).
6
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Exoticization of the Oromo and Amhara Identities as a means of securitization.
One of the more obtuse ways of securitizing the Oromo and Amhara identities is by
dominating the internal other. This is because “the objectified portrayal of majorities as exoticized
is essential to the construction of the Tigray’s minority, the very formulation of the Ethiopia
‘nation’ itself” (Yalew, 2014). Regarding naming, this intense othering is designed to quantify the
majorities as commodities rather than equal footed citizens. It seems “the state has turned its gaze
upon the internal other, engaging in a formalized, commodified, oriental orientalism that may be
focused on the minorities but represents a long tradition of fascination with the outsider in
Ethiopian society” (Saed, 1978 in Yalew, 2014). Securitizing the Oromo and Amhara identities in
this unique manner and emasculating the other is essential to the EPRDF. “Belonging to a distinct
culture tells us ‘who we are,’ and it is this process of self-identification which is key to nations”
(Roe, 2007, p. 218). This non-violent and arguably non-repressive means of objectification
nevertheless constitutes a speech act, as “the exoticization of majorities essentializes the imagined
identity of the Tigrayans and reaffirms Tigre feelings of superiority” (Yalew, 2014) is crucial to
the existence of the regime.
As ethnic mobilization was the TPLF’s means to seize power, it now appears that the ethnic
polarization was created as a result of threatening the state power structure and national cohesion.
There is insecurity when sharing the national agenda, mistrust against the government and other
ethnic groups, many times irrational (political and economic) competition, and a new dynamic of
the ‘we vs. them’ conception (Berhe, 2008). The previous Prime Minister Meles was the
unchallenged intellectual and ideological guide of the party and government, and as a result, had
accumulated a disproportionate share of power in the Ethiopian state. He had successfully and
effectively marginalized his TPLF opponents and concentrated power to his own hands and those
of close colleagues (Tadesse, & Young, 2003). Moreover, the TPLF promoted hatred of the other
two major ethnicities (The Oromo and Amhara). They gave names for Oromo “Tebab” and for
Amara “Temketgna.” The name “Tebab” in Amharic language stands for ‘Narrow Oromo
Nationalists’ as the Oromos believe in Oromoness, and “Temketgna” stands for ‘Arrogant Amhara
Nationalists’ as the Amharas believe in Ethiopianess. Indeed, it is a deliberate ‘speech act’ used
for the last 25 years to subjugate the other ethnic majorities and solidify the referent object (the
Tigray identity) at the center. It helped the TPLF to increase its power by dividing the two largest
ethnic groups.
The Securitization Process
The most notable feature of the securitization process of the Oromo and Amhara identities
is that it is circular. The securitizing actor (the TPLF) securitizes the Oromo and Amhara identities
(which the EPRDF is also comprised of) from an internal threat (other Ethiopian citizens) by
subverting and subsuming the internal other (Amharas and Oromos). While “transforming an issue
into a security question only requires the audience’s acknowledgement that it is indeed a threat”
(Emmers, 2007, p. 173), in this case, the audience is the referent object of which the securitizing
actor is also a part. Therefore, admission of the existence of a threat is pre-determined as long as
International Journal of African Development v.5 n.1 Spring 2018
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the audience (Tigrayan Ethiopians) keep faith in the securitizing actor (the TPLF), which it is not
going to do whilst the securitizing actor has securitized their identity. This therefore legitimizes
“the claims of the state to have authority over citizens as citizens [which] provide a source of its
ability to exert violence against them” (Krause, & Williams, 1997, p. 45). This logical process is
difficult to follow, but it boils down to a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby, as the EPRDF
articulates, the threat is an “existential threat to a referent object” (Emmers, 2007, p. 170) and
hence propagates its own existence because “in practice, the idea of state security – the integrity
and functioning of the institutions and idea of the state – and regime security – the security of the
ruling elite from violent challenge – become indistinguishable” (Jackson, 2007, p. 205).
The Implications and Consequences of Securitization
Marginalizing the dominant Ethnic Nationalities - the Oromo and Amhara.
The fall-out from the securitization of the Oromo and Amhara identities was in many ways
quite predictable. Favoring the minority ethnic group and trying to dominate other cultures is
usually met with ill feeling and violent resistance. Ethiopia has been left with the lingering problem
of large marginalized groups, which have implications for the threat towards territorial control,
and ultimately, for sovereignty. The net result of this failed forcible integration is that the EPRDF
faces continuing ethnic unrest amongst ‘majority’ people (particularly in Oromia and Amhara)
exacerbated by an assertive Tigrayan nationalism that the EPRDF has itself encouraged (directly
and indirectly) in a bid to bolster its legitimacy by highlighting its patriotic credentials. It is a
matter of time before two of the three members of the EPRDF, the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic
Organization (OPDO) and the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) desert them in
their role as puppets. Both groups hold little real power, but simply have been personally rewarded
for going along with the TPLF under the name of their ethnicity. The transparency of the close
relationship between the Tigrayan identity and the Ethiopian state has made any pretensions of
multinationalism increasingly difficult. One obvious such failure is amongst its major population
because the OPDO/EPRDF’s ideological project in Oromia – to win recognition as the sole
legitimate representative of Oromo’s interests and to make Oromos think of themselves as
Ethiopians and citizens of the Ethiopia – has not been successful.
Ethnic cleansing of Amhara and forced displacement of Indigenous people from their
Ancestral lands.
Population transfer as a method of gaining regional preponderance and ensuring the
stability of the minority ethnic group is a deliberate activity so as to benefit from the resources of
regions other than the Tigrayans’ original settlement. The net result of this is that “increased
Tigrayan migration to participate in the region’s Sesaaam production continues to exacerbate
ethnic tensions” (Tsega, 2017) Tigrayans flooded the territory, especially from the 1980s on, when
the TPLF-led government reform program created new opportunities for migration and profit.
Although they probably make up no more than 10 percent of the population, the Tigrayans are
concentrated in Wolqayt’s cities and dominate the modern sectors of the economy. The close ties
8

https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/

between economics and demographics are illustrated here, as well as the fact that “many Wolqayts
claim they are being pushed to the economic margins and overwhelmed by Tigre’s immigration.
In the next section, we will look at the economic implications of the securitization of the
Tigrayans in these ethnic areas. Article 32 of the Ethiopian Constitution guarantees freedom of
movement within the national territory. Ethiopia is also a signatory to several conventions,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which clearly state that
a citizen has the right to work and live in any part of his or her country. However, since 2012,
ethnic Amharas have been subjected to forcible eviction from Guraferda Bench-Maji in the
Southern Regional State as well as from the Beni Shangul region of Western Ethiopia. Targeting
Amharas, one of the largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia, for illegal deportation is a barbaric act that
will have dire consequences for fostering ethnic harmony in Ethiopia. Stoking hatred will only
serve to destabilize the country (Endalk, 2013).
Moreover, there is an ongoing hostility in the Amhara region. The government’s annexing
of the Wolqayt communities to the Tigray administrative region has raised a serious question from
its indigenous Wolqayt people who claim to be Amhara. Others should not be surprised at the
failure of communities to accept the imposition of identities that do not correspond with how they
view themselves and their surroundings. Favoring the minority ethnic group ensures a strong base
of support, but discontented majorities have the possibility of taking asymmetrical means to
destabilize key elements of the EPRDF rule and the Ethiopian economy. As we established,
Wolqayt and Addis Ababa, especially, are areas which are vital for the EPRDF to retain control
for geopolitical imperatives. The securitization of the Oromo and Amhara identities comes with
its own set of problems as “the formulations of Tigrayan nationalism generally limit the extent and
ways that non Tigrayan Ethiopian voices are recognized, and the EPRDF has problems in dealing
with ethnic or nationality difference other than as a function of economic development” (Tsega,
2017)
The Addis Ababa ‘Master Plan’ and the ‘Ethiopian Somali Special Forces’ as a means
of displacing the Oromos from their Ancestral lands.
In April 2014, the government announced its readiness to implement what it called the
"Addis Ababa Integrated Regional Development Plan" (the Master Plan for short), which proposed
to annex most of the city's surrounding areas belonging to the National Regional State of Oromia.
This provoked an immediate reaction from the public, but the government responded with brutal
repression of the protests. Clashes are thought to have claimed 140 lives of students and farmers
from the Oromia region. The announcement of the Master Plan led to another round of killing and
arrests of the Oromo youth. Ethiopian jails were beefed up even more. Oromia was subjected to a
continued state of terror. Ethiopia is fast becoming a concentration camp of Oromo people.
As many argue, Ethiopia’s tense ethnic federalism is being tested as it experiences the
recent deadly clashes between ethnic Oromos and ethnic Somalis in the country’s dry and mainly
pastoralist southeast. Local militia and police, including the controversial Somali Special Forces
International Journal of African Development v.5 n.1 Spring 2018
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known as the Liyu (for Amharic ‘special’) issued a proxy against the Oromo. There is no doubt
that the Liyu force has full support of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) government
in Addis Ababa. The TPLF initially set up the Liyu police as a counter insurgency force against
the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), a group fighting for self-determination for the
Somali region. Importantly, these ethnic clashes arose during the time when there was ongoing
protests in the Oromia and Amhara regions and while the two major ethnic groups showed their
unity to resist the TPLF led ruling party. I argue that this was a deliberate political decision made
by the TPLF, because without these new ethnic clashes at the Somali-Oromo border, the unrest
would not have been erupted. Due to the silent response from the ruling government, one of the
high-level OPDO officials, Abadula Gemeda (speaker of the House of People's Representatives),
has resigned out of his own freewill.
Conclusion
In this analysis, the securitization of the Oromo and Amhara identities contradict the
existing literature where “elites favor certain groups in the allocation of state resources, oppress
minorities viewed as hostile, create minority scapegoat groups during times of unrest and appoint
members of the elite’s own ethnic group to positions of power” (Jackson, 2007, p. 206). However,
there is a paradox in that a tiny minority in the ruling coalition has not only become a securitizing
actor and referent object in the securitization process but also demands and monopolizes
federalism for the last 25 years. In the Ethiopian context, the TPLF was inherently and structurally
deficient in establishing a genuine accommodative federal political framework in the country.
Hence, it has been embarking on sustaining a political travesty via EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples’
Revolutionary Democratic Force) that would assure its hegemonic project by using ethnic rights
as a discourse to attract and subdue the disoriented ethnic elites. As the Copenhagen school
forecasted, securitization is not a positive tool of statecraft. “Security is what we make of it”
(Booth, 1997, p. 93), and “what constitutes an existential threat is regarded as a subjective matter”
(Emmers, 2007, p. 172), but in dealing with these subjective threats, we often ignore other threats
and simultaneously create new ones.
To ensure the Tigray identity at the expense of others, “the state confronts powerful social
forces with substantial coercive force, which in turn provokes violent resistance” (Jackson, 2007,
p. 202). But securitizing an issue can make you vulnerable to the consequences of the exceptional
actions you undertake, and something that has been bitterly experienced by those in Rwanda,
where the traditional use of State violence in the exercise of power has created deep roots in
history. It is this violence that facilitated Tutsi political domination over Hutu masses (Batware,
2012). The government intensively works in a divide rule system so as to polarize the two major
ethnic groups unless and otherwise its ruling period might be at an end.
For decades, the ruling party has governed by pitting the Oromo and Amhara against one
another. Now, the two groups are joining forces against the government; therefore, the OromoAmhara solidarity has become the greatest threat to the Ethiopian government. However, as much
as the dominant elite TPLF utilized ethnicity to come this far and defend the present power
10
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structure, the marginalized elites may use similar tools to resist domination by fomenting ethnic
conflicts in which civil liberties and human rights, the essential elements of building civil society,
will be the casualties. As Berhe (2008) strongly argued, ethnic mobilization can only play a
positive role if it is based on establishing and institutionalizing civil liberties and human rights
upon which diversities are accommodated and differences are mediated democratically. To the
aforementioned, Bete Amhara is a typical and successful resistance movement in the Amhara
region - witness the rise of Amhara Nationalism. The Copenhagen school advocates
desecuritization and repoliticization as more sustainable methods of dealing with security issues
in the political sphere.
I believe this securitization essay has shown the decidedly limited benefit of the Oromo’s
and Amhara’s identity’s securitization. This is due to the fact that securitization is succeeded only
by acceptance from the audience so as to move the issue above the sphere of normal politics
(Wæver, 1995). However, by observing the overall hostilities in the country, one can understand
that Ethiopia's Tigray-dominated government may not be able to sustain its hold on power for
much longer if the current nationwide uprising in Ethiopia against a minority tyranny continues
without changing its views. Though it is not going to be attempted here, what can be suggested is
that desecuritization of the Oromo and Amhara identities through power sharing can be used as a
means of curing the current unrest and future political stability.
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Sustainable Energy Transitions:
Changing the ‘Business as Usual’ Trajectory in Sub-Saharan African Urban Areas
Mark Borchers, Sustainable Energy Africa NPC
Megan Euston-Brown, Sustainable Energy Africa NPC
Simon Bawakyillenuo, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana
Alex Ndibwami, Uganda Martyrs University, Uganda
Simon Batchelor, Gamos
Abstract
This paper describes a novel approach to helping municipal authorities address the
sustainable energy challenges associated with rapidly growing urban populations in SubSaharan Africa. Population in Africa is expected to double between 2010 and 2040, and
substantial urban growth is expected in small and medium-sized cities where local
government capacity constraints are most serious. A long-term partnership between
municipal authorities, NGOs, and academics can build capacity, and a prescribed strategy
can lead to progress on the ground. In order to contribute to future action, the paper argues
for a greater role of local government in sustainable energy transitions, and presents some
of the lessons learned from work in municipality-based energy work undertaken in South
Africa over a 17-year period. It provides evidence of change, but more importantly,
considers the process by which that change occurred and the intentional strategy of policy
influence. Several South African cities engaged in this process with the assistance of the
non-profit organization Sustainable Energy Africa have been able to move to greater
renewable energy and energy efficiency implementation, and have strengthened their
energy capacity and governance frameworks. The paper reviews the changing energy
characteristics of South African cities, and describes the key processes that create a policy
environment conducive to moving away from business as usual and responding to
sustainable energy imperatives around clean energy and energy poverty. The use of energy
modeling to support municipal energy strategy development is also described as an
important informant for decision-makers regarding the consequences of decisions taken,
or not taken, today. As such, it provides the groundwork for transferring the
methodological process to other countries, while the latter part of the paper draws on recent
experiences in Uganda and Ghana in replicating the work.
The Energy Challenges of African Urbanization
Population in Africa is expected to double between 2010 and 2040. The urban population
proportion across sub-Saharan Africa is 38% (UN, 2014), but is growing steadily at 1.4% per year.
Most urban development in Sub-Saharan Africa is occurring in a non-planned and non-transparent
manner (African Research Institute, 2013), and well over half of urban dwellers live in slum
conditions, which presents serious governance challenges. One of the noteworthy features of the
International Journal of African Development v.5 n.1 Spring 2018
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population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is that it is expected to take place mostly in small and
medium sized cities, rather than capitals (UN-Habitat, 2010). Yet this is where local government
capacity is weakest, and there is little to suggest that urban governance capacity will improve
significantly under ‘business as usual’ conditions, as reflected in a recent assessment of capacity
in African local government: “few countries have developed strategies to cope with the challenges
posed by rapid urbanization” (Cities Alliance & UCLGA, 2013, p. 10).
Energy is just one facet of sustainable urbanization, but a completely cross-cutting one,
closely linked with welfare, economic health and environmental sustainability. However, as noted
in the recent African Energy Outlook (IEA, 2014b), in spite of being resource-rich, access to
modern energy in Sub-Saharan Africa remains low, the use of unsafe and unhealthy fuels is
widespread, energy infrastructure is poorly developed, and the electricity supply is unreliable.
While efforts to improve access to electricity are increasing, it is not keeping pace with population
growth so the absolute number of people without a connection is rising. The often unreliable power
systems have led to a proliferation of expensive back-up generators, and the ubiquitous reliance
on solid biomass is putting forestry stocks under increasing pressure. The energy challenges in the
region are therefore substantial, and there are roles for all levels of government in shaping a more
sustainable future.
Over the past decades the understanding of a ‘sustainable energy transition’ has started to
broaden from a focus on cleaner energy to include the democratization of energy. This involves a
greater decentralization of energy systems, increased bottom-up decision-making, and a demanddriven planning focus, in contrast to the nationally centralized, supply-side planning common
around the world before the 1990s (Goldthau, 2014; Reddy, 2002). A greater involvement of
municipalities is a component of this trajectory, as reflected in the MDGs (Modi et al., 2006),
where local government’s role is specifically noted, and the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All,
2014) initiative, where ‘bottom up’ solutions are considered important, amongst others is
presented. The UN-Habitat notes, “Each region, nation, city and locality is different and
sustainable innovations must be tailored to specificities that vary between localities and over time”
(UN-Habitat, 2014, p. 7). This again suggests a stronger role for municipal government in energy
transitions.
The Role of Municipalities in Sustainable Energy Transitions
Although not yet acknowledged by many national governments, municipalities need to be
stronger players in supporting the sustainable energy transition. Their core role around urban
planning, transport planning, electricity distribution, and building plan approvals, amongst others,
are important factors in energy transitions. Buildings consume 32% of the world’s energy (IEA,
2014a), and each inefficient building that is erected today commits its occupiers to upwards of 50
years of unnecessary energy consumption and associated high costs and emissions levels.
Uncontrolled sprawling urban form results in cities that are likely to consume 30% or more
transport fuels than denser cities (FFC, 2011). Municipalities are also significant consumers of
energy in their operations, and operate landfill and wastewater treatment systems that can present
14
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opportunities for clean energy generation. In addition, they can play a facilitative role for localized
energy programs, such as the promotion of small-scale renewable energy systems (e.g. rooftop PV
or biogas systems) and efficient cook stove initiatives (Kaza and Curtis, 2014). They are in close
contact with their citizenry, including the growing urban poor population, and so are well placed
to plan and respond more appropriately than national governments or other ‘external’ agents.
Sustainable Energy Transitions in Cities: The Case of South Africa
The 18 urban areas covered by the recent State of Energy in South African Cities Report
(SEA, 2015) are home to half of South Africa’s population, but occupy under 5% of the country’s
land area. They account for over a third (37%) of the national energy consumption and nearly half
(46%) of national electricity consumption. They also consume half (52%) of the country’s petrol
and diesel. The city energy picture is thus crucial in moving the country along a sustainable energy
trajectory. Yet, as with most local governments in developing countries, they are capacity
constrained and struggle to provide the necessary services to their citizens, let alone give attention
to issues which have longer-term consequences such as sustainable energy transitions. This is a
dangerous situation, with the potential for a spiraling decline in welfare as the consequences of
unsustainable practices steadily become the crises of the day.
Given the growing recognition of the role of local government in a sustainable future
(ADB, 2011; Cities Alliance and UCLGA, 2013; & UN-Habitat, 2014;), support for this level of
government has started to increase over the past years, with organizations such as the International
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) and the South African Local Government
Association (SALGA) having a growing sustainable energy focus. The following sections describe
a municipal support program run by the non-profit organization Sustainable Energy Africa since
1998 – the longest-standing of such support initiatives in South Africa. When this work started,
cities were generally not regarded as players in the energy sector, and were not considered in most
national energy policy or strategy discussions. Today, this has changed. Due in no small part to
such support programs, cities are now regarded as central agents to a sustainable energy future for
the country. For example, local governments now are instrumental in key national policies such as
the National Climate Response White Paper and the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan, and
have a recognized role in national electricity planning documents.
Agents of Change: An Applied Methodology for Facilitating Energy Transition at the
Local Government Level.
The capacity shortfall of local government to tackle the challenges posed by sustainable
energy imperatives are significant, and are likely to remain so into the long-term under current
conditions, as noted earlier. Given this situation, there is a clear need for external capacity support,
and recently international organizations have begun to respond to this need, as discussed above.
However, efforts to support municipalities with sustainable energy initiatives are too often
ineffective. A fundamental reason for this is because many such initiatives, often conceptualized
by outsiders, lack a detailed grasp of the complex internal operations and dynamics of
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municipalities and do not appreciate the severe constraints they operate under. Often, approaches
to this issue are derived from experiences in northern cities, where capacity – human and financial
- is far less of a challenge, mandates and priorities are significantly different, and there is
substantially less political interference and manipulation than at the local level (Bawakyillenuo et
al., 2015).
Sustainable Energy Africa has worked as a support organization for municipal authorities
in South Africa over a 17-year period to promote sustainable energy. Over this time, they have
developed a structured method of working with local government to support sustainable energy
transitions. This methodology can be applicable to any organization in the role of change agent to
this government sector, and is now being used in other African countries as indicated in the
SAMSET (2013) project. The methodology is described in detail elsewhere (Bawakyillenuo et al.,
2015), but in summary, there are two key elements involved: one is the presence of an intermediary
organization and the other is the structured workstream.
Role of the Intermediary.
Key to the approach is the involvement of a local intermediary organization, which can fulfill a
number of functions:
 Links several municipalities together in a partnership arrangement;
 Facilitates the development of a Sustainable Energy Strategy by municipal authorities;
 Coordinates local government inputs to relevant national activities;
 Identifies barriers and constraints to the successful implementation of projects;
 Provides a certain amount of expertise and research capability, but more importantly, has
the contacts to be able to source specialist expertise as needed;
 Acts as a knowledge intermediary, making technical information accessible to partners;
 Promotes learning and capacity building of municipal partners, for example by running
suitable workshops and courses.
The intermediary should be an established, respected institution that deals with
urbanization and/or energy and has a grounding in applied research. Candidates include
universities, NGOs, and professional associations. However, the complexion of the intermediary
organization is important; for example, local government associations tend to be too political, and
some university locations may be too academic.
Structured Workstream.
A structured program of the following activities is designed to identify priority issues,
develop a strategy to address these, and act on the strategy:
1. Developing a State of Energy Report on each municipality – examine the energy supply
and demand (domestic, commercial, industrial, transport, and government), including
energy access and poverty, and environmental implications of energy use.
2. Undertaking primary research to fill information gaps evident from the State of Energy
assessments.
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3. Modeling energy’s future using a simple energy modelling package, or even a
spreadsheet. Considering energy use in the future based on, for example, population and
economic growth trends can help decision makers identify forthcoming problems, and plan
accordingly (discussed more later).
4. Developing a Sustainable Energy Strategy evolving from the previous activities that
identifies areas to be pursued, and assigns responsibilities and timeframes.
5. Implementation support so the intermediary organization supports the process by
facilitating, sourcing technical support, and communicating technical information to
partners. This is arguably the most critical area of work of the program.
The structured workstream described above, and the work of the intermediary organization in
particular, all serve to strengthen the capacity of municipal partners. Formal capacity building
activities have also been found to be effective:
 Networking events - municipalities share lessons from implementation of particular
projects.
 Week long ‘Masters Level’ courses – relevant not only to municipalities but also to
academics, consultants, NGOs, and development workers.
Networking not only facilitates lessons sharing, but builds relationships between municipalities
and enables the development of common positions resulting in a stronger voice to national
government.
The Changing (or not) Energy Characteristics of South African Cities
Given the multiple factors that are inevitably at play in an ever-changing energy sector,
what has the impact of such a dedicated local government support program been? The recent State
of Energy in South African Cities 2015 report provides an overview of the changes that are taking
place across the top cities in the country. Together with a range of other research reports, the
emerging picture is one of significant local government energy governance shifts, substantial
implementation in some sectors, and little movement, even deterioration, in others.
The Energy Picture.
South African cities are characterized by high transport fuel energy consumption, partly
associated with sprawling cities with poor public transport. Electricity is the second largest energy
source (Figure 1) supplying the residential, commercial, and much of the industrial energy needs.
Depending on the industrial sector characteristics of a city, there may be significant coal or heavy
furnace oil consumption in the energy profile. Electricity is accountable for the majority of global
warming emissions due to the carbon-intensive nature of national electricity generation, which is
mainly coal-based. Largely because of such electricity consumption but also because of their high
transport energy use, South African cities are amongst the more carbon-intensive globally (SEA,
2015).
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Figure 1: Typical metro energy use and carbon emissions (SEA 2015)
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Key Urban Energy Trends.
Overall, energy use in South African cities
has increased over the past decade, as expected in a
developing country with a growing population and
economy. This is substantially driven by transport
fuel increases, since absolute electricity
consumption has declined since 2007 (Figure 2 and
3) due to steep electricity price increases and to some
extent the global recession. The economy in many
urban areas is becoming less energy intensive, partly
because some cities are showing a small shift away
from manufacturing and industrial sectors towards Figure 2: Energy consumption over time in South African metros
the less energy-intensive financial and services (SEA 2015)
sectors, but the decoupling is also thought to be a
response to electricity price increases. This reduction in energy intensity is a positive trend, as the
national economy has been notoriously energy intensive due to historically low electricity prices.
Significant progress has been made with
electricity efficiency since 2007, both in the private
sector as well as in municipal operations. Although
this trend has been accelerated by the electricity price
increases, the focus on efficiency strategies and action
plans, awareness raising campaigns, private sector
energy efficiency forums and pilot projects that
preceded the price hikes is likely to have enabled a
more effective response to the situation. Within
municipalities, efficiency improvements in traffic Figure 3: Electricity consumption over time in South African
lights, street lights and buildings has been significant, metros, showing the decrease after 2007 (SEA 2015)
supported by a National Treasury Energy Efficiency
and Demand-Side Management (EEDSM) grant, and this has precipitated the institutionalizing of
electricity efficiency in local government operations in several cities. Another significant
development in the field of energy efficiency is the finalization of national building regulations
that specify minimum efficiency standards for all new buildings (SABS, 2011), although they are
not yet being widely applied mainly due to capacity constraints amongst municipal staff. However,
in spite of these positive steps, there still remain significant unexploited energy efficiency
opportunities, as reflected in the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (DoE, 2013) as well as a
recent assessment of efficiency opportunities in municipal operations (SACN, 2014). Amongst
these is lack of ceilings in the majority of the approximately 3 million government subsidized low
income households, resulting in poor indoor comfort levels and higher space heating energy
expenditures in winter.

International Journal of African Development v.5 n.1 Spring 2018

19

The renewable energy profile of cities is improving (Figure 4) with several methane from
landfill gas projects completed or underway and one significant wind generation project in place.
In addition, sewage methane is being explored and rooftop solar PV embedded generation
installation numbers are accelerating. Many municipalities have developed, or are in the process
of developing, regulatory and procedural guidelines to accommodate this increased interest in
embedded generation, as it is becoming ever more popular in light of consistently steep
conventional power price increases and renewable energy technology price decreases. Total
amounts of renewable generation, however, are still very small in relation to city purchases from
the national power grid – less than 0.3% of the total (SEA, 2015).

Figure 4: Municipal (led or assisted) renewable energy capacity (SEA 2015)

Access to electricity in South African cities is generally close to the national targets of 97%
access by 2025, with 10 of the top 18 cities having connection rates of 90% or above, and only one
being below 80% electrified (SEA, 2015). Several cities have programs to electrify informal
settlements, often using innovative approaches and appropriate technologies to move into this
previously marginalized sector (Gaunt et al., 2012).
Overall, carbon emissions from cities are decreasing per capita in terms of GVA despite
increases nationally (Figure 5). This has to do with the shifting nature of industries in urban areas,
but also the recent decrease in total electricity use. To a lesser extent renewable and other
sustainable energy interventions have contributed to this trend (SEA, 2015).
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Figure 5: Metro carbon emissions trends compared with national (SEA 2015)

In the urban transport sector, there has been limited progress however. In spite of the
Gautrain rapid rail project and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) projects being implemented in several
cities, the characteristic of urban transport is moving increasingly towards greater private vehicle
dominance, worse congestion, greater real household expenditure on mobility, and longer
commute times (DoT, 2013, DoT, 2014). Sustainable transport efforts are only likely to gain
traction within a supportive spatial planning framework, however, and unfortunately, the
development of South African cities has largely reinforced the apartheid spatial form of sprawling,
low-density urban spaces, with the poor often in far-flung settlements, resulting in inefficient and
expensive transport systems and reduced access to urban amenities by many households (CGTA,
2014). While a few urban areas have progressive spatial development frameworks or regulations,
urban form changes slowly, so even in these instances, it is not yet conducive to significant shifts
towards sustainable transport.
The State of South African Cities Report (SEA, 2015) indicates that urban energy-related
governance has made substantial progress over the past decade, with seventeen metros and
secondary cities developing sustainable energy strategies by 2011 from the first one in 2002 (SEA,
2013), and dedicated sustainable energy management capacity increasing exponentially. (In 2015,
there were over 35 dedicated staff dealing with sustainable energy matters in four leading metros,
which is an increase from zero in 2000.) In addition, the availability and collection of local-level
data to enable planning and track progress has improved markedly since 2000, prompted by
multiple data collection exercises (SEA, 2006; SEA, 2011; & SEA 2015). An overarching local
government sustainable energy strategy has been developed by the South African Local
Government Association (SALGA, 2014), and the engagement of many municipalities with
substantial renewable energy and energy efficiency projects indicates a departure from business as
usual practice. However, without external support, the fact remains that most municipalities
struggle to attend to sustainability projects that have longer-term benefits because of the pressing
demands of day-to-day service delivery.
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Evidence of Impact from the Support Program
Urban change is driven by multiple factors, including energy prices, technology
developments and prices, global warming pressures, national and local policy shifts, local political
interference, resource discoveries, and economic performance and structural changes. In addition,
in the past years, there have been several players active within the local government energy sector,
partly linked to the increasing recognition of their crucial role in a sustainable energy transition
and a resulting inflow of funding in this direction. It is therefore not easy to isolate the impact of
any one support program such as the initiative described earlier, albeit a longstanding and
extensive program. An independent review was undertaken in 2014 to this end which drew on
interviews with stakeholders as well as a review of tangible projects linked to the program. In brief,
the support given by the program was described as having a clear role in the following:
 initiating the development of nation-wide city energy data,
 facilitating energy efficiency programs in different sectors in several municipalities,
 promoting renewable energy (often rooftop solar PV) in several major cities,
 bringing local government perspectives to a range of key national policies and strategies,
 bringing energy and climate change issues into spatial planning for the first time, and
 institutionalizing sustainable energy and climate change issues within municipalities
(CDRA, 2015).
In six metros, the institutionalizing of sustainable energy has progressed significantly with
energy strategies being developed and staff compliments expanded significantly. Tangible change
has been evident, because of a range of factors, of which the above support is seen by stakeholders
as being amongst the significant ones. The support program facilitated a sharing of experience
with successful projects through research support, inter-municipal exchanges, site visits and
making technical expertise available. Implementation of the following has accelerated as a result:
 Installation of renewable energy capacity including electricity from landfill gas and waste
water gas, rooftop solar PV, biowaste and wind electricity;
 Energy efficiency measures including street lighting, traffic lighting, and buildings
efficiency.
Municipalities are generally conservative by nature and follow more readily than lead, so
effort invested in supporting the first municipalities generally has a multiplier effect, especially
when successes are shared via facilitated learning exchange events.
Making a Support Program Work in Practice
The experience from the last 17 years of working with municipalities has given insight into
a number of important principles for local government support programs. The approach needs to
be flexible enough to accommodate the following key operating principles:
 Because municipalities are by nature conservative, it is most effective to work primarily
with proactive partner municipalities, from which lessons can radiate to others. Selected
partner municipalities should be fast growing, have senior-level buy-in to the program, and
above all, they should be enthusiastic to participate.
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‘Outsiders’ cannot easily grasp the detailed inner dynamics of municipalities, which are
very often bureaucratically complicated as well as being subject to idiosyncrasies
associated with politics and power. It is, therefore, essential that the sustainable energy
strategy is led by the municipalities with the intermediary organization fulfilling facilitation
and support roles.
 It is important to make sure that the programs focused on are compatible with political
interests and strategic priorities; it may be appropriate to focus on specific sectors where
there is the most interest and alignment with municipal goals.
 Success depends on goodwill within the municipalities, so the program should support the
interests of key staff, even if this may not address highest priority energy issues, especially
at the early stages of working with municipalities. Once the benefits of the program are
appreciated, focus can shift more towards energy priorities.
 It is worth linking with the ‘champions’ within a municipality who are keen to see change.
Because change requires effort, little happens without people who have a specific
motivation and vision in this area.
It is important to emphasize that this is a long-term approach. In the absence of any clear
revenue streams, the support program will require external funding. Few local governments in
South Africa or Africa are likely to have the capacity, even in the long-term, to give adequate
attention to future sustainability concerns in the face of the more immediate service backlogs and
other urgent pressures. Supporting the capacity of local government can be funded by national
governments but comes with a risk of bringing national political interests to bear, which may not
be in the best interest of local government. Funding from development support donors is thus more
appropriate.
Energy Futures Modeling to Support Municipal Prioritization and Planning
Although just one of
a suite of support activities,
energy futures modeling has
played a significant role in
the support of South African
cities. As part of their energy
strategy
development
process, full-system energy
modeling
has
been
undertaken in five cities Thekwini, Ekurhuleni, Cape
Town, Buffalo City and
Polokwane. A provincelevel model has been
developed for Gauteng, and
Figure 6: Modeled energy consumption forecasts under Business-as-usual (Ekurhuleni)
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partial models have been developed in several other cities. Modeling the future has been found to
be an important motivator for change. If decision-makers can see the future impact of decisions
taken, or not taken, today, they are more likely to be proactive in this regard.
The accuracy of such modeling exercises is reliant on adequate data. While local-level
data is improving, it is still far from comprehensive or reliable (SEA, 2015). However, a decade
of experience with modeling (Winkler et al., 2005) shows that, even with substantially less-thancomplete data sets, it is a worthwhile exercise, because for strategy development purposes in a
municipality, a high degree of accuracy is not important. It is enough to demonstrate the broad
implications of current trajectories and different intervention choices. The futures modeling is
based on a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario, which is generally taken to be an expected future should
current trends continue (See Figure 6 as an example.). Different municipalities will customize
alternative, more sustainable scenarios based on existing policy frameworks and emerging priority
issues. For example, if decision-makers can see the cost of a future ‘business as usual’ energy
profile (e.g. Figure 7) and the potential cost savings of a different trajectory (e.g. Figure 9), they
are more motivated to change the trajectory. In addition, the modeling can show which
interventions are most critical to effect such change (Figure 8). Municipal officials are thus
equipped with facts and figures to help argue the case for change and negotiate the inevitable
political and bureaucratic inertia.

Figure 7: With energy cost increases and high growth, the city may face an expensive
energy future (Cape Town)
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Figure 8: Energy saving impacts of different sustainable energy efficiency interventions (Buffalo City)

Figure 9: Modeled cost savings from efficiency and renewable interventions (eThekwini)
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The modeling can also explore what is required to move a city’s carbon profile to one in
keeping with national or global mitigation ambitions. In South Africa’s case this is the peakplateau-decline trajectory defined in the National Climate Change Response White Paper (DEA,
2011). Through such an exercise, it is common to find that, even with a very ambitious set of
efficiency and renewable energy interventions, the carbon trajectory can only temporarily accord
with these ambitions (Figure 10), and in the decades to come, will start to depart from acceptable
levels unless more fundamental and hitherto undefined shifts in the energy sector emerge. The
difficulty of achieving a stable, declining carbon trajectory in the long-term is a concern the world
over, one which is mirrored in South African cities.

Figure 10: Even with significant sustainable energy implementation, emissions rise
above acceptable levels after about 2035 (Cape Town)

Although energy futures modeling is an important part of strategy development and the
local government support process, it must be seen as just one component of a general support
framework, and should be adequately embedded in such a process if it is to be of use. Elements of
the support program design mentioned earlier, including capacity building, participatory strategy
development and a strong implementation support component, are essential if change is to take
place.
Supporting Sub-Saharan African Cities with Sustainable Energy
Urbanization rates in Africa are amongst the highest in the world, and, as with South Africa,
the municipal capacity to undertake even minimum levels of urban planning and basic service
delivery is severely inadequate. This is acknowledged by institutions such as the African
Development Bank (ADB, 2011), UN-Habitat (2014) and Cities Alliance (Cities Alliance &
UCLGA, 2013); all of whom have noted the need for bolstering local government mandates,
capacity and resources. This includes the municipal role in sustainable energy transitions given the
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central role energy plays in welfare improvements and economic health, as well as its
environmental impact. In many African countries, the capacity challenges are even greater than
those faced by South African municipalities.
In general, although few outside of South Africa are electricity distributors, local
governments across Sub-Saharan Africa have strong roles in spatial and transport planning and
building plan approval. They also often manage solid and liquid waste streams, with associated
renewable energy opportunities. All of these have important direct links with sustainable energy.
Drawing on the experience in South Africa, the SAMSET project (SAMSET, 2013) has
been working with selected Sub-Saharan African municipalities at a detailed level since 2013. The
project is a partnership with universities and development organizations in Africa and the UK, and
six municipalities in Uganda, Ghana and South Africa. The project has identified intermediary
support organizations in each African country – one at the Institute of Statistical Social and
Economic Research at the University of Ghana, and one in the Faculty of the Built Environment
at the Uganda Martyrs University, in addition to Sustainable Energy Africa in South Africa. The
project is building the capacity of these organizations through their engagement with the structured
workstream described earlier, and they are in turn supporting local partner municipalities with
energy issues of relevance.
A central component of the project is to research and improve the knowledge exchange
process (Marvin & Silver, 2014), both amongst the project partners as feedback to improve activity
effectiveness, as well as more generally between local government and support organization
players – those aiming to be change agents to this sphere of government. Given the current frequent
misalignment of development support initiatives and local government needs discussed earlier, the
knowledge exchange framework being developed is seen as a core contribution to such
development support in Africa.
The municipal support work of SAMSET is in its early stages still and therefore impacts
and lessons are not yet apparent. To date, ‘state of energy’ surveys have been undertaken to
establish the problems and opportunities within municipalities, relationships with municipalities
have been formalized, capacity building events have been held, and coordination with key
stakeholders pursued. Energy futures modeling is in advanced stages and strategy development
work has started. The inter-municipal knowledge exchange events that have taken place to date
have revealed numerous transferrable learnings between the countries. This collaboration will
guide the full process of systemic change with the municipalities over the coming years, and the
longer-term plan is to roll out the approach and for the current intermediary support organizations
in each country, to capacitate further intermediary organizations in other African countries.
Conclusion
Given the rate of urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa and the lack of capacity in most
governments to respond to the expanding service delivery needs, the region may be facing a crisis
of global proportion. In Africa, there is a call for at least a partial localization of solutions. In
addition, there is a growing recognition of the potentially important role of municipalities in
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addressing the many challenges facing urban areas, including those associated with sustainable
energy transitions. This, coupled with the severe capacity shortages in municipalities, point to an
important focus for development support. The program described herein has had a positive impact
on the trajectory of South African urban areas and can make a contribution in bolstering municipal
abilities throughout Sub-Saharan Africa to respond to these challenges. It seems appropriate that
such approaches are given greater attention by development support institutions globally.
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The Impact of Motivation on Employee Performance in
Selected Insurance Companies in Nigeria
Oluwayomi Ayoade Ekundayo, Joseph Ayo Babalola University, Nigeria
Abstract
Motivation refers to a complexity of forces that inspires a person at work to intensify his
desire and willingness to use his potentialities to perform in order to achieve organizational
goals or objectives. This study investigates the relationship between motivation and the
level of employee performance as applied to some selected insurance companies in Lagos.
The study has three main objectives: to evaluate the effects of motivation on employee
performance in some selected insurance companies, to assess motivational factors that can
influence employee performance, and to recommend possible policies and innovations for
better performance of the employees and increased profitability. Structured Questionnaire
was used as the instrument for the research work. This instrument was tested for reliability
and validity of its content. The results of the tests were certified by experts. The study used
stratified random sampling and simple random sampling techniques in selecting the
respondents. A sample of 100 respondents which included management, senior and junior
staff members, of the selected insurance company was used for the primary data. Simple
percentages, distribution tables and pie chart statistical tools were used to analyse the
primary data while Chi-Square (X2) was applied to test the only hypothesis formulated for
the study at 0.05 level of significance. The findings revealed that motivation was the major
factor that affected employee performance. Furthermore, the study showed a direct strong
and positive relationship between motivation of employees and their performance. This
study hereby recommends that the management teams in organizations should always carry
out a thorough study on the various motivational tools that can appeal and motivate their
employees. Such motivational tools can include: involvement of employees in decision
making, rotation of employees, provision of fringe benefits, payment of bonuses to
workers, and promotion of deserved staff to higher positions of authority.
Keywords: motivation, employee performance, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
Introduction
Motivation can be defined as the complexity of forces that inspires a person at work to
intensify his desires and willingness to use his potential to perform in order to achieve
organizational objectives. According to Mile (2004), motivation is a condition which influences
the arousal, direction and maintenance of behavior. Human needs must be satisfied, and this can
cause the arousal of motivational forces. Koontz et al. (1990) opined that motivation of employees
is an important inner control tool and should be satisfied in order to attain advantages such as
increased employee commitment, increased productivity and efficiency. Motivation emphasizes
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result-oriented management through the setting of smart goals and effective communication
systems in an organization.
According to Koontz et al. (1990), employee performance refers to the efficiency and
effectiveness of employees in achieving organizational goals and objectives. They further stated
that employee performance could be evaluated by considering the level of absenteeism, quality of
reports, and the time of reporting for and leaving duty.
Statement of Problem
Towers, (2003) emphasized in his book titled, Working Today: Understanding What Drives
Employee Engagement, quoted by Adelanwa (2013), that employee motivation was the biggest
driver of organizational performance. He further stated that an organization that was able to
motivate its employees and maintain it would be able to leverage their zeal and drive in order to
ensure staff performance.
This study is therefore aimed at evaluating the impact of motivation on the employees and
the level of their performance.
Research Questions
1. Is there any relationship between motivation and employee performance?
2. Is it necessary to motivate employees before they can perform?
3. Should motivation of employees be limited to salary and allowances?
Objectives of the Study
This research study will evaluate the motivational factors that can influence employee
performance, assess effects of motivation on employee performance, and recommend possible
motivational policies and innovations for increasing the level of performance of the employees.
The independent variable in this study is performance while the dependent variable is motivation.
Motivation will be discussed using the following variables: salaries and wages, ICT training, fringe
benefits (e.g. house rent allowance, leave bonus, transportation allowance, luncheon vouchers),
staff training, provision for staff self-development benefits, length of service award to deserved
staff, along with others.
Research Hypothesis
1. There is no strong relationship between employee performance and motivation.
2. It is not necessary to motivate employees before they perform.
3. Motivation of employees should not be limited to salaries and allowances.
Scope of Study
The study focuses on the impact of motivation on employee performance and the
relationship between motivation and employee performance.
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Significance of the Study
The research will be of great importance to various organizations and groups of employers
of labor in assisting them in knowing different forms of motivation for better performance.
Literature Review
There are competitive environments among the various businesses and organizations.
Therefore, all employers of labor try to manage their overhead costs in order to retain their key
employees through motivation. The relationship between motivation and employee performance
is that employees tend to perform much better when they are positively and consistently motivated.
However, the employees perform less when they are poorly motivated. Therefore, motivation is
directly proportional to the performance of employees. Kreitner (1989) and Higgins (1994) in their
respective comments asserted that motivation is the psychological process that gives behavior,
purpose, direction and an internal drive to satisfy an unsatisfied need. Adelanwa (2013) referenced
Deci, Ryan and Roberts by saying,
Traditionally, motivation has been defined by the two dimensions that comprise it, namely:
energy and direction. The energy dimension of motivation is the driving force behind
someone’s efforts and persistence during engagement in a particular activity. Direction of
motivation determines the area or field of interest in which that effort is projected. Both
energy and direction are necessary elements of a complete motivational act. Energy without
a direction has no purpose, and direction without energy results in a state of no motivation.
(p. 56)
Different scholars have agreed and disagreed on the ways employees should be motivated.
Some of them assert that in order to motivate an individual, a financial reward is necessary by the
motivator whereas others believe that money is not a true motivator hence both financial and nonfinancial incentives are required. According to Cole (1998), financial incentives are rewards that
employees receive in consideration of their contribution towards the organization. Lindner (1998)
noted that monetary methods of motivation have little value, even though many firms still use
money as a major incentive. She adds that wages are normally paid per hours worked and workers
receive money at the end of the week, and overtime is paid for any additional hours worked,
whereas salaries are based on a year’s work and are paid at the end of each month. Chien-Chung
(2003) said, “Piece rate is the paying of a worker per item produced in a certain period of time.”
He asserted that this incentive increased speed of work and therefore, productivity. This was in
agreement with the earlier revelations made by Taylor (1911) who noted that the employees
considered piece rate as a practice of motivation. Doellgast (2006) believed that fringe benefits are
often known as ‘’perks’’ and are items which an employee receives in addition to their normal
wage and salary. These include: company cars, health insurance, free meals, education, and so on.
He asserts that these encourage loyalty to the company, and as such, employees may stay longer
with the company. Another believer of this school of thought includes Likert (2004).
An additional school of thought believes that non-financial incentives are the most
important motivators of human behavior in terms of the needs of human beings. These researchers
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believe that non-financial incentives such as training opportunities, job rotation and
communication styles are excellent motivators. The believers of this school of thought include
Herzberg (2000) and Fowler (2001). However, Clifton (2000) disagreed with the view that job
rotation does not actually lead to the motivation of employees. This practice only helps the
employees not get bored with their work but does not maintain a certain level of motivation in
employees.
A third school of thought believes that employee performance can be increased through the
provision of non-financial incentives such as goal clarity, knowledge of structures and feedback.
Believers in this school of thought are Knights and Willmott (2007), Peterson and Luthans (2006),
Rynes, Gerhart, Minette, and Edwards (2004) along with Taylor (1911).
Another school of thought believes that performance might not occur if the environmental
conditions are so unsuitable as to present insurmountable barriers to performance (Rynes et al.,
2004). These environmental conditions, they believe, include technology, training and experience,
abilities, and work-home balance. Technology, according to Samuel (2010), is a primary tool that
can be used to boost employee performance. Improvement in technology accompanied by training
of the employees can significantly increase their level of performance because it reduces the stress
that comes with doing the job manually. Scott (2000) defined ability as the capacity to learn and
perform the tasks required. He revealed that a good mixture of ability, training and experience is
the root cause of the best performance. He asserted that the best performing employees have at
least, two of the three factors. In addition, Berman (2001) wrote that as much as an employer might
not want to be affected by the personal life of his employees, personal problems can sometimes
affect employee performance. Managers need to be more sensitive to employee personal problems
and be prepared to discuss the issues with the employees when necessary. If an employee requires
time off to deal with a personal problem, Berman continued, then granting that time off would help
to show all other employees that the company values its employees. In all, motivation that leads
to productivity can be complicated.
Challenges of Motivation
Some of the challenges facing the application of motivation in organizations include
corporate culture, communication style, organization direction, decision making, and feedback
mechanism (Deci, 1975).
Theoretical Framework
This research study is based on the following motivational theories:
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory (1943)
Abraham Maslow in 1943 published a theory on what motivates human beings in his paper
titled, “A Theory of Human Motivation.” In it, Maslow said that human beings had five levels of
needs that they always sought to meet. The more the needs are basic for life, the more motivated a
person is to fulfil them. However, they would experience more stress if they failed or were unable
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to fulfil them. The five levels of need are: physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness needs,
ego-status needs and self-actualization needs.
Expectancy Theory of Motivation
This theory tries to explain and predict motivated behavior. It attempts to answer the
question: What determines a person’s readiness for motivated behavior? The theory draws on
thoughts from rational science, which includes human behavior as being controlled by a desire for
maximum use of a given behavior. The following formula can be used to explain the theory
(Atkinson, 1964).
Motivation = Expectancy x Instrumentality x Valence (E x I x V) where:
E = Expectancy, or “the relevant employee’s expectations that his performance leads to the desired
result, i.e. that the performance will be successful (Laegaard & Bindslev, 2006, p. 46).”
I = Instrumentality, or “the personal assessment of the probability of different rewards as a
consequence of successful task performance. Some rewards will in all probability occur while
others have significantly smaller or very poor probability (Laegaard & Bindslev).”
V = Valence, or “the value attached to these rewards by the employee concerned. Examples of
rewards are promotion, higher pay (increase in salary), time off, over-time pay, credit, and so on.
The factor V is the personal value of possible rewards and is often called Valence (Laegaard &
Bindslev).”
Management by Objectives (MBO)
This theory relies on the idea that “most human behavior depends on unconscious choices
related to objectives and intentions” (Laegaard & Bindsley, 2006, p. 48). All actions have a
direction and a desired result. Techniques for objective setting include the practical use of several
motivational theories, or of which the Expectancy Theory is a primary influence. The belief is that
the objectives and the process of objectives setting have positive influence on motivation that can
lead to better performance. Objectives, or goals, must be SMART. That is S = Specific, M =
Measurable, A = Ambitious and Attractive, R = Realistic, T =Time related (Laegaard & Bindslev).
McClelland’s Motivational Theory (1971)
David McClelland’s Theory begins with the management group, and he “focuses on three
meaningful needs which he believes are culturally acquired and therefore, possible to change
through training. He does not deal with progression and regression between needs but with the
needs/motives that have significant influence on productivity and efficiency in work life.
McClelland’s needs, which are often called APA needs, include:
1. Achievement Needs: This is the need to achieve high performance and to master difficult
and complex tasks.
2. Power Needs: This is a need to take responsibility, take charge, gain influence, and the
willingness to make a difference. McClelland distinguished between social power needs,
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i.e. the need to perform well for others and/or the entire company, and personal power
needs, i.e. the need to create personal gain.
3. Affiliation Need: This is the need for social interaction and need to create and maintain
friendships. McClelland believed that all people have different composition of the three
needs, but that one of the three needs is usually dominate (Laegaard & Bindsley, 2006, p.
54).
Research Method
A descriptive research design was used in carrying out this study. The purposeful sampling
technique was used to collect data from the management staff, underwriting department staff,
claims department staff, marketing department staff and accounting department staff of the
selected insurance organizations through the use of a structured questionnaire. One hundred copies
of the questionnaire were administered and collected. Distribution and frequency tables and
percentages were used for data presentation. A four Likert scale ranging from Strongly agree - SA
(4), Agree - A (3), Disagree - D (2), and Strongly disagree - SD (1) was used to measure the
adequacy of the data. Only one of the hypotheses was tested using the Chi-square [X2] statistical
tool.
Data Presentation, Analysis and Results
Table 1
Length of Service
Length of service
1-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16 years
Total

Frequency
16
34
28
22
100

Percentage
16
34
28
22
100

Valid %
16
34
28
22
100

Cumulative Percentage
16
50
78
100

Table 2
Wages and salaries as a factor of motivation
Motivation Levels Frequency Percentage Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree
10
10
10
10
Agree
18
18
18
28
Disagree
45
45
45
73

36

Strongly Disagree

27

27

27

Total

100

100

100

100
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Table 3
Fringe Benefits as Factor of Motivation
Fringe Benefits Frequency Percentage Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree
64
64
64
64
Agree
32
32
32
96
Disagree
4
4
4
100
Strongly Disagree
0
0
0
100
Total
100
100
100
Table 4
In-Service Training of Workers as Factor of Motivation
Employee Training Frequency Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree
76
76
76
Agree
20
20
96
Disagree
4
4
100
Strongly Disagree
0
0
100
Total
100
100
Table 5
Participation in Decision Making as Factor of Motivation
Decision Making Frequency Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree
4
4
4
Agree
8
8
12
Disagree
30
30
42
Strongly Disagree
58
58
100
Total
100
100
Table 6
Promotion as Factor of Motivation
Employee Promotion Frequency Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree
20
20
20
Agree
14
14
34
Disagree
46
46
80
Strongly Disagree
20
20
100
Total
100
100

International Journal of African Development v.5 n.1 Spring 2018

37

Table 7
Goal Clarity and Staff Performance as Factor of Motivation
Goal Clarity
Frequency Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree
24
24
24
Agree
56
56
80
Disagree
12
12
92
Strongly Disagree
8
8
100
Total
100
100
Note. Respondents were requested to indicate if goal clarity of an organization can help to
improve employee performance.
Table 8
Working Conditions as a factor for improved Performance
Working Conditions Frequency Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree
48
48
48
Agree
38
38
86
Disagree
8
8
94
Strongly Disagree
6
6
100
Total
100
100
Note. The respondents were asked to indicate if the working conditions can lead to improved
performance of the employees.
Table 9
Use of ICT as a factor for improved performance
Use of ICT
Frequency Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage
Strongly Agree
44
44
44
Agree
40
40
84
Disagree
10
10
94
Strongly Disagree
6
6
100
Total
100
100
Note. Respondents were asked if the use of ICT can lead to improved performance of the
employees.

38

https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/

Relationship Between Motivation and Employee Performance
Questions 1 to 6 of this section we analysed using Likert’s Scale.
Table 10
Code and value of responses
Option
Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

Code
SA
A
D
SD

Point
4
3
2
1

Total value == Total respondents x Point of categories
Mean Average Value (MAV) = Total value
Total response
Table 11
Mean average value (MAV) of items 1-6
No.
Questions
1 With the help of management, my
performance has improved
2 My performance reduced when it took my
employers long time to rotate the employees
3 I always perform my best when I know that I
am accepted at work
With the current motivational practices at my
4 working place, the performance of the
employees is reduced
5 Employees often endeavour to meet the set
goals/objectives which attract bonus payments
6 There is strong relationship between
employee performance and motivation

SA A D SD
25 40 10 25

Total Value
265

MAV
2.65

20

46

4

30

256

2.56

38

34 16

12

298

2.98

26

16 28

30

238

2.38

44

46

8

2

332

3.32

60

36

2

2

354

3.54

Testing of Hypotheses
The test was conducted with 95% confidence level and 0.05% level of significance, (n-1)
(c-1) degree of freedom.
The Chi-square (X2 ) formula is X2 = (Fo-Fe)
Fe
Where Fo = observed frequencies
Fe = expected frequencies
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i.e. expected frequency = Total Row x Total Columns
Grand total
i.e. TR x TC.
GT
H1: There is no strong relationship between employee performance and motivation.
From the table above, items 3, 4, 5 and 6 are used as data for this hypothesis.
Table 12
Responses to items 3-6 for relationship of performance and motivation.
Questions
3
4
5

SA
38
26
44

A
34
16
46

D
16
28
8

SD
12
30
2

Total
100
100
100

6

60

36

2

2

100

Total

168

132

54

46

400

Table 13
Chi-square calculation for observed frequency vs expected frequency.

40

Fo

Fe

Fo – Fe

[Fo-Fe]2

38
34
16
12
26
16
28
30
44
46
8
2
60
36
2
2

42
33
13.5
11.5
42
33
13.5
11.5
42
33
13.5
11.5
42
33
13.5
11.5

-4
1
2.5
0.5
-16
-17
14.5
18.5
2
13
-5.5
-9.5
18
3
-11.5
-9.5
TOTAL

16
1
6.25
0.25
256
289
210.25
342.25
4
169
30.25
90.25
324
9
132.25
90.25
=

[Fo-Fe]2
Fe
0.381
0.030
0.463
0.022
6.095
8.758
15.574
29.761
0.095
5.121
2.241
7.848
7.714
0.273
9.796
7.848
102.401
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/

Decision Rule
The rejection or acceptance of a null hypothesis is based on some level of significance as
a criterion. The null hypothesis is rejected if X2 calculation is greater than X2 tab and accepted for
H1. The degree of freedom at .05 level of significance is given by
(R-1) (C-1) = (4-1) (4-1) – (3)(3) = 9.
The calculated X2 = 102.401. The critical value at 0.05 level of significance and 9 degrees
of freedom is 16.919. Since the X2 calculated is 102.401 and the critical or table value at the 0.05
significance level and 9 degrees of freedom is 16.919, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the
alternate hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, there is a strong relationship between employee
performance and motivation.
Summary of Findings
This study demonstrates that the selected insurance company effectively and appropriately
applied positive motivation to make its employees perform extremely well. It also discovered that
there is a strong relationship between motivation and employee performance. The type of
motivation determined the level of performance of the employee. When positive motivation was
efficiently, skillfully and effectively applied, the level of employee performance increased and
vice versa.
Conclusion and Recommendations
From the summary of findings, it can be inferred that the type of motivation will stimulate
employees to perform very well and must be such that it will meet an employee’s desired needs
and expectations. Furthermore, motivation must be such that it will enhance an employee’s
promotion level and position, i.e. positive change.
This study therefore recommends that the insurance companies should always organize
self-development programs for their employees. They must organize training and retraining
programs as well. An employee must be moved to different departments in the insurance
companies so that every staff member will acquire an all-round experience and skills within the
organization. Hard work must be recognized and rewarded. All these recommendations, if put into
practice or use, will reduce laziness, idleness, frustration and high labor turnover.
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Does Inclusive Growth Matter for Regional Integration in Africa?
An Empirical Assessment
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Abstract
Inclusive growth is an important channel through which African countries can foster higher
regional integration especially through trade. This is because many African countries are
characterized by exclusive growth, small and fragmented domestic markets that are
landlocked and often prone to external shocks. Using an augmented gravity specification,
this paper conducts an empirical investigation of the relationship between regional
integration and inclusive growth in Africa. The adapted model is estimated using ordinary
least squares, Pseudo Poisson maximum likelihood estimator and the Blundell-Bond
system generalized method of moment estimator. The empirical results reveal that
inclusive growth plays a vital role towards intra-regional trade in Africa. The findings also
support the need to strengthen regional and national institutions as well as provision of
infrastructure. The paper makes a case for consistent and integrated national and regional
policies especially with respect to the pursuit of broad based growth.
Keywords: regional integration, inclusive growth, gravity model, panel data, Africa.
Introduction
Despite Africa’s enormous market potentials for trade in different products, given its
estimated population of over 1.11 billion as at 2013, the benefits from this positive trend is yet to
be harnessed due to the exclusiveness of growth in the continent. African consumers are unable to
enjoy the gains from regional markets primarily due to high poverty and income inequality
occasioned by growth without the “trickle-down” effect. Comparatively, as observed in the 2012
Seminar by the Philippines Institute for Development, high economic growth and lower population
growth reduced poverty but some areas still lag behind as East Asia continues to experience
inequality and persistent poverty. Intra-regional trade has occupied the centre stage of sub-regional
development policy with a view to improve the standard of living. Regional integration is an
important avenue for African countries to foster broad-based growth (African Development Bank,
2014). In line with the classical trade theory, this would imply removal of trade restrictions. The
link between trade and welfare can be traced to the growth channel (See, Dollar & Kraay, 2004).
Observably, weak global growth occasioned by contemporaneous recessions prompts a shift from
external to domestic and regional demand. Adequate income buffers that stabilize purchasing
power should concomitantly match adverse shocks. In general, growth in most African countries
has not been inclusive, as indicated by the relatively weak inclusive growth measures such as
household per capita spending, job creation, and accessibility to basic infrastructure.
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A striking feature of intra-regional trade in Africa is that the trend has been positive during
the period of 2011-2015. Evidently, Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) have dominated in this regard recording about USD3.3 and
USD1.9 trillion in terms of imports compared with the USD869 billion, USD1.01 and USD1.1
trillion recorded accordingly by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
(CEMAC), East African Community (EAC) and Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). The benefit of these positive trends may be difficult to harness due to inclusive
growth drag in Africa. For instance, household final consumption spending is quite low with
CEMAC recording USD2.5 billion in the 1991-1995 period to USD11.21 in 2011-2015 compared
with the EAC’s USD2.92 and USD19.99 billion during the same periods. Observably, AMU,
SADC and ECOWAS dominate in this regard recording, accordingly, USD81.45, USD35.36 and
USD27.83 during the period between 2011 and 2015. This obvious disconnect prompts this
empirical pursuit.
Although inclusive growth remains a critical component of regional integration especially
through income and consumption, it has not been given adequate attention in explaining intraregional trade. Based on data from the World Bank’s world development indicators, Africa lags
behind other continents in terms of inclusive growth measures such as employment, poverty,
access to basic infrastructure and inequality. This has prompted the analysis of intra-African trade
using augmented gravity specifications in order to analyze the responsiveness of bilateral trade
flows to income, distance, trade policy, bilateral investment treaties, FTAs, and other control
variables (Ajakaiye & Ncube, 2010; Akpan, 2014; Carrere, 2004; Ebaidalla & Yahia, 2014; Golit
& Adamu, 2014; Hatzenberg, 2011; Kayizza-Mugerwa et al., 2014; Ndulu, 2006; and Shuaibu,
2015). Evidently, these studies fail to account for inclusive growth, which is an important factor
especially in the context of Africa since it affects regional demand and invariably, the volume of
intra-regional trade. Further, very little attempt has been made to assess the interaction between
inclusive growth and regional integration. This motivates this paper, in addition to the fact that the
outcome of this research is expected to provide insight on regional and sub-regional trade and
development policy formulation and implementation.
On the methodological front, we observe the existence of a trade flow that has a bilateral
value equal to zero that may pose a selection problem. To overcome this challenge, we use
alternative estimation techniques such as the Pseudo Poisson Maximum-likelihood estimator
(PPML) following Silva and Tenreyro’s (2006) approach. These models explain the volume of
trade between countries through a Poisson distribution with a conditional mean that is
exponentially related to our set of explanatory variables. In addition to the use of the fixed effect
estimator, the panel causality test proposed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) that tests for Granger
non-causality in heterogeneous panel data is used to check for possible reverse causation. To
overcome selection bias associated with heterogeneity in gravity models, we account for
unobserved time varying country-pair heterogeneity through the use of fixed effect in the spirit of
Bergstrand, Larch and Yotov (2015). Moreover, Cheng and Wall (2004) opine that unless
heterogeneity is accounted for correctly, gravity models can greatly overestimate the effects of
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regional integration on the volume of trade.
Another important contribution of our paper is based on the empirical finding of a strong
persistence in aggregate trade data (Bun and Klaassen, 2002; De Benedictis & Vicarelli, 2005; and
Fidrmuc, 2009). They observed that countries engaged in trade with each other at time t-1 also
tend to trade at time t (intensive margin). We explore these dynamics by applying the dynamic
panel model that uses the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator (De Benedictis & Vicarelli,
2005). Finally, we subject our model to a battery of robustness checks to ascertain the potency of
our results to sub-samples (sub-regional groups) and alternative estimators. The findings provide
insight towards regional integration policy formulation and implementation, especially within the
context of inclusive growth that has continued to escape policy makers in Africa. The paper will
be organized as follows. Section 2 provides evidence on regional integration in Africa. Sections 3
and 4 discuss the methodology and empirical outcomes, respectively. Section 5 concludes the
paper and highlights some implications for policy.
Evidence on Regional Integration and Inclusive Growth in Africa
Regional integration has occupied the centre stage of the global trade system, and this is
particularly important for Africa as it lags behind other continents in terms of sustained inclusive
growth and development. There are several regional integration arrangements in Africa out of
which eight are regional economic communities: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), and six are inter-governmental organizations: the Central African Monetary
and Economic Community (CEMAC), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States
(CEPGL), the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the Mano River Union (MRU), the Southern
African Customs Union (SACU) and the West African and Monetary Union (UEMOA). Their
main objective is the pursuit of economic, social, political, technological and legal cooperation.
Such arrangements are deepened through the formation of customs and monetary unions, common
markets and a regional judiciary. They also seek to promote and liberalize inter- and intra-regional
trade through harmonized tariffs.
A striking feature of intra-regional trade in Africa is that the trend has been positive during
the review period across the sub-regional arrangements considered (See Table 1.). Evidently,
AMU and SADC have dominated in this regard recording about USD3.3 and USD1.9 trillion in
terms of imports compared with the USD869 billion, USD1.01 and USD1.1 trillion recorded
accordingly by CEMAC, EAC and ECOWAS. This positive trend may be explained by the
significant impact of regional trade agreements amongst member countries in the various subregional bodies, especially with respect to the harmonized common external tariffs. Concurrently,
intra-African exports have also exhibited a remarkable upward trend that mirrored the behavioral
pattern of intra-African imports.
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Table 1
Intra-African Trade Performance
AMU
CEMAC
EAC
ECOWAS
Period
Total Intra-Africa Imports (USD Billion)
1991-1995 346.83
72.20
134.17
143.44
1996-2000 374.34
131.34
227.46
194.93
2001-2005 597.51
188.67
354.82
344.83
2006-2010 1439.18
487.99
718.44
750.03
2011-2015 1967.37
869.26
1008.02
1077.53
Total Intra-Africa Exports (USD Billion)
1991-1995 266.32
34.07
109.63
146.85
1996-2000 284.54
36.53
185.60
214.81
2001-2005 506.19
64.47
286.06
342.82
2006-2010 1404.70
299.45
554.46
759.89
2011-2015 2272.04
498.24
810.39
1254.58
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics online

SADC
278.80
489.99
652.66
1654.39
3284.91
86.39
269.94
584.01
1327.31
3074.75

The inherent weaknesses of most African economies exacerbated the inclusive growth drag
observed in Table 2. Household final consumption expenditure is quite low across the board with
CEMAC recording USD2.5 billion in the 1991-1995 period and USD11.21 in 2011-2015. The
EAC also recorded USD2.92 and USD19.99 billion during the same periods. Observably, AMU,
SADC and ECOWAS dominate in this regard recording, accordingly, USD81.45, USD35.36 and
USD27.83. These developments may be traced to the resource dependence and less conflict-prone
countries in the sub-regions that recorded higher values. Although unemployment as a percentage
of total labor force has declined across the sub-regional bodies during the review period, the most
significant positive trends were recorded in AMU and ECOWAS while the EAC recorded the
highest share with 9.12% and AMU, CEMAC and ECOWAS documented a 5% average compared
with the relatively high value observed in the case of SADC.
Good governance and institutions have been identified as important drivers of intraregional exports (Shuaibu, 2015). Notably, the relatively low level of intra-regional trade in Africa
may be traced to the poor governance and weak institutions that have bedevilled the continent’s
overall development and sustained trade amongst African countries. For instance, all the subregions have recorded very weak regulatory quality, high corruption and political instability.
Evidence from the World Bank World Development Indicators reveals that between 2013 and
2014, the ECOWAS sub-region recorded a positive trend in terms of political stability and this
may have contributed to the improved intra-regional trade flows recorded at the time.
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Table 2
Inclusive Growth Indicators
AMU
CEMAC
EAC
ECOWAS
SADC
Period
Household final consumption expenditure (USD Billion)
1991-1995
21.49
2.49
2.92
3.40
9.81
1996-2000
29.02
2.42
4.86
4.30
13.08
2001-2005
30.72
3.72
5.52
6.81
14.22
2006-2010
51.12
7.71
11.75
15.18
25.46
2011-2015
81.45
11.21
19.99
27.83
35.36
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force)
1991-1995
12.40
800.17
18.69
16.62
742.59
1996-2000
3.61
134.91
10.23
7.05
141.64
2001-2005
1.63
19.65
6.46
6.27
41.15
2006-2010
5.36
8.04
9.75
6.49
10.99
2011-2015
5.45
5.65
9.12
5.16
8.13
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) (national estimate)
1991-1995
43.98
69.20
81.90
61.37
53.89
1996-2000
43.30
60.87
73.68
59.05
51.73
2001-2005
44.57
70.08
72.63
63.29
60.45
2006-2010
42.07
50.50
76.48
63.33
55.18
2011-2015
40.85
71.00
76.60
68.63
61.55
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators online
The concept of inclusive growth also involves access of the greatest number to the requisite
infrastructure. While teledensity and information and communication technology-related access
have improved significantly in Africa (World Bank Group, 2018), improved access to sanitation
facilities and improved water sources have been somewhat stagnant with minimal improvement
during the review period. In addition to the high incidence of poverty and low income in the
continent, this may also be explained by inadequate efforts by the government towards providing
these facilities for the rapidly growing population and attendant pressure on existing facilities.
Methodology
Analytical Framework
Given the plethora of analytical expositions, the main focus in the literature is a precise
estimation of the gravity equation. One important theoretical contribution in the gravity literature
is related to the structural form of the equation and the implication of misspecification or omitted
variable bias. In particular, the way trade costs and firm heterogeneity are incorporated in the
gravity equation as populated by the contributions of Anderson and van Wincoop (2001, 2003)
and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). The heterogeneity in firm behavior is mainly due to
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fixed and variable costs that are market specific and higher for international trade than for domestic
markets. Consequently, only the most productive firms are able to cover these costs and find it
profitable to export. The profitability of exports varies by country destination and is higher for
countries’ higher demand, but lower costs of exporting.
Link between inclusive growth and trade.
The framework of this study draws from the trade-welfare transmission channel developed
by McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2001) which illustrates how trade policy changes affect
households through increase in consumption, production and exports. We illustrate how trade
liberalization can offer considerable opportunities to poor households but also increase their
vulnerability in terms of its short- and medium-term adverse impacts. First, RTAs in form of freer
trade can translate into larger market for consumers with increased product varieties. Regional
integration can also lead to lower transaction costs (TC) and increased competition from foreign
producers (DD), and therefore lower prices for consumers which in turn leads to an increase in
household consumption (HC). An important feature of this channel is that it emphasizes the
households’ abilities to change income sources and consumption patterns in response to changes
in relative prices.
𝑅𝑇𝐴 → 𝑇𝐶 ↓→ 𝐷𝐷 ↑→ 𝐻𝐶
Second, RTAs can reduce trade costs for imported inputs used in the production process.
This translates to lower production costs (PC) that can in turn increase firm competitiveness (SS)
in local and international markets (EX). Increased competitiveness spurs business expansion, job
creation and higher household income. Trade liberalization can also change the composition of
goods produced by local firms. In a seminal paper, Aghion et al. (2005) argue that firms with
different capabilities tend to respond differently to increased competition. More competition can
result in re-allocation of resources from less productive to more productive export-oriented firms
(Melitz & Ottaviano, 2008). It can also lead to higher within-firm productivity through efficiency
gains as firms become exposed to more sophisticated intermediates and technology that increase
technical efficiency and capacity to expand production.
𝑅𝑇𝐴 → 𝑃𝐶 ↓→ 𝑆𝑆 ↑→ 𝐸𝑋 ↑
Finally, with increased competition due to RTAs, firms tend to focus more on products that
have comparative advantage and export more of these products (Bernard, Redding & Schott,
2007). This is particularly crucial for producers in developing countries that face significant
technological constraints in terms of access to adequate imported inputs. Alternatively, increased
household welfare leads to increased productivity and higher output which can lead to increased
output of exports. Increased household welfare also implies increased propensity to import a
variety of goods from abroad.
Empirical Model
The framework used in this study draws from the theoretical gravity model proposed by
Bergstrand (1989) for the following reasons. First, it is widely accepted in the literature. Second,
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it incorporates the modelling of multilateral trade resistance which accounts for omitted variable
bias in the estimated gravity coefficients (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2006).
In its traditional form, the gravity model predicts that bilateral trade flows (exports or
imports) between countries is determined by national incomes of the exporting and importing
countries and the geographical distance between them. The income (GDP) of the exporting country
indicates the supply capacity whereas the importing country’s GDP indicates the total demand.
The geographic distance between the countries is used to measure transport costs. The
multiplicative gravity equation is given by:
𝛼
𝛼
𝛼
𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 2 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗3
(1)
Further extensions have justified the inclusion of additional control variables in the gravity
model such as exchange rate risk variables including volatility and currency union (Bergstrand,
1985; Frankel & Rose, 2005; & Rose, 2000), geographical factors such as common border,
landlocked, island and remoteness (Feenstra, Romalis & Schott, 2002; Frankel and Rose, 2002;
Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; & Soloaga and Winters, 2001;), membership of RTAs (Baier and
Bergstrand, 2007, 2009; & Frankel & Rose, 2002). Including these additional factors in equation
(1) and taking the natural logarithm yields a log linear gravity model given as:
𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡 ) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 )  + 𝛼2 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 ) + 𝛼3 𝑙𝑛(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛼4 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 ) +
𝛼5 𝑙𝑛 (𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡 ) +𝛼6 𝑙𝑛(𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛼7 𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛼8 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼9 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼10 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 +
𝛼11 𝐼𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼12 𝐼𝐶𝐺𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼14 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡
(2)
Where 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the value of exports between country i and country j at year t, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 and
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 are respectively the national incomes for country i and j in year t and 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 is the
geographical distance between the major cities of countries i and country j. 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡 are
the population in country i and j in year t. GDP and population are the proxy for the supply and
demand capacities of the two trading countries respectively. RTAij is a binary variable assuming
the value 1 if i and j have a regional trade agreement (specifically, ECOWAS, SADC, EAC,
CEMAC, AMU) and 0 otherwise, lockij is a binary variable which assumes the value of 1 if
country i and country j are both landlocked countries, langij is a binary variable that takes the value
1 if i and j share a common official language and 0. Otherwise, borderij is a binary variable
assuming the value 1 if i and j share a common land border and 0 otherwise, colij is a binary
variable that takes the value of 1 if country i and country j share the same colonial history, INFij
is a measure of quality of infrastructure, INSTij is a measure of the quality of institutions. 𝛼0 is a
constant of proportionality.
An important aspect and thus contribution of this study is to show that inclusive growth
can foster regional integration through increased intra-regional trade flows between countries
(Bernard, Redding & Schott, 2007). This is particularly important in the context of African
countries where inclusive growth remains at the forefront of regional and national development
pursuit. Therefore, we use household final consumption expenditure to account for the effect of
inclusive growth for country i (𝐼𝐶𝐺𝑖 ) and for country j (𝐼𝐶𝐺𝑗 ). Alternative measures of inclusive
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growth used for robustness checks include percentage share of the population that have access to
improved sanitation and water source.
Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the two-way error component term 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗,𝑡 where 𝛾𝑖 is the
unobserved individual country-specific (exporter and importer) effects, and these are accounted
for through exporter (𝛿𝑖 ) and importer (𝛿𝑗 ) fixed effects – the multilateral resistant term. 𝜃𝑡 is
unobserved time effect, and 𝜇𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the remaining part of the stochastic disturbance term. All of
these fixed effects correct the biases from estimating panel data (Baldwin & Tagloni, 2006)
Apriori, the key coefficients of interest 𝛼11 and 𝛼12  are expected to be positive as higher
inclusive growth facilitates higher exports and stimulates higher imports. 𝛼1 and 𝛼4 are expected
to be positive as a high level of income and population in the exporting country denote a high level
of production ceteris paribus, which increases the exports of goods. The coefficients on𝛼2
and𝛼5 are also expected to be positive as a high income level in importing countries stimulates
higher imports. The distance coefficient 𝛼3 is however expected to be negative as it is a proxy of
all trade cost. Finally, the coefficients on lang, col, land and RTA are all expected to be positive
while the coefficient on border is expected to be negative.
Estimation Strategy
The estimation procedures carried out in this study are in two phases. The first stage entails
conducting baseline regressions using ordinary least square (OLS) regression. In this type of
regression, the individual-specific effect is a random variable that is correlated with the
explanatory variables. Therefore, we allow individual errors in different time periods to be
correlated (Hill, Griffiths & Lim, 2012). Secondly, the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) estimator is utilized. This method is appropriate because in the presence of
heteroscedasticity, the PPML estimator performs better since OLS is not efficient (Silva &
Tenreyro, 2006). The logarithmic linearization of an empirical model in the presence of
heteroscedasticity leads to inconsistent estimates because the expected value of the logarithm of a
random variable depends on higher-order moments of its distribution (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006).
There are two important methodological concerns associated with selection bias in gravity
models. The first concern is related to the bias that arises from multilateral resistance. Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003), who extended on Anderson (1979), showed that the flow of bilateral
trade is influenced by trade impediments that exist at the bilateral level (bilateral resistance) and
by the relative weight of these obstacles with respect to all other countries (the multilateral
resistance). To account for this bias, we control for time varying and time-invariant unobserved
country characteristics that are common to both countries. Rose and van Wincoop (2001) and Baier
and Bergstrand (2007) applied similar approaches to account for multilateral resistance terms.
The second source of methodological concern is related to selection bias associated with
the presence of heterogeneous firms operating internationally. Contrary to what is implied by
models of monopolistic competition à la Krugman (1979), not all existing firms operate on
international markets. Contradicting results find that only a few firms serve foreign markets
(Bernard, Redding & Schott, 2007; & Mayer & Ottaviano, 2008) and not all exporting firms export
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to all foreign markets, as they are generally active in a subset of countries. The critical resulting
implication of firm heterogeneity for modelling the gravity equation is that the matrix of bilateral
trade flows is not full since many cells have a zero entry, more frequently at the aggregate level.
The existence of trade flows that have a bilateral value equal to zero may signal a selection
problem. If the zero entries are the result of the firm choice of not selling specific goods to specific
markets (or its inability to do so), the standard OLS estimation of the gravity equation would be
inappropriate as it would produce biased results (Helpman, Melitz & Rubenstein, 2008). This is
primarily due to two reasons. First, it is not possible to raise a number to any power and end up
with zero, the log of zero is undefined, and zero-trade flows cannot be treated with logarithmic
specifications. Second, the zeroes are non-randomly distributed as they indicate the absence of
trade, hence suggesting that barriers to trade are prohibitive to allow a particular trade relationship
to take place at a given level of demand and supply.
Therefore, we also use the PPML, where the dependent variable is expressed in levels
instead of logarithms as suggested by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Poisson models were originally
applicable for count data, but as pointed out by Wooldridge (2002), they are also applicable when
using non-negative continuous dependent variables. These models explain the volume of trade
between countries through a Poisson distribution with a conditional mean that is exponentially
related to the set of explanatory variables. Other studies in the literature use the Tobit model to
deal with the zero valued trade flows (Andersen & Marcoiller, 2002; Rose, 2004). However, this
method has some shortcoming as it involves artificial censoring of small trade values which is
subject to measurement errors and biased results (Rose, 2000; & Silva & Tenreyro, 2011). We
tested the results against different measures of inclusive growth.
Data Description
The variables used for estimation are taken from different sources. The dependent variable,
i.e. the bilateral trade (export) flow between countries, is from the IMF, Direction of Trade
Statistics covering 49 African countries between 1990 and 2015 counting about 45,923 data points.
Exporters and importers’ nominal GDP, and GDP per capita income, population and real exchange
rate are taken from World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Bilateral distance, area and
other dummy variables (contiguity, official language, common colonizer, and whether the
countries are landlocked or not) are derived from CEPII database. Detailed variable description
and data source can be found in Table 3.
Table 3
Description of Variables used in Estimation
SN Variable
Symbol
Description
1

Regional
Integration

RI

Source
International Monetary
Intra-African Exports (million
Fund Direction Of Trade
USD)
Statistics
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Table 3 (continued)

2

Improved
sanitation facilities
ICG1
(% of population
with access)

3

Improved water
source (% of
population with
access)

ICG2

4

Household final
consumption
expenditure, etc.
(current US$)

ICG3

5

GDP at market
prices (current
US$)

GDP

6

Official exchange
rate (LCU per
US$, period
average)

ER

7

Control of
Corruption
(estimate)

INSTQ1

52

Improved sanitation facilities World Bank World
(% of population with access) Development Indicators
Access to an improved water
source refers to the
percentage of the population
using an improved drinking
water source.
Household final consumption
expenditure (formerly private
consumption) is the market
value of all goods and
services purchased by
households.
GDP at purchaser's prices is
the sum of gross value added
by all resident producers in
the economy plus any product
taxes and minus any subsidies
not included in the value of
the products.
Official exchange rate refers
to the exchange rate
determined by national
authorities or to the rate
determined in the legally
sanctioned exchange market.
Control of corruption
measures the extent to which
public power is exercised for
private gain, including petty
and grand forms of
corruption, as well as
“capture” of the state by elites
and private interests.

World Bank World
Development Indicators

World Bank World
Development Indicators

World Bank World
Development Indicators

World Bank World
Development Indicators

World Bank Institute.
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Table 3 (continued)

8

Political
Stability/No
Violence
(estimate)

9

Regulatory Quality
GOVN
(estimate)

POLSTAB

10

Population, total

POP

11

Mobile and fixedline telephone
subscribers (per
100 people)

INFRA4

Political stability and absence
of violence measures the
perceptions of the likelihood
that the government will be
destabilized or overthrown by
unconstitutional or violent
means, including domestic
violence or terrorism.
Regulatory quality measures
the ability of the government
to formulate and implement
sound policies and regulations
that permit and promote
private sector development.
Total population is based on
the de facto definition of
population, which counts all
residents regardless of legal
status or citizenship.

World Bank Institute.

World Bank Institute.

United Nations
Population Division.
2009. World Population
Prospects: The 2008
Revision
International
Telecommunication
Mobile and fixed-line
Union, World
subscribers are total telephone
Telecommunication/ICT
subscribers (fixed-line plus
Development Report
mobile).
And Database, And
World Bank Estimates.

12

Distance

dist

Geographical distance
Mayer And Zignago
between country of origin and
(2006) Index
destination

13

Distance

distcap

Simple distance (most
populated cities, km)

Mayer And Zignago
(2006) Index

14

Weighted distance distw

Weighted distance
(population-wt, km)

Mayer And Zignago
(2006) Index
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Table 3 (continued)

15

Weighted distance,
distwces
CES

16

Landlocked

17
18
19
20
21

22

23
24

Weighted distance (pop-wt,
km) CES

Mayer And Zignago
(2006) Index

Head, K., T. Mayer And
J. Ries, 2010
Head, K., T. Mayer And
Country code
iso
J. Ries, 2010
Head, K., T. Mayer And
Border dummy
border
J. Ries, 2010
Head, K., T. Mayer And
Common language comlang_off Common official language
J. Ries, 2010
Common colonial
Head, K., T. Mayer And
Colony
Colonial relationship
relationship
J. Ries, 2010
Head, K., T. Mayer And
Common coloniser Comcol
Common colonizer post 1945
J. Ries, 2010
Dummy if
currently in
If currently in colonial
Head, K., T. Mayer And
curcol
colonial
relationship
J. Ries, 2010
relationship
Colonial relationship post
Head, K., T. Mayer And
col45
1945
J. Ries, 2010
If countries were or are the
Head, K., T. Mayer And
Similar country
smctry
same country
J. Ries, 2010
landlocked

If both countries are
landlocked
Country code for origin and
destination country

Empirical Results and Discussion
The results of the basic regressions are presented in Table 4. Since the number of time
series observations (years) are relatively smaller than the number of cross-sectional observations
(countries), we do not need to worry about time series estimation procedures such as stationarity,
spurious regression and cointegration of the variables. The basic OLS results are presented in the
first three columns and the last three present the results for the PPML. The coefficients of inclusive
growth are positive and significant, as expected, in all the regressions, suggesting that inclusive
growth exerts a positive impact on export flows within Africa. As expected, economic size (GDP)
positively influences exports and imports while population only influences exports. For all models,
the coefficients on the income elasticities of exporters' and importers’ GDP are far below the
theoretical value of 1. However, both GDP and population coefficients are not significant in the
regressions where inclusive growth is measured by household final consumption expenditure.
Distance negatively affects trade flows, suggesting that trade decreases with greater distance
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between country-pairs due to increasing trade costs. The landlocked dummy is also significant and
negative for both exporting and importing countries, implying that countries are also likely to trade
less with other countries due to higher trade costs.
The results also show that countries that share the same border and language are likely to
trade more than countries that do not share the same border and speak different languages. The
presence of telecommunication infrastructure and effective institutions that control corrupt
practices especially along the borders of exporting and importing countries are likely to increase
trade between country-pairs. In line with a priori, the regional trade agreements between countrypairs have a positive effect on trade and the potency of the impact is higher for SADC and EAC
relative to ECOWAS. However, no effect was observed for CEMAC and AMU sub-regions. These
results are robust to the exclusion of zero trade flows as suggested in the literature.
Table 4
Regression results for regional integration and inclusive growth
The dependent
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
variable is
Intra-African
Exports (million
OLS
OLS
OLS
PPML
USD)
ICG1 (exporter) 0.707***
0.056***
(0.125)
(0.010)
ICG1 (importer)
0.223*
0.017*
(0.125)
(0.010)
ICG2 (exporter)
1.638***
(0.308)
ICG2 (importer)
1.053***
(0.259)
ICG3 (exporter)
1.270***
(0.266)
ICG3 (importer)
0.361*
(0.253)
GDP (exporter) 0.368***
0.539***
-0.192
0.031***
(0.108)
(0.092)
(0.226)
(0.008)
GDP (importer) 0.564***
0.542***
0.397
0.045***
(0.100)
(0.088)
(0.217)
(0.008)
Population
0.572***
0.446***
-0.040
0.043***
(exporter)
(0.113)
(0.107)
(0.104)
(0.009)
Population
0.097
0.143
-0.045
0.008
(importer)
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(5)

(6)

PPML

PPML

0.128***
(0.026)
0.083***
(0.021)

0.044***
(0.007)
0.043***
(0.007)

0.092***
(0.021)
0.027*
(0.020)
-0.009
(0.018)
0.032
(0.017)

0.033***

-0.003

(0.009)

(0.008)

0.011

-0.004
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Table 4 (continued)
Distance

(0.099)
-1.567***
(0.135)

Official
common
language

0.926***

(0.093)
-1.494***
(0.134)
0.816***

(0.100)
-1.484***
(0.140)
0.900***

0.076***

Border
Landlocked
(exporter)

-1.192***

-1.189***

-0.955***

-0.096***

-0.096***

-0.078***

(0.167)

(0.165)

(0.181)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.015)

-0.818***

-0.810***

-0.771***

-0.064***

-0.064***

-0.060***

(0.165)

(0.169)

(0.178)

(0.013)

(0.014)

(0.014)

0.744***

0.683***

0.703***

0.059***

0.054***

(0.111)

(0.110)

(0.114)

(0.009)

(0.009)

(0.009)

0.203*

0.243**

0.222*

0.016*

0.018**

0.018**

(0.105)

(0.109)

(0.115)

(0.008)

(0.009)

(0.009)

0.008***

0.007***

0.005**

0.001***

0.000***

0.000**

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.005***

-0.009***

-0.008***

-0.000***

-0.001***

-0.001***

(0.002)
1.178***
(0.282)
1.304**
(0.625)
0.738***
(0.256)
0.194
(0.488)
-0.164
(0.423)
-11.185***
(1.985)

(0.002)
1.377***
(0.270)
1.534***
(0.571)
0.445*
(0.261)
0.278
(0.490)
0.151
(0.394)
-21.820***
(2.452)

(0.002)
1.272***
(0.294)
1.799***
(0.611)
0.509*
(0.266)
0.180
(0.493)
0.280
(0.407)
-16.369***
(2.168)

(0.000)
0.109***
(0.019)
0.125***
(0.043)
0.041**
(0.021)
0.033
(0.038)
-0.024
(0.031)
-0.208
(0.197)

(0.000)
0.098***
(0.021)
0.144***
(0.045)
0.046**
(0.020)
0.024
(0.038)
-0.009
(0.028)
0.283*
(0.165)

INSTQ1
(importer)
INFRA4
(exporter)
INFRA4
(importer)
SADC
EAC
ECOWAS
CEMAC
AMU
Constant
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(0.000)
0.095***
(0.020)
0.109**
(0.047)
0.065***
(0.020)
0.026
(0.038)
-0.046
(0.030)
0.620***
(0.155)

(0.011)
0.070***
(0.020)

0.074***

(0.141)
1.037***
(0.273)

INSTQ1
(exporter)

(0.011)
0.057***
(0.020)

0.068***

(0.008)
-0.115***
(0.011)

(0.140)
0.874***
(0.274)

Landlocked
(importer)

(0.154)
0.887***
(0.275)

(0.008)
(0.007)
-0.123*** -0.117***
(0.011)
(0.011)
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(0.012)
0.058***
(0.020)

0.055***

Table 4 (continued)
year*exporter
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
FE
year*importer
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
FE
Observations
13,803
13,596
12,281
13,803
13,596
12,281
Adj. R-squared
0.45
0.45
0.44
Source: Authors Calculation using STATA 13
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of export flows (in Million USD) and is computed at
the country-pair and year level. Columns 1 present the key results where inclusive growth is
measured by improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access). Columns 2 and 3 present
the results where inclusive growth is measured by improved water source (% of population with
access) and Household final consumption expenditure (current US$) respectively. All regressions
are estimated with year*importer and year*exporter fixed effects. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis below the estimated coefficients are clustered at country-pair level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Further Analysis: Dynamic Gravity Equation
As a preliminary test to the system GMM estimation, common and individual coefficient
panel causality tests were carried out to check for possible reverse causation. These tests make
different assumptions about homogeneity of the coefficients across the cross sections. On one
hand, the common coefficient test treats the panel as homogenous in the standard Granger causality
sense and does not allow the data from one cross section to interact with lagged values of the data
from the next cross section. However, this does not account for heterogeneities across countries.
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) propose an alternative assumption that allows all coefficients to
vary across cross sections. We present evidence of reverse causation between regional integration
(RI) and two measures of inclusive growth (ICG1 and ICG3) but observed a one-way causal
association in the case between RI and ICG2. This finding is reinforced by the panel Granger
causality test that assumes homogeneity in the cross sections. These estimation results are not
presented in this paper but are available upon request.
Thus, we explored dynamic interaction in the gravity model for two reasons. First, due to
the behavior of export which is assumed to be autoregressive (Costantini & Melitz, 2008); and
second due to strong persistence found in the aggregate trade data (Bun & Klaassen, 2002; De
Benedicts & Vicarelli, 2005; & Fidrmuc, 2009). We explored these dynamics by applying the
dynamic panel estimation model that uses the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator (De
Benedicts & Vicarelli, 2005). Finally, the validity of the instruments was tested using the
Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which considers the sample analogy of the
moment conditions used in the estimation process.
The results of the GMM estimator are presented in Table 5. The Sargan/Hansen tests of over
identifying restrictions are satisfactory, as is the Arellano–Bond test for AR (2) errors. We find
very significant evidence that intra-African trade flows are autoregressive, which is consistent with
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Costantini and Melitz (2008). Most importantly, inclusive growth is found to be a significant
determinant of intra-African trade flows. The GMM estimates in column 1, for example, suggest
that a percentage point increase in improved sanitation facilities increases trade flows for the
exporting country by 1.30 and 0.48 percentage points for the importing country. The results are
stronger when inclusive growth is measured by improved water source, recording 2.13 and 1.39
percentage points for the exporting and importing countries, respectively.
Table 5
Regression results for the dynamics of regional integration and inclusive growth
The dependent variable is
(1)
(2)
(3)
Intra-African Exports (million
USD)
GMM
GMM
GMM
lag(Intra-African Exports)
-0.136***
-0.143***
-0.067**
(0.031)
(0.031)
(0.035)
ICG1 (exporter)
1.303***
(0.267)
ICG1 (importer)
0.477**
(0.228)
ICG2 (exporter)
2.130***
(0.626)
ICG2 (importer)
1.390**
(0.571)
ICG3 (exporter)
1.418***
(0.527)
ICG3 (importer)
0.136*
(0.540)
Distance
-1.528***
-1.424***
-1.126***
(0.217)
(0.228)
(0.220)
GDP (exporter)
0.647***
0.570***
-0.243
(0.173)
(0.192)
(0.474)
GDP (importer)
0.386*
0.321
0.585
(0.201)
(0.214)
(0.493)
Population (exporter)
0.343*
0.490**
-0.124
(0.178)
(0.207)
(0.193)
Population (importer)
0.434**
0.522**
0.385*
(0.191)
(0.219)
(0.200)
Official common language
0.658***
0.683***
0.739***
(0.224)
(0.229)
(0.228)
Border
0.859**
1.037**
0.926**
(0.417)
(0.405)
(0.401)
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Table 5 (continued)
Landlocked (exporter)

-1.173***
-1.433***
-1.134***
(0.280)
(0.278)
(0.286)
Landlocked (importer)
-0.930***
-1.010***
-0.975***
(0.287)
(0.289)
(0.289)
INSTQ1 (exporter)
0.344**
0.475***
0.346**
(0.140)
(0.142)
(0.134)
INSTQ1 (importer)
0.277*
0.349**
0.302**
(0.148)
(0.147)
(0.142)
INFRA4 (exporter)
-0.000
0.004
0.002
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
INFRA4 (importer)
-0.002
-0.006
-0.006
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
SADC
2.180***
2.609***
2.428***
(0.410)
(0.394)
(0.405)
EAC
1.603*
1.757**
2.505***
(0.882)
(0.797)
(0.752)
CEMAC
-0.546
-0.443
-0.044
(0.868)
(0.879)
(0.777)
ECOWAS
1.505***
0.757**
0.734**
(0.407)
(0.383)
(0.369)
AMU
-0.128
0.516
0.601
(0.461)
(0.453)
(0.440)
Constant
-16.190***
-25.890***
-18.515***
(3.510)
(4.198)
(3.609)
year*exporter FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
year*importer FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
-1.41 (pr>z = -1.08 (pr>z = -1.22 (pr>z =
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)
0.116)
0.148)
0.221)
2
2
7191 (pr>χ = 7067(pr>χ = 6583 (pr>χ2 =
Sargan Test
0.000)
0.000)
0.000)
Number of observations
7,011
7,043
6,329
Number of groups
576
576
551
Source: Authors Calculation using STATA 13
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of export flows (in Million USD) and is computed at
the country-pair and year level. Columns 1 present the key results where inclusive growth is
measured by improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access). Columns 2 and 3 present
the results where inclusive growth is measured by improved water source (% of population with
access) and Household final consumption expenditure (current US$) respectively. All regressions
are estimated with year*importer and year*exporter fixed effects. Robust standard errors in
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parenthesis below the estimated coefficients are clustered at country-pair level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conclusion and Policy Implications
The need to increase the volume trade amongst African countries cannot be downplayed
given the enormous market potential of the region. However, Africa’s growth has at best been
exclusive as the benefits of aggregate growth have not benefited the larger majority. This has been
exacerbated by the high incidence of poverty and inequality recorded in African countries.
Instructively, we argue that inclusive growth can play a very crucial role towards boosting intraAfrican trade given the fact that it visibly improves welfare and household income, thereby
expanding their spending space. In the absence of broad based growth that improves the purchasing
power and welfare of households, the quest for higher intra-African imports and exports remains
a mirage.
Therefore, this paper sought to ascertain whether inclusive growth matters for increased
intra-African trade. Predicated on a gravity specification that accounts for alternative measures of
inclusive growth, the model was estimated using static and dynamic panel data analysis techniques.
From the empirical analysis conducted in this paper, some key findings emerge. It was observed
that the traditional gravity model variables (GDP, population, bilateral distance, common border,
common official language, and landlockedness) are found to be important determinants of bilateral
trade flow in Africa. Besides these factors, improved infrastructure and better institutional
framework also influence multilateral trade flow within the continent. As measured by GDP of
exporting and importing countries, production capacity and demand potential also positively affect
trade between countries. Geographic distance and landlockedness are found to be detrimental to
intra-regional trade. Another important finding is that landlocked countries incur higher per unit
cost of export and import and therefore, such countries tend to trade less compared to those
countries with access to international waters. Cultural ties between the trading partners was found
to be trade creating.
The empirical findings show mixed results related to the contribution of regional economic
communities (RECs) on intra-regional trade in Africa. The result from the traditional gravity
model shows that three of the RTAs (SADC, EAC and ECOWAS) have created trade among the
members. On the other hand, CEMAC and AMU have not contributed to the promotion of trade
between member countries. The quantitative evidence presented in this paper provides insights
regarding the link between regional trade integration and inclusive growth. Specifically, the need
to tackle important binding constraints such as poor infrastructure, weak institutions and the
exclusiveness of growth with a view on boosting intra-African trade remains critical for the region.
The importance of these issues has been underscored by the African Development Bank’s (AfDB)
long term regional integration policy and strategy plan.
Our findings do not make a case for the formulation and implementation of new policies;
rather, it makes a case for implementing the existing regional trade and inclusive growth policies.
This would particularly require strengthening institutional capacities and higher sub-regional
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socio-economic cooperation. This means that at the sub-regional level, there is a need to ensure
that inclusive regional integration policies are pursued by member countries. This is because the
sub-regional bodies can serve as a potent medium for developing infrastructure, and increase
financial integration as well as leverage trade, investment and value chains. This will no doubt
reduce the cost of trade and increase trade facilitation through the removal of trade restriction. This
can be done by strengthening and harmonizing regional trade arrangements such as the common
external tariff as well as other multilateral protocols related to free movement of persons, goods
and services.
Another important policy implication from our findings is related to Africa’s weak
infrastructure which negatively affected its competitiveness, productivity, and share of global and
intra-regional trade. This makes a case for a regional approach towards infrastructure development
especially in the ICT, power and water sectors, amongst others. On the other hand, regional
infrastructure should be made accessible and affordable. For instance, regulated pricing and
subsidy may be considered to help protect vulnerable groups and households from being excluded.
At the same time, local content-based development should be considered.
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Abstract
This research employs Bourdieu’s theory of habitus to explain the disposition of the donor
community to integrate indigenous knowledge systems and practices into development
projects. The theory’s objectivist perspective specifies the mechanism that links structural
conditioning to social practice and regularities. It holds that power is culturally and
symbolically created, and it is constantly re-legitimized through the interplay of agency
and structure. This facilitates an analysis of the development field as social space
characterized by indigenous and donor power relations. It argues that the reinforcement of
indigenous knowledge as the main channel for development will generate transferable local
capacities and set new energies in motion in Africa that will greatly reduce the prevailing
inequalities on the continent.

Introduction
This article employs Bourdieu’s theory of habitus to explain the disposition of the donor
community to integrate indigenous knowledge systems and practices into development projects.
The analysis is built on Bourdieu’s objectivist perspective which specifies the mechanism that
links structural conditioning to social practice and regularities. It uses this insight to explore
indigenous knowledge, being the idea of “local ownership” in development, as a “cultural and
symbolic capital” in the development field where the interplay of indigenous and donor ideas
produces outcomes. The aim is to analyze indigenous practices as a cultural capital for resisting
wholesale imposition of knowledge.
The argument is articulated in twofold: the first part situates the analysis in Bourdieu’s
theory of practice, i.e. Bourdieu’s habitus, to analyze the development field as social space
characterized by forces of power relations (indigenous and donor). Indigenous epistemic systems
are increasingly regaining recognition as a critical strand of thoughts in opposition to the modernity
perspective (Shiza & Abdi, 2014). In the second part, we advocate for a paradigm shift on
development thinking and practice that reinforces the role of indigenous knowledge, not as a
privilege but as a standardized means for development practice. We took the argument up from a
general understanding as the need for local participation in development (Sillitoe, 1998) urging a
necessity to bolster indigenous knowledge over donor ideas in the development practice. Our view
is not far from Shiza and Abdi’s observation that anchoring African knowledge and development
is a way of disrupting the global ethno-racial hierarchy to present African ideas of development
on the global scale on equal terms to other paradigms. We argue that the use of indigenous
knowledge as the main channel for development will generate transferable local capacities and set
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new energies in motion in Africa that will curb the prevailing crisis of development on the
continent.
The concept of development itself remains a very controversial issue as it tends to mean
different thing to different people. As we do not intend to go into the muddled debate on the
meaning of development, for this paper, we will adopt a definition that views it as being a process
that encompasses the needs and means by which to provide better lives for people in the poorest
countries. This definition of development is not only restricted to economic prosperity, but also
includes the provision of education, health, food and a sustainable environment which together
constitute essential ingredients of human development. Taken from this perspective, we agree that
Africa remains one of the poorest continents in the world as most of its people are still mired in
poverty despite the significant decline in world poverty in recent years.
The current dismal state of development coupled with the absence of social equity in
present-day Africa makes the achievement of an intergenerational equity almost impossible.
Works devoted to explaining why Africa has not been able to achieve the level of development
deemed necessary for a sizeable portion of its population abound. Mainstream development
studies, mostly in anthropological literature, attributed the adoption of indigenous knowledge (IK)
in development projects to the failure of top-down, fabricated development frameworks that has
dominated development strategies for decades. The dominant argument on the inclusion of
indigenous knowledge (local ownership), particularly in anthropological literature, in development
projects in non-Western societies is that its adoption will enable development agencies and NGOs
to achieve desired universal human conditions. Similarly, the tremendous progress made by China
and India in the past few decades has further reduced Africa to the continent with the highest
number of people living below the poverty line with one dollar a day or less (Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2010).
There is therefore a persistent antagonism amongst scholars and practitioners alike as to
the best approach that can lead Africa out of its current development problems. While some
scholars have suggested that the problems of the continent can best be resolved by promoting
economic growth; others argue that institutional reforms are the panacea to Africa’s lasting
problems. The only unanimity amongst most scholars is that their respective approaches are based
on a Eurocentric perspective that further reinforces the notion of European exceptionalism. We
address the different facets of the complex approaches to Africa’s near to endemic development
challenges in the section on the development debate. This section reviews the status of the
development debate with the aim of answering the question of how indigenous knowledge can be
harnessed to speed up development in African communities.
This paper is divided into three main sections. The next part recapitulates the development
debate beginning from the growth theories of the 1940s to the present dominant neoliberal school
of thought. The second part of the paper builds on the analysis of the theory of habitus that roots
indigenous knowledge of development in an understanding of embodied capital of local people.
The disposition of the donor community to integrating indigenous knowledge systems and
practices into development projects is argued in the third section that focuses on situating
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indigenous knowledge in development practice and evaluates the application of indigenous
knowledge in healthcare using the example of Burkina Faso.
The Development Debate
The debate over the desirability of modern forms of development has been the object of
extensive study in development theory by both those that support it and those that oppose it
(Rabbani, 2011). The debate between advocates and critics of development revolve around the key
question of why countries of the global South and most specifically Africa have not been able to
develop and lift themselves out of poverty in the same way as countries of the West and those of
East Asia. A wide range of scholarly works have been published by experts from different
disciplines to explain the development dilemma and several debates have probed the most suitable
solutions to the unending development challenges (Ashcroft, 2011; Murithi, 1997; Savage, 2013).
Development economics research has for the most part been preoccupied with trying to
explain the causal reasons why some countries are rich and others not, why some countries, peoples
and communities develop while others stagnate, and the structural factors that distinguish countries
that enjoy high levels of development and those that still face astonishing levels of backwardness.
Most importantly, development theory has placed emphasis on what can be done to strengthen the
experience of the rich countries to alleviate the suffering of the poor (Barrett, 2008).
This debate dates back as far as the 1940s when it was essentially dominated by fierce
exchanges between the modernization and dependency schools of thought. The 1950s saw the birth
of decolonization in many third world countries, and these freshly decolonized territories
embarked on a frenetic process of catching up with the levels of development enjoyed by the
countries of the West. Development at this stage was viewed from a growth perspective and
development efforts focused on achieving growth of the Gross National Product (GNP). The main
idea behind this Western model of development was to reproduce the same economic prosperity
found in the West in the freshly decolonized countries. The driving force behind this approach to
development was the belief that such GNP growth would generate higher per capita incomes that
would trickle down from the top to the bottom of the society for the mutual benefit of all (Ewane,
2004; Von Kimakowitz, 2012).
The Harrod-Domar growth model provided the normative background for the reliance on
GNP growth as a means of achieving development, which dominated development thinking
throughout the 1950s. The model that was developed by Sir Roy Harrod in 1939 and Evsey Domar
in 1946 is a growth model that states that the rate of economic growth in a country is dependent
on the level of savings and the capital output ratio. It posits that a high level of saving in a country
provides funds for firms to borrow and invest. Investment can increase the capital stock of an
economy and generate economic growth through the increase in production of goods and services.
The Harrod-Domar model argues that governments of developing countries need to encourage
saving and support technological advancements to decrease the economy’s capital output ratio to
attain economic growth (Solow, 1956). This model inspired other theorists to further conceptualize
on growth as a means of achieving development in the poor countries. Theories such as the Big
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Push, balanced growth, development growth poles and the stages of growth theory by W.W.
Rostow were born out of this growth model.
The Big Push theory developed by Rosenstein-Rodan in 1943 mainly argues that a
comprehensive investment package, or big push, is necessary to generate economic growth. It
holds the view that a huge amount of resources must be attributed to economic programs for such
programs to produce the desired results. In other words, economies of scale will be achieved in
underdeveloped countries if so many mutually supporting industries, which depend on each other,
are created. The theory believes that even the simplest activity requires a network of other
activities, and that individual firms cannot organize such a large network, so the state or some
other giant agency must step in. However, the big push came to grief in the 1970s and 1980s as
evidence accumulated that, in Africa at least, public investment and foreign aid had produced no
perceptible change in productivity, not the least because so much of it was stolen. Recently,
though, the idea has come back into vogue. At the UN, discussions always focus on its millennium
development goals, and some scholars argue that if public investment and foreign aid are big
enough, they will boost household incomes, spur savings and boost local investment. They should
also “crowd in” external investment by improving infrastructure (The Economist, 2011).
Nurkse’s theory of balanced growth published in 1953 was geared towards eliminating
structural underdevelopment, especially as it sees limited market opportunities as being the
impediment to development. The theory identifies the shortage of real capital as the main
bottleneck in economic development, and it is both the starting point and end of a causal chain. It
requests that governments must mobilize all potential sources of capital for investment to be made.
Nurkse sees development as simply being an extension of the market and increase in production
that includes agriculture. The theory assumes that there is the willingness and ability for rational
investment decisions in a traditional society. His diagnosis of ‘underdevelopment’ and policy
suggestions are strictly confined to economics. His opus has been attacked for neglecting noneconomic factors in development, such as failure to consider capital formation in education, skills
and health (Bass, 2009).
The development pole theory elaborated by Perroux in 1950 suggests that economic
growth, interregional equilibrium and integration of underdeveloped regions could be achieved
through a strategy of decentralized development. The underlying assumption here is that beneficial
spread effects would be generated from the induced poles to their peripheral areas. Perroux argued
that growth does not occur everywhere at the same time but in points or growth poles with variable
intensities. It is therefore from the growth poles that development spreads along different channels
and would have spillover effects for the whole country or region (Serra, 2003).
The main argument of Rostow’s theory of stages of growth is that economic growth is
based around a relatively short period of two or three decades ― when the economy and the society
of which it is a part transform themselves in such ways that economic growth is, subsequently,
more or less automatic (Rostow, 1956). The theory describes five stages through which all
societies pass and analyzes the long-term processes of economic development from an economic
history perspective. Rostow assumes that the traditional society has 75% of the population working
International Journal of African Development v.5 n.1 Spring 2018

67

in food production, and political power is wielded by landowners or a central authority that is
backed by the army and state bureaucracy. This theory came under criticism because of its inability
to explain why some countries witness progress and others not. It is a highly ethnocentric theory
that does not give room for alternative goals and processes of development.
The growth theories that dominated the development debate throughout the 1940s and the
1950s viewed human beings as simply beneficiaries of development rather than as active
participants in the development process itself. They have been criticized for not considering the
human beings as the goal of development. The growth theories were pervasive in their discourse,
and some scholars have questioned the main epistemological foundations of development from an
essentially growth perspective.
The 1960’s saw a new dawn in the development debate as scholars became increasingly
convinced that financial or capital injection alone was not sufficient to set the expected
development in motion in the world’s poor countries. There was a revolution in development
thinking, and most scholars found the need to accompany growth with change. This decade saw
the emergence of modernization theorists who believed that poor countries needed solid political
systems and that Eurocentric and America-centric forms of development could be replicated in the
poor countries of the global south.
Modernization theorists believe that endogenous factors such as the absence of
communication and infrastructure, traditional agrarian structure, illiteracy, and low division of
labor account for the high degree of backwardness in the poor countries. They treat the
industrialized countries as a model for society and economy and argue that a change of these
internal factors is an appropriate strategy for development. Poor societies therefore have to
embrace the modernization of production as a means of knowledge transfer and capital aid to
achieve industrialization. Development according to theorists of this school of thought is perceived
as a rise in production and efficiency measured mainly by a comparison of GNP.
In the late 1960s, the basic claims of the traditional neoclassical approach that the poorer
countries were late in embarking on solid economic practices, and that as soon as they adopted the
techniques of modern economics then poverty would begin to decline in these countries came
under serious attack from dependency theorists mainly from Latin America. Dependency theory
argued that poverty resulted from capitalist exploitation, and it was a consequence of the
international political economy and the inflexible division of labor that favor the rich countries at
the detriment of the poorer countries. Scholars such as Raul Prebisch argued that economic growth
in the advanced industrialized countries did not necessarily lead to growth in the poorer countries
but rather generated severe economic difficulties in them.
Such economic problems were attributed to the fact that poor countries exported primary
commodities to the rich countries that then transformed them into finished products and sold them
back to the poor countries. The finished products from the industrialized countries always cost
more than the raw materials that they obtained from the poor countries. Poor countries only serve
as suppliers of cheap minerals, agricultural commodities, and cheap labor as well as the
repositories of surplus capital, obsolescent technologies, and manufactured goods. Dependency
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theorists recommended that poor countries should embark on importing substitutions so to avoid
buying expensive products from the advanced industrial nations. The dependency is built on the
assumption that political and economic power are heavily concentrated and centralized in the rich
countries.
Poor countries were integrated into international political economy under harsh terms as
they tried to replicate the West and accept the growth prescriptions of Western economists. This
resulted largely from the colonial heritage which was further exacerbated by the fact that the elites
in the poor countries benefited strongly from their role as suppliers of primary goods to developed
countries. Wallerstein’s world system theory captures this core-periphery relationship succinctly
whereby the industrialized countries constitute the core while the poorer countries were considered
as the periphery. The core experienced rising levels of prosperity while the periphery served to
satisfy the needs of the core (Von Kimakowitz, 2012).
The debate in the 1980s was dominated by the neoliberal doctrine that was championed by
the Bretton Woods institutions with the expressed support of the highly industrialized nations. The
neoliberal development thinking was initially conceived to be applied in the rich countries of the
West. The neoliberal theory suggests that the market is more efficient than the state and would
produce better outcomes, and therefore, the state should not intervene. The neoliberal thinking was
based on the belief that unemployment was the product of the absence of flexibility in the labor
market and suggested that states should embark on legislative reforms and not try to create jobs
through management and industrial policy in order to increase labor market flexibility.
Accordingly, states needed to rely on monetary policy rather than using fiscal policy to resolve
problems of unemployment and to promote growth. It further suggested that states should
deregulate and liberalize markets so that investors can hope to achieve the highest profits (Von
Kimakowitz, 2012).
Neoliberalism was a political economy theory that was mainly driven by the belief that
mankind can achieve better welfare by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms within an
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade
(Harvey, 2005). In the 1980s, the poorest countries, especially those in Africa, faced deep-seated
economic problems and started experiencing structural problems. Faced with these difficulties,
African states started seeking financial support from the World Bank, IMF and the EU. Neoliberal
policies then began to be imposed on the poor countries around the world, especially as the
industrialized countries became the main capital owners at the IMF and World Bank.
These policies are set by the Washington Consensus, which is a set of 10 free market
economic ideas that emphasize the importance of macroeconomic stability and integration into the
international economy and expansion of market forces within the domestic economy. In other
words, a neo-liberal view of globalization or market fundamentalism. The 10 policy instruments
included:
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1. Low government borrowing to avoid large fiscal deficits relative to GDP;
2. Redirection of public spending from subsidies (especially indiscriminate subsidies) toward
a broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary education,
primary health care and infrastructure investment;
3. Tax reform, broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates;
4. Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms;
5. Competitive exchange rates;
6. Trade liberalization of imports, with an emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions
(licensing, etc.) with any trade protection to be provided by low and relatively uniform
tariffs;
7. Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment;
8. Privatization of state enterprises;
9. Deregulation or abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition,
except for those justified for safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and
prudential oversight of financial institutions;
10. Legal security for property rights.
The 10 points of the Washington Consensus were imposed as conditionality by the Bretton
Wood institutions and other multilateral donors on the recipient poor countries. The Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were designed with the aim of combating ever-rising inflation and
achieving favorable balance of payments for the poorest economies especially African economies.
The World Bank did not require poor countries to try to act directly on the balance of payments as
this would be very difficult, but African countries were required to act directly on monetary and
fiscal policies that they could control. It was hoped that through these conditions, reduced inflation
would increase investment that was necessary for economic recovery in Africa. Governments were
required to cut spending, liberalize domestic markets, reform their tax systems and reduce trade
barriers (Ewane, 2004; Siebold, 1996).
The IMF stabilization policies that focused on restoring the external sector balances failed
to produce the expected effect in most countries that implemented them, and this approach to
prosperity came under serious attacks from multilateral bodies such as the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECCLAC), United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). Inflation remained high and poverty levels rose in most of Latin America and Africa.
Many African countries never experienced measurable progress years after implementing the
SAPs, rather most of them entered a period of decline and experienced unfavorable trade balances
(Ogbonna, 2012).
Since the early 1990s, the IMF and World Bank have been recommending good
governance in all aspects of public life in the poor countries as a condition for aid. The main idea
has been to enhance transparency in policy decisions and improve accountability on the use of
public finances and procedures. Poor states have since been compelled to shape their national
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policies to create policy and institutional landscapes that will facilitate their integration into the
global market.
The current development debate adopts a human rights-based approach to development
that seeks to empower both the beneficiaries of development while, at the same time, making them
participants in the development process. The right to development (RTD) requires greater
accountability from all actors in the development process: through legal, administrative, or
political mechanisms, individuals, as right-holders, can make claims on the conduct of individual
and collective agents, including states, which, as duty-holders, can be held responsible for not
meeting their obligations. The RTD was first proclaimed by the defunct Organization of African
Unity (OAU) and was included in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1981. In
1986, the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (DRTD) was adopted and was later
reaffirmed in the 1993 Vienna and 2000 UN Millennium Declarations (Piron, 2002).
The debate on the RTD was highly politicized between the poor and the rich countries.
Most of the agreements reached in the various development fora have not always been replicated
by the Commission on Human Rights. The Independent Expert on the Right to Development has
made positive contributions to the debate by proposing a development compact that may lead to a
politically acceptable solution. The ‘compact’ may need to be further defined in a manner
consistent with current best practice or presented as a theoretical framework to guide real
partnership agreements. The most controversial element of the RTD lies in the international
implementation of the right. In the past, it was seen by some as giving rise to an obligation of
developed states and international organizations to provide development assistance to developing
states. However, such a human rights obligation of a legally binding nature cannot be grounded in
international law. The current controversy surrounds the process of globalization, the equal
participation of developing countries in that process, and its relation to human rights (Piron, 2002).
The human rights-based approach to development overlaps with the question concerning
local ownership of the process of development. Local ownership to development involves the use
of indigenous knowledge of the people in the communities where development projects are taking
place. This process emphasizes local ownership as a critical component for achieving development
in the world’s poorest countries. It builds on the argument that a more localized development
practice where people have a stake empowers the people and gives them a sense of belongingness
rather than disconnecting them from the process of development (The World Bank, 2004).
The debate as elaborated above has completely ignored African indigenous knowledge in
the search for solutions to the continent’s seemingly intractable development challenges. However,
more and more scholars are recognizing today that rural people have always maintained a certain
formidable power that guides their indigenous institutions and knowledge systems thereby
maintaining some level of reliance (Donelly-Roark, 2004). Therefore, the disposition of the donor
community to regularize indigenous knowledge in the form of inclusion of local voices and
priorities (Briggs and Sharp, 2004) into development projects emanates in the power relations
between indigenous and donor participation in the development practice. In contrast to the past
where indigenous knowledge was an obstacle to development, it is now seen as pivotal to achieving
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development in Africa ((Briggs & Sharp, 2004). To expatiate the perspective of indigenous
knowledge as a cultural capital that conditions development thinking, planning and delivery, we
provide an analysis of the theory of habitus in the next section to provide a foundation for the
subsequent section on situating indigenous knowledge in development practice.
Bourdieu’s Concept of Habitus
The concept of “habitus” was developed within Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice. In
the Outline of a Theory of Practice, he draws our attention to the social conditions of scientific
practice by developing a theory that, on the one hand, critiques the foundation of social science
and on the other hand, accounts for a theory of practice that argues that there exists relatively
autonomous structured fields, which have a structuring capacity and function in accordance with
rigorous mechanism of cultural and social reproduction which is capable of imposing their
necessity on agents (Bourdieu, 1977).
The autonomous structured field is described as the doxa (or the field) in which agents
tacitly accord by the mere fact of acting in accordance with social convention. These, in Bourdieu’s
understanding, are the always existing obligatory boundaries of experiential context that are “a
relational obligation endowed with a specific gravity which it imposes on all the objects and agents
which enter it” (Bourdieu in Adams, 2006, p. 514). The acting in accord with social convention is
the habitus (Bourdieu, 1977). The habitus, in this respect, emerges from explicit action of
inculcation producing a system of rules such as grammars and rhetoric, and defines the right ways
to put the rules into practices as repertoire of devices or techniques. Adams (2006) notes that the
field instantiates us as subjects and reproduces social distinctions via the enactment of habitus.
The concept of habitus was formulated by Bourdieu to overcome the pernicious dualism
between objectivism and subjectivity, exemplified in France by Levi-Strauss and Sartre (King,
2000; Lau, 2004; Asimaki & Koustourakis, 2014). For Bourdieu, the concept captures and
encapsulates the dialectics of objectivism and subjectivism by inscribing subjective, bodily actions
with objective social forces so that the most apparent subjective individual acts take on social
meaning (King, 2000). The habitus is thus internalized history and a ‘structure’ ‘structured’ by
conditions of the relevant social (class, group, institutional) milieu (Lau, 2004). The concept is
built on Bourdieu’s objectivist perspective which specifies the mechanism that links structural
conditioning to social practice and regularities (Lau, 2004). It thus comprises two sides: as
structured structure and as structuring structure.
In this regard, habitus emerges as a conceptual tool suitable for explaining actions within
a social field where a dynamic interplay of struggles produces history (Chandler, 2013). Thus,
agency and autonomy are incorporated in the concept of habitus through personal and collective
accumulated history that imprints them as pre-reflective action-orientation (Adams, 2006). This
generative capacity of habitus makes it function as both ‘the structure of the field’ and ‘structured
by the field’ leading to enduring transferable patterns of the social world. In this usage, habitus is
a collective practical sense of objective possibilities that force the shape of the field providing the
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pattern through which thoughts and action are produced. Accordingly, Bourdieu submits that
practices that are generated by habitus follow a practical logic of practice:
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce
habitus, system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structure predisposed to
functioning as structuring structures, that is as principles which generate and organize
practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcome without
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary
in order to attain them (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 53).
The concept of habitus thus stresses that human action can be “coherent without springing
from an intention of coherence and deliberate decision; adjusted to the future without being the
product of a project of a plan” (Elder-Vass, 2007, p. 326). As the set of dispositions inculcate in
each of us by the conditioning that follows from our social environment (Elder-Vass, 2007), it
conceals in its function symbolic power and through its capacities ensures the reproduction of itself
as a self-regulating system compelling a lasting relation of domination established in the system.
According to Lau, habitus emerges horizontally from its structural conditions; it is what it
is because these conditions are what they are, and not vice versa (Lau, 2004). The objective and
prior cultural and structural features of a society, which were referred to by Bourdieu as the opus
operatum, meaning the work which has been done, are beyond humans while the modus operanu
are the practical strategies which an individual adopts (King, 2000). In this regard, Bourdieu sees
society not only as consisting of interactions between individuals, but also as dialectics between
practice and structure (King, 2000). He therefore appeals to the concept of habitus according to
which society consists of objective structure and determines — and isolated—individuals (King,
2000).
The suggestion that the operation of habitus is subconscious has been criticized by several
scholars (Elder-Vass, 2007). Bourdieu (1977) constrains the role of conscious thought in human
action by arguing that habitus acts within the agents as the organizing principle of their actions
and that this modus operandi informing every thought and action reveals itself only in the opus
operatum. In the operation, habitus is seen as possessing emergent causal mechanism irreducible
to structural and individual manipulation. Elder-Vass (2007) noted that the omission of conscious
thought from the development of our dispositions is untenable as a general claim since “Many
(though certainly not all) of our dispositions seem to be learned quite consciously via explicit
verbal instructions, rather than being absorbed and embodied subconsciously” (p. 327). Therefore,
Bourdieu neglects the role of conscious thought in both the development and the operation of
habitus (Elder-Vass, 2007). The concept was thus heavily criticized for offering less substance for
comprehending the complexity that comprises individuality of the agent (Chandler, 2013; ElderVass, 2007).
King criticizes the concept of habitus as being incompatible with Bourdieu’s practical
theory and slips back exactly into the kind of objectivism Bourdieu refutes (2000). According to
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King, “much of what Bourdieu describes under the name of ‘practical theory’ and which he
believes justified the concept of the habitus is, in fact, quite radically incompatible with habitus
(King, 2000) because: one, it fails to provide an explanation of social change, and two, it reduces
social reproduction to the mechanical imposition of prior social structure onto individuals thereby
returning to the very systemic image of social life which Bourdieu initially rejected in his critique
of the structuralist account of gift exchange. Therefore, critics of the concept have mainly argued
that the notion of habitus does not resolve the subject-object dualism of social theory which
Bourdieu intends to do, but, in fact, relapses against Bourdieu’s intention into the very objectivism
which he rejects. Despite this, King noted that Bourdieu’s contribution to the agency-structure
debate cannot be completely dismissed.
The importance of Bourdieu’s contribution to social theory has driven other commentators
to argue that Bourdieu has gone a long way toward overcoming the dualism of structure and agency
by presenting a genuine advance in social theory (Crossley, 2001; King, 2000). Chandler (2013)
argues that the dynamism, or the potency for change and individuality, of the agent, saturated by
cultural capital, derives from being built of an economy of interest working strategically within
the agent, which is very similar to Bourdieu’s ‘economy of practices’ comprising various fields of
struggle. In this regard, the principle of our action is naturally practically emergent from
experience. Lau dispensed Bourdieu’s myriad description of the concept specifying three interlinked components for it: belief-premises, perception-appreciation, and a descriptive and
prescriptive practical sense of objective possibilities and of the forthcoming for its
operationalization (Lau, 2004).
In this article, we follow Bourdieu’s conceptualization of habitus as a practical sense
emergent from experience. The embedment of ‘local ownership’ in the structure of global
development thinking, planning and delivery is analyzed as emergent in the habitual practices of
a development project. In other words, the disposition to indigenous knowledge in development
practice is an internalized understanding and experiences of the both of “donor- and “receivingcommunity” that have emerged from development practices. These practices evolve habitual
through a complex renegotiation of relations between the “donor” and “receiving-community”, or
to the agents, and leaves room for the transformation of both parties.
Situating Indigenous Knowledge in Development Practice in Africa
“Indigenous knowledge is an integral part of the culture and history of a local community.
We need to learn from local communities to enrich the development process.”
James D. Wolfensohn, World Bank President (In Gope et al., 2017)
This section firstly illustrates indigenous knowledge, being the idea of ‘local ownership’
in development, as a ‘cultural capital’ used for resisting wholesale imposition of development
ideas. We argue that the elitist, top-down approach to development that relies on the application
of modern science, technology and expert knowledge held outside Africa for the continent’s
development is epistemologically flawed. African perspectives on development have been greatly
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impacted by indigenous cultural traditions and the sense of place, and this makes it relevant for
African development values to be invoked in the quest for finding a lasting solution to the
continent’s development crisis. This argument is inspired by the theory of habitus with the hope
of generating objective possibilities to overcome the development insufficiencies experienced in
most parts of Africa through the application of indigenous knowledge.
According to the World Bank (1998), there is no all-encompassing definition of indigenous
knowledge systems. From a strictly Western perspective, the term indigenous is often associated
with being primitive, wild and natural (Dei, 1999). Indigenous knowledge (IK) is the local
knowledge – knowledge that is unique to a given culture or society (Zageye & Bambe, 2006). IK
contrasts with the international knowledge system generated by universities, research institutions
and private firms. It is the basis for local-level decision making in agriculture, health care, food
preparation, education, natural-resource management, and a host of other activities in rural
communities (Warren, 1991). Indigenous knowledge can equally be defined as being the
information base for a society, which facilitates communication and decision-making. Indigenous
information systems are dynamic and are continually influenced by internal creativity and
experimentation as well as by contact with external systems (Flavier, 1995).
Kok (2005) posits that knowledge systems generally are systems through which people
make sense of and attach meaning to the world in which they live. These views and perceptions
originate within a specific community or culture and are handed down from generation to
generation, resulting in personal experiences and wisdom being transferred to younger people.
These knowledge systems reflect the dynamic way in which the residents of a community come to
understand themselves in relation to their natural environment, and how they organize that
knowledge of flora, fauna, cultural beliefs and history to enhance their lives (Bray & Els, 2007).
According to Gorjestani (2004), indigenous knowledge is an essential element of the social
capital of the poor and constitutes their main asset in their efforts to achieve control of their own
lives. It forms the base of the knowledge system of any country and encompasses the skills,
experiences and insights of people applied to maintain or improve their livelihoods (World Bank,
2004). For these reasons, the potential contribution of indigenous knowledge to locally managed,
sustainable and cost-effective survival strategies should be promoted in the development process.
Generally, the inclusion of indigenous knowledge in development practice is based on the
claim that the Western knowledge dominated scientific path for underdevelopment in non-Western
societies has failed to achieve its claim of capability to deliver these countries from their
development problems. We, therefore, see the need for local participation to help break the
impasse. However, the persistence of an indigenous knowledge system itself can also be a
reflection of its capacity in holistically resisting modernity. Its forcibility as a part of a covert
response to the destabilizing flux of modernity is noted by Fanon (1963). Therefore, its invocation
in development practice forges a corporeal disposition that makes up development practices. The
appeal to indigenous knowledge in this regard is seen through the capacity to renew itself as one
of the forces for achieving development in Africa.
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The World Bank (1998) identifies three levels of relevance of indigenous knowledge that
may be within the process of sustainable development: the first level is the local community where
the bearers of such knowledge live and produce; second is the various development agents such as
governments, donors, local leaders and private sector initiatives. These agents recognize
indigenous knowledge, value it and appreciate it in their interaction with the local communities.
However, before incorporating it in their approaches, they need to understand it and critically
validate it against the usefulness for their intended objectives; third, the global knowledge level
ensures that indigenous knowledge forms part of global knowledge and in this context, it has a
value and relevance in itself. Accordingly, indigenous knowledge can be conserved, transferred,
or adopted and adapted elsewhere.
The acceptance of African indigenous knowledge in development practice is an effort in
the way of finding the most suitable approach to resolving Africa’s enduring development
challenges. In this process the indigenous knowledge asserts its relevance in an institutional
configuration that tends to suppress it. Local knowledge acts as a force that determines how
development is conducted in specific localities. In this regard, the assumption that Western
knowledge provides the only route, i.e. as superior to other knowledge, to development is
confronted by indigenous knowledge’s determinative capacity. Die states that “indigenous
knowledge, as local participation, is a resistance to historic and continuing dominance of Western
practice of development” (2014, p. 16). Therefore, the force of indigenous knowledge creates a
space for itself in the development field.
In this regard, the indigenous epistemic system and the Western model are seen as endowed
with the same principle of achieving a satisfactory end whereby they are organized in relation to
each other in the field of development. About 60% of the African population, for instance, lives in
rural areas where they depend largely on their indigenous worldviews to solve problems that affect
their wellbeing and social development (Shiza & Abdi, 2014). The contending issues are, however,
whether African indigenous knowledge is transformational or whether modernity (Western
knowledge) will consume it over time in the search for solutions to development challenges.
The choice of African indigenous knowledge derives from a strictly normative standpoint
that inclusiveness of a decision-making process determined by the requirements of survival is
conditional and self-defeating. The issue of development in Africa is one of survival, and therefore
development policies must be conceived in a way that will not exclude the choices and knowledge
of the Africans themselves. Dei (2014) maintains that a critique of the Western discursive approach
to African development should be pursued as an anti-colonial and anti-racist intellectuality to
reclaim and recover indigenous knowledge.
For some scholars the focus on indigenous knowledge has been in answering the question
related to whether African countries should establish endogenous localized political systems and
structures to form centralized and powerful governments that contribute to promoting economic
prosperity, improved living conditions, transparent parliamentary systems and social stability
based on the Western political ideology (Liu, 2013). Research has equally devoted attention to the
question of whether it is necessary to establish a powerful government that can effectively channel
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national resources in joint efforts to achieve the state's long-term development goals, or to establish
a weak government that only pursues its own immediate interests or partial interests and thus, leads
to continuous mutually exclusive cut-throat competition.
We explore the role of indigenous knowledge in health care in Burkina Faso to elaborate
its relevance as a valuable and inevitable resource in Africa’s development process while at the
same time show how this resource can be exploited to help people on the continent take control of
their own lives. This presents a counter-hegemonic perspective of indigenous knowledge whereby
development can best be understood and achieved if the indigenous people are encouraged to drive
their development process by focusing on reinforcing their indigenous epistemic systems. Our
choice of the healthcare sector derives from the fact that the development discourse has for too
long focused on achieving economic prosperity while paying little attention to social development.
We argue that the inclusion of indigenous knowledge in social projects will greatly increase the
possibility of such projects to impact positively on the lives of the poor masses in Africa. This is
particularly true because most of Africa’s population live in the rural areas and most of them
depend on indigenous knowledge to obtain a means of livelihood.
Indigenous Knowledge and Healthcare
Scientific innovation and technological advancement in medical research have led to a
remarkable increase in life expectancy, eradication of some diseases and a significant drop in
mortality around the world. These developments notwithstanding, a large portion of the world’s
people still do not have access to essential drugs. In areas where modern medicine is not readily
available, the people resort to the use of traditional medicine which is easy to find at affordable
costs. Almost 80% of Africa’s people do not have access to regular medicine and resort to the use
of traditional medicine for their medical needs. It was in recognition of this fact that the World
Health Organization in 2000 adopted the resolution on “Promoting the Role of Traditional
Medicine in the Health System: A Strategy for the African Region” (Xiaorui, 2004).
Most of the plants used in traditional medicine have great biological and therapeutic
potential and can be used in the treatment of common diseases such as coughs, diarrhea and fever.
Considering this, the value added of traditional medicine development strategies should focus on
promoting the growth of this local knowledge and enhancing consultation with indigenous
practitioners to facilitate the treatment of some diseases (An, 2004). However, this knowledge is
often exploited by big capital wielding pharmaceutical companies who patent the products.
In Burkina Faso, the government has taken measures to exploit and develop indigenous
medicine as a means of improving healthcare delivery in the country. The Ministry of Health has
created a Department of Pharmaceutical Services and Traditional Pharmacopoeia in order to
establish a policy for developing a traditional medicine pharmacopoeia throughout the country.
The first decision by the department was to develop traditional pharmacopoeia at the regional level
that met regularly to exchange experiences gained in the field. Traditional therapist and herbalist
organizations have been established in major cities around the country and regulations have been
put in place to supervise the practice of traditional medicine in Burkina Faso. The country that is
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also heavily afflicted by the AIDS epidemic is using traditional pharmacopoeia as a substitute of
the expensive antiretroviral drugs in the fight against the disease. The government is helping to
develop traditional medicine as a necessary supplement to the existing medical care provided for
all segments of society by the medical centres of the country (Dakuyo, 2004).
The example of Burkina Faso is a clear indication that indigenous knowledge is essential
to economic growth and must be an integral part of Africa’s development process. The use of
traditional pharmacopoeia and the creation of support networks for traditional healers are
contributing to the effectiveness and sustainability of the country’s healthcare system. These kinds
of indigenous knowledge practices can be integrated in many other sectors in order to boost the
continent’s prospects of achieving prosperity without having to rely on knowledge held elsewhere.
The experience of Burkina Faso is testimony to the fact that indigenous knowledge represents a
precious, invisible link between regions and cultures, its resources and the store of experiences
nurtured by the specialists in the community (Ndenecho, 2011). The knowledge held by these
traditional or native healers represent what Bourdieu (1994) refers to as cultural capital which can
exist in three forms: incorporated form, objectified state and institutionalized form.
However, reliance on indigenous knowledge in the health sector is not without challenges.
One of the greatest challenges is that indigenous knowledge in Burkina Faso, like in most parts of
the continent, is still greatly influenced by rituals and customary practices, some of which are
gradually disappearing. More so, the high rates of illiteracy in some countries on the continent
could result in most work based on indigenous knowledge not being accessed by the local
populations, and thus leading to the researchers knowing more than the local populations. Burkina
Faso, as well as many other African countries, is facing rapid biodiversity loss, and this might
result in practices and knowledge related to fauna or flora being lost. To effectively address such
threats to indigenous knowledge, African states would need to enact stringent measures that aim
to protect natural habitats and ecosystems in order to guarantee continuous access to scientific
knowledge.
The preference of the dominant modern Western systems of learning and scientific
investigation is rapidly destroying these indigenous knowledge systems, especially in the
healthcare sector in Africa (Gareth, 2000). It is imperative to incorporate African traditional
medicine (social capital) into the formal healthcare systems of African countries. This can be
achieved through ethnopharmacology, which can help identify indigenous medicinal plants that
are safe and effective. However, this would require that Western donors or pharmaceutical
companies respect the intellectual property rights of the traditional healers. In line with the theory
of habitus, modern medical technology can serve to describe, analyze, validate and classify the
native beliefs and processes of the traditional knowledge systems. Gareth (2000) argues that such
validation using new techniques would help to confirm the difficult process of observation,
analysis, and evaluation that determines every individual’s culture. The validation may also
represent the basic point of reference in the process of exchange between the donors’ modern
medicine and the local African traditional doctor (Neba, 2011).
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Conclusion
The indigenous knowledge underpinning of resistance to dominating Western knowledge
has been argued through its persistence in development practice. Its persistence evolved habitually
through a complex renegotiation of power relations between the donor- and receiving-community,
which leaves room for the transformation of development space. In the struggle to resolve the
enduring puzzle of development in Africa, the role of indigenous knowledge is thus affirmed as
important. We argue that the importance of indigenous knowledge in development practice is in
its capacity to generate transferable local skills and set energies in motion to reduce the prevailing
inequalities on the continent. Therefore, the article advocates for a paradigm shift in development
thinking and practice that reinforces the use of indigenous knowledge as a first line of action in
the process of development.
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Breaking the Poverty Trap in Africa:
A Comparative Perspective on Poverty Alleviation
Moges Abu Girma, University of Tsukuba, Japan
Abstract
An increasing number of African countries have recently registered improved rates of
economic growth. Translating economic growth into poverty reduction, however, requires
putting into place policies and institutions that promote a sustainable and shared economic
growth process. The degree of success in poverty reduction depends largely on balancing
the process of economic growth and the judicious pattern of income distribution so that an
increasing share of the population benefits from the growth process and engages in more
productive endeavors. Building the necessary policy and institutional framework to
promote sustainable and shared economic growth is central in breaking the poverty trap
and in initiating sustainable economic development. This article develops a political
economy argument and demonstrates how successful poverty reduction are closely linked
with pursuing economic policies that engage in increasing a segment of economic agents
and develop the essential institutional arrangements to initiate sustainable economic
development.
Introduction
African countries have exhibited relative improvement in their economic growth in the new
millennium. Sub-Sahara African economies have registered on average a 2.29 percent annual
growth rate in real per capita income from the year 2000 to 2015. Given the average growth rate
of their population at a rate of about 2.699 per annum during this period, the overall economic
performance has been relatively robust. This is an important improvement compared to the long
stagnation that economies in the region exhibited from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1990s.
During this period, the economies in the region on average grew less than the growth of their
population leading to a reduction in their real per capita income for an extended period of time
with considerable cost to Africans and their hope of breaking the poverty trap.
Robust economic growth, however, is not new to African countries. Africa registered rapid
economic growth during the 1960s but that initial push for sustainable growth and improvement
in standard of living became no longer possible once economic policy mismanagement set in and
the commodity price boom was busted (Van de Walle, 2001). In reality, the post-1960 average per
capita economic growth rate of Africa was about 0.79 percent whereas the population growth was
stable and held fast at an average rate of 2.69 percent per annum (World Bank, 2017).
The overall economic growth performance of the region in the post-independence period
has been so moderate that it is not yet clear if the recent relative improvement is a new trend or a
temporary recovery from the long recession of the economies in the region. Have African
economies learned the appropriate lesson from their past experiences as well as lessons from other
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developing countries outside the continent to sustain their economic growth and more importantly
to convert that growth into a steady reduction in poverty across the continent? These are some of
the central issues that call for a critical and in-depth analysis of the current economic performance
of Africa, and the efforts to break the vicious circle of chronic poverty and destitution across the
continent.
The source of such economic growth, sustainability as well as differences across countries,
are features that need further elaboration and systematic analysis of what factors should be
emphasized in an effort to translate economic growth into sustainable development and poverty
reduction. In light of the experiences of such economies in economic stagnation, demographic
pressures, and worsening poverty situation, the recent performances are indeed remarkable in their
magnitude as well as spread across countries. Whereas overall average economic growth
performance has exhibited significant improvement, translating economic growth into steady
improvement in the standard of living is the most challenging and often unachieved objective in a
number of countries. Whereas the countries in the region registered better economic growth, this
record should be contextualized in that the growth rate occurred from a distressingly low level of
income. Despite the recent growth rate, the average real per capita income in sub-Sahara African
countries is estimated at just $1,652 in 2015 as compared to $1,072 in 1960 measured in terms of
the 2010 constant international dollar (World Bank, 2017). Overall, the observation of real income
per capita over a longer span of time across African countries does not leave much room for
optimism yet. As Figure 1 below graphically depicts, the most consistent and stable growth rate in
the continent has been population growth and the economies struggle to stay barely above the
forces of demography.
Economic recovery and growth provides economies new opportunities to restructure their
economies and identify pathways that could lead to sustainable economic performance. If the
recent economic recovery can be capitalized upon and national economies earnestly address
structural bottlenecks and institutional and policy rigidities in sustaining the growth performance
of their economic agents, they could create new momentum that could ensure sustainable
economic growth and poverty reduction. The central policy issue is that given the current economic
growth performance of most of the African countries, do they have the policy and institutional
capacity to translate their economic growth into a sustained reduction in poverty? If not, what can
be done about it? Breaking the low-level-equilibrium poverty trap requires both initiating and
sustaining robust economic growth, raising the average income well beyond the subsistence level,
and translating such dynamism into steady job creation, structural transformation, and reduction
as well as eventual elimination of chronic poverty.
The overall improvement in the economic growth performance is a wider phenomenon and
observed in diverse settings and situations across the developing world. African countries, as well
as the wider family of developing countries, have improved their economic growth performance.
Translating the improved overall economic growth performance into a steady reduction of chronic
poverty across African countries requires putting in place institutions and policies that provide
equitable opportunities to all the population and enabling economic agents to accumulate essential
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human and investment capital. This leads to sustained improvement in their productivity and sets
the stage for further reduction or even elimination of chronic poverty. For the first time in its
history, Africa now has more non-poor than poor populations with an emerging middle class that
has significant potential power to transform the continental economy (Moges, 2014). This has
tremendous implications for the prospects of African economies and the life of Africans in the
coming decades.
Poverty reduction is the outcome of both growth and income distribution processes and
these elements are closely linked with the pattern of economic growth. It is therefore critically
important to understand the process and forces that give rise to a persistent decline in poverty
across countries and draw policy lessons that would help to promote the capacity of national
economies to further address the remaining poverty and inequality challenges. A number of African
countries have exhibited a unique pattern where both the share and the number of poor people first
increased and only recently have both started to follow a downward trend. A closer examination
of the poverty indicators across African countries strongly suggests that the performance of
countries in terms of addressing chronic poverty is not amenable to generalization, and there are
both success as well as failure stories. Whereas the number of countries that have managed to
reduce the poverty rate has been increasing, there are dominant cases with high concentrations of
poverty and population that exert significant influence on the overall poverty situation in the
continent. Despite the improved situation and performance of African countries, for the countries
under our consideration and for which comparable data is available, the total number of poor
people has increased by about 64 million since the turn of the millennium.
These features suggest that the process of poverty reduction exhibits unique
characteristics, and that subsequent efforts to eliminate poverty should take into account these
forces so as to enable the majority of the population to escape the poverty trap and achieve
sustainable improvement in their standard of living. The inspiration of this article emerges from
the unique and historic possibility that chronic poverty as we know it could be eliminated within
a foreseeable future provided that African countries, which are the weakest spots in this effort,
could draw practical lessons from other developing countries and coordinate their efforts to break
away from the poverty trap.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the recent trends in the extent of poverty reduction
across African countries, highlight the pattern and features of the poverty reduction process, and
draw policy lessons for further poverty reduction efforts. To accomplish this purpose, we have
made use of a unique set of new and revised poverty and inequality data across African countries
for which consistent and reliable data could be found. The study focuses on the period since the
year 2000 during which poverty reduction policies took center stage in a new political-economy
and global policy environment. We identified the effort and achievement of developing countries
in terms of promoting economic growth, breaking away from economic stagnation, responding in
terms of the pattern of income distribution, and interacting to both growth and distributional forces
in shaping the outcome in the incidence of poverty across countries.
Success in poverty reduction is contextually defined in terms of sustained reduction in the
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share of the population of the countries under consideration that live on less than USD $1.90 per
day chronic poverty line. An economy is considered successful in dealing with chronic poverty if
it has managed to reduce their poverty index consistently below the 5 percent threshold and has
set the stage for sustained poverty alleviation.
The paper contributes both to the theory of poverty analysis and the practical issues of
development policy in the context of African countries and addresses the nexus between economic
growth, income distribution issues, and poverty. A systemic analysis of the challenges and
achievements in terms of poverty reduction provides a new insight into effective approaches,
policy choices, and prospects in promoting sustainable and equitable economic growth that have
a significant effect on the standard of living of the population and in terms of reducing the scope
and depth of chronic poverty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops conceptual
arguments and deals with issues of poverty and the poverty reduction policy framework. Section
three explores the argument in a broader analytical framework that attempts to link poverty
reduction with growth performance with income distribution. Section four provides the evidence
regarding the achievement in poverty reduction and its underlying forces. The paper concludes by
drawing relevant policy lessons for countries where chronic poverty is still a formidable challenge.
Poverty: Conceptual Context and Measurement Challenges
Poverty is a multi-dimensional concept and as such requires a comprehensive policy
approach to deal with it. Chronic poverty refers to the inability of households to provide sufficient
subsistence and to lead a decent economic and social life. It is a pronounced and extensive
deprivation in well-being of individuals, families, and communities.
From the conceptual perspective and current common perception, poverty and by
implication, the policy of poverty alleviation have ambiguous and imprecise meanings (Chen and
Ravallion, 2010; Deaton, 2005; Kanbur, 2005; Moges, 2013b, 2013c; Ravallion, et al. 2009; World
Bank, 2005). Whereas researchers have widened the conceptual framework and context of poverty
from consumption expenditure, capability, and freedom perspectives, the difficulty and
inaccessibility of precise measurement of such concepts have led to the alternative focus on a
narrow but more pragmatic identification of poverty indicators for public policy response
purposes. This approach has limitations in understanding the full extent of the challenges
individuals and families in the situation of the poverty trap face. This situation is not only related
to material deprivation but overall lack of capability to change their situation. Breaking the impasse
requires empowerment of the poor to address their situation coupled with effective intervention by
the government sector or even external forces that have vested and rational interest in breaking the
trap and making the escape permanent.
A poverty reduction policy involves measuring accurately the income of households
relative to a reference poverty yardstick, counting the number of poor people, putting this figure
in relation to the entire population, and characterizing the nature, underlying causes, and dynamics
of their poverty. Each step is a difficult task and require considerable resources. Moreover, the
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lack of precision makes the concept vulnerable to political yard sticking in which actual poverty
problems are not directly addressed or addressed obliquely (Deaton, 2005; Kanbur, 2005; Easterly,
2009; Jones, 2004). The headcount poverty index, for instance, could be reduced without
necessarily reducing the absolute number of people in chronic poverty. This is particularly relevant
in countries where population growth is fast, life expectancy is short and more children are born
into poverty than those born in non-poor families. Moreover, who is poor and who is not largely
depends on the poverty threshold the country adopts and when this yardstick is not realistic enough,
the resultant poverty indicators would be misleading. Even when the benchmark yardstick is
realistic enough, the poor are not homogenous. There is diversity within the ranks of the poor, and
a concept of poverty would be partial if it fails to capture these essential features and develop ways
to address them accordingly.
The conceptual context of chronic poverty is relevant especially in the poorest regions of
the world as the situation might also involve generalized poverty where economies are simply not
able to produce sufficient goods and services for the subsistence necessities of their population. It
is important to note that the concept of poverty reduction might involve inter-temporal fallacy in
that the poverty reduction strategy might become the victim of its own success. If one assumes
that public policies reflect the will of the majority, at least in a democratic political setting, decline
in the poverty index reduces the incentive for public policies to emphasize on further reduction
measures especially when such measures are financed by contributions from the non-poor
segments of the population or involve redistributive fiscal policy measures (Moges, 2013a). It is
also realistic to acknowledge that not everybody has a vested interest in the elimination of poverty.
As much as most of us want to overcome the humiliation that foreign aid and alms bring in the
name of helping the poor, it is necessary to recognize the fierce resistance the powerful aid industry
poses for radical changes in how countries implement anti-poverty measures.
It therefore becomes important to develop poverty elimination strategies that appeal both
to the poor and the non-poor in society, empower the poor to make choices that affect their life,
recognize the potential resistance that could emerge from vested interest groups, and mobilize
support from a wide base while emphasizing the idea that eliminating chronic poverty is to the
vested economic, social and political interest of the whole population of a nation. It is only under
such comprehensive and broad based support that African countries can mobilize the necessary
political, social, and economic resources to break the poverty trap once and for all.
The issues of poverty reduction could also be analyzed from the perspective of the process
of economic growth and distribution of economic opportunities across economic agents and
households. The level of poverty, as well as growth of mean income relative to the poverty line, is
an important factor in reducing poverty. An economy might find itself in a situation of generalized
poverty where aggregate output is not big enough to provide a decent living standard for all. In
such a situation, average income falls short of the poverty line. This phenomenon emerges where
economic agents and resources are underutilized, unemployed, underemployed or economic agents
that do not have sufficient incentive, capital or technology to work for a number of institutional,
policy, political, social and economic reasons. The first order of priority in such a situation is to
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unburden economic agents from such constraints and develop strategies to eliminate structural
bottlenecks for the realization of the economic potential of the country under consideration. This
in turn requires a thorough examination of the economic, social, political and behavioral factors
and the institutions that give rise to such under-capacity utilization of natural and human resources
in the economy.
Even when an economy improves its productive capacity and its average income is higher
than the absolute poverty line, output may not or cannot be equally distributed across households.
This is true partly because inequality and its root causes extend beyond economic forces.
Observation of cross-country patterns of income distribution suggests that even the most
egalitarian societies have an index of inequality in the range of 0.20 to 0.25, whereas the most
unequal economies register about 0.60 to 0.66 (Milanovic, 2005). The pattern of wealth
distribution across households, despite the limitation of the quality of such data, is turned out to
be even more extremely unequal (Davies et al., 2010). However, not all inequality in a system
reflects injustice. When the rewards that economic agents receive are adjusted relative to their
effort, dexterity, and creativity so they are fairly balanced, it maintains the incentives for higher
efficiency and robust growth in national income.
Economic growth is indeed the most powerful instrument to reduce poverty provided that
it creates employment opportunities to the poor, increases the demand for factors that the poor
own, and creates the condition in which the poor develop the capability to accumulate productive
assets that prepare them for a productive and better life (Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Kraay & Raddatz,
2007; Moges, 2013b). Economic growth has twin effects both of which have important effects on
poverty indicators. From an analytical perspective, economic growth could imply an increase in
the average income of all households without necessarily changing their relative income. There is
also a distributional effect in which the growth process is accompanied by changes in the relative
income with ambiguous effects on the poverty indicators (Bourguignon, 2003; Dollar & Kraay,
2002). Nonetheless, the growth process might exhibit anti-poor elements when economic agents
are not positioned to equally participate in and benefit from the growth process due to constraints
of human capital, access to financial services, a weak business and investment climate, weak
institutions, and restrictive economic policies (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994; Persson & Tabellini,
1994).
Is economic growth distribution neutral? There are strong tendencies that cast doubt on the
distributional neutrality of growth. The growth of income of a national economy does not benefit
all economic agents equally for a host of reasons including differences in resource endowments;
inputs in market imperfections, government policies, institutions, and social relationships.
Economic growth benefits mostly those who have the capability to initiate growth, and it
eventually reaches those economic agents who get employment opportunities and those who
produce factor inputs in the production processes. This process is gradual and its flow does not
necessarily involve a significant portion of the population. It is possible that economic growth
could be driven by a sector that has very weak linkage with the rest of the economy and with
inconsequential effect on employment generation. Such a growth process can give rise to
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deterioration in the distribution of income and worsen the inequality situation leaving the majority
of the population behind.
Poverty reduction could be achieved by the growth in the income of the poor or
improvement in the distribution of income. These two features of the growth process and its
implication on poverty indicators are an important analytical approach to decompose the relative
importance of the growth and distribution components in the process of poverty reduction
(Bourguignon, 2003). The relative importance of these forces influences the extent to which
growth can be translated into poverty reduction on a sustainable basis. The dynamics of economic
growth and its impact on the poverty situation in a country hence largely depends on the political
economic forces that shape the nature and dynamics of the economic and socio-political forces
within the country.
Analytical Framework for Poverty Analysis
The level and change in the indicators of poverty of a country are closely linked to the
degree to which economic agents utilize all of their economic resources in the system for the
production of goods and services at a given state of technology. Productive efficiency and
technological progress are engines of economic growth. Given the production process, the
distribution of output across households involve political economic, market, demographic, and
institutional forces. As such, the process of production and distribution of economic resources
ultimately influence the prevalence and persistence of poverty in the system. From such a
perspective, the stage of economic development as measured by per capita or per household
income, the growth rate of the average income, pattern of income distribution, and population
growth are the main forces that shape the level and changes in the indicators of poverty.
The measurement of poverty and its dynamics over time depends on computing the
aggregate output of the nation and its growth rate, the distribution of income across households,
the size and growth rate of the population, and a realistic poverty yardstick. These factors in
isolation as well as in combination influence the level and dynamics of poverty of a nation over
time and across households.
Poverty Indices
The measurement of poverty as defined above could take various approaches and practical
twists. The most commonly used approaches involve establishing a distribution function of the
aggregate output of an economy, arranging the distribution of income or purchasing power with
respect to the distribution of the population and with the help of a separately determined poverty
line to divide the population into poor and non-poor classes. This process is conceptually simple
but could be misleading unless it is used precisely and interpreted from the perspectives of
distribution, dynamics, and responsiveness to policy initiatives.
Accurate measurement of poverty starts with a reliable measurement and ordering of
income at the household level and national level as well as computing accurately the size and
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growth of the population in a country. These features could be captured in a conceptual framework
that reflects various perspectives of poverty.
Consider that the income or consumption expenditure level of a total of n-households in a
nation is arranged in an ascending order and take the following notation:
(𝟏)
𝐲 = (𝒚𝟏 ,
𝒚𝟐, ⋯ , 𝒚𝒅 , ⋯ , 𝒚𝒎 , ⋯ , 𝒚𝒏 )
The aggregate value of income of households approximates the size of the national output
that is available for consumption which closely approximates the disposable income in the national
income computation plus public services and goods that household members receive from the
government. Hence the aggregate size of output is critically important.
If the average income of a nation falls short of the threshold poverty line, by necessity, the
majority of its population would be suffering from chronic and endemic poverty. This is a situation
where the poverty threshold income level is higher than the average income of the entire economy,
yd >ym. This is an exceptional situation of generalized poverty. It captures the central challenge of
a failed system that could not generate enough goods and services to provide the necessities of
economic life. As we will discuss this issue later on, a number of African countries currently find
themselves in generalized poverty that describes a low-level-equilibrium-poverty trap. This is an
equilibrium trap conditioned by institutional, political, demographic, environmental, and
technological forces that reinforce each other for stability. Breaking such a stable equilibrium
requires radical reforms that break the rigidities, constraints, and limitations on economic agents
from making decisions and responding to incentives so as to engage in productive endeavors and
earning in the process a decent standard of living.
It is only when the total output that the economy generates is large enough that sufficient
resources can be available for addressing poverty objectives. Income per household hence
measures what could be available, on average, for members of households and is measured by
dividing national income by the total number of households, n. Income per capita, which depends
on the average family household size, is equivalent to the aggregate output divided by the size of
the national population. Note that the aggregate output is produced by a productively employed
segment of the population and its productivity whereas this total output should support the
consumption expenditure of the entire population. Therefore, the aggregate size of output and the
total size of the population are two fundamental determinants of how many goods and services
could be available on average for individuals to consume and invest for further production.
The average income is an important indicator in a sense that it shows the value of goods
and services that a typical household and its members can command if income and consumption
capabilities were fairly and equally distributed. However, income is rarely distributed equally
across households or economic agents. Households and their members have inherent inequality in
age, productive capacity, incentive to work, education, health, dexterity, and the like that are
reflected partly on their capacity to earn income. The dispersion of household income relative to
the average income captures the distribution of income. However, the extent of inequality is a
matter of public concern, especially when differences in income do not reflect differences in
productive attributes of households and their members. It is also possible that inequality might
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have functional influences on the growth rate of income of households and hence the intertemporal dynamics of income and poverty indicators.
The simplest and quite obvious indicator of inequality is the gap in income between the
richest households and the poorest. In our ordered ranking of households by their income level,
this is depicted by (𝒚𝒏 − 𝒚𝟏 ). The relative concentration of households towards the highest, the
middle, or the lowest on the income ladder generates the most obvious form of income and
consumption expenditure gap in a country. This gap and its behavior over time would have
important bearings on the relative poverty index.
There is a stylized tendency of economic resource distribution which suggests that
households tend to concentrate nearer to the lowest income, somewhere below the average income
level, giving the overall distribution of income a skewed structure. The level of income that most
of the households generate and consume - the modal income - is a typical barometer of interest in
economic analysis for it reflects the most representative feature of a household and its members.
In this context, it is also relevant to take into consideration the magnitude of (yd – y1) which shows
how much income of the poorest households fall below the poverty line. The smaller the gap the
better, whereas a larger gap suggests more daunting challenges in addressing the problem
especially if those falling below the poverty line constitute a higher share of the population.
The next issue of interest is related to the distribution of income of households relative to
the average income of households. If we consider ym in equation (1) above as the average income
of households, the deviation of individual household income relative to the average indicates how
income and expenditure capabilities are distributed across households.
Measuring income distribution and inequality is a notoriously difficult and inaccurate
business. In practice, nations gather vital information on the distribution of income by conducting
national household surveys on income or expenditures but for a long list of reasons such sample
surveys fail to provide accurate indicators of the pattern of income distribution. Moreover, the
surveys are conducted infrequently, and their outcomes largely deviate from national income
accounting based estimates of aggregate output and income. It is therefore customary to rely on
expenditure surveys to derive indicators of income distribution and inequality and rely more on
national income accounts to gauge the level of national economic activity and growth rate.
Based on the level and distribution of aggregate output of a nation across the population,
indicators of consumption deprivation are computed by applying a poverty threshold line. A class
of poverty measures, following the general framework of the Watt index, were commonly used in
poverty analysis (Foster et. al., 1984, Morduch, 1998). This class of poverty index summarizes the
level of poverty and its extent for a given distribution of income and the poverty line and the
corresponding average exit time to eliminate poverty from the system. It can be summarized as
follows:
𝒅

𝟏
𝒛 − 𝒚𝒊 𝜶
𝑷𝜶 (𝒚 ; 𝒛) =
∑(
)
𝑵
𝒛

(𝟐)

𝒊=𝟏

Where Pα (𝒊 = 𝟎, 𝟏, 𝟐) is the poverty index and is the function of income (y) of poor households
and the poverty line (z). As indicated earlier, there are n households arranged in increasing order
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from the lowest to the highest income per household, and household d has an income exactly equal
to or below the poverty line.
P0 is the indicator of the headcount poverty index (HPI), which measures the total number
of people in households with an income below the poverty line expressed as a share of the total
population in all households, N. Households and their members whose income falls short of the
poverty line would constitute the poor.
This is useful and yet it is highly dependent on the choice of the poverty line yardstick
that is used to designate households as poor or non-poor. The poverty line is drawn using a set of
commodities that are dominantly used and affordable by poor households. However, one has to be
aware of the problems of picking an arbitrary threshold for it may not realistically reflect the
choices that are available for poor households to allocate their limited resources (Chen et al., 2010;
Ravallion et al., 2009). Poverty involves lack of choice and vulnerability to different shocks that
are outside the control of the members of the household. This is particularly the case in chronic
poverty even if relative poverty also invokes a considerable lack of freedom of choice. The way
the poverty threshold is chosen and determined affects the classification of households in the two
broad categories of the poor and the non-poor. This could take quite an arbitrary bend if those near
or above the threshold are still deprived of the basic necessities of life and choices that would make
their status of non-poor almost trivial (Deaton, 2005).
There are two related measurement approaches of poverty that measure how poor
households fall short of the poverty line - the poverty gap index (P1) - as a percentage of the poverty
threshold level. This approach is sensitive to the distribution of income among the poor households
for it measures the average deviation of income of poor households from the poverty line threshold.
This suggests that anything that helps the poorest households relative to the rest would improve
the overall extent of poverty. This might involve income transfers, welfare programs, or income
boosting approaches that would benefit the poorest segments of the society. And yet it does not
directly address the extent to which households with an income level higher than the poverty
threshold would be vulnerable. This is quite an important concern particularly when the non-poor
are concentrated just above the poverty line but not far enough to be comfortable about their current
and future economic status.
Consider a family of four whose current consumption expenditure is such that they are
considered a non-poor household, and yet they barely make it. If a child is born, the family size
expands by 25 percent while income most likely remains somewhat the same at least in the short
run. In such a case, the family may soon be in poverty unless it compensates its purchasing power
with a corresponding rise in their real income.
These two concepts of poverty index, headcount poverty index and the poverty gap, are
the most commonly used, popular, and relatively simple approaches to describe the absolute
poverty of a nation.
The third concept is the measure of the severity of poverty which is the square of the
poverty gap that attaches more weight for those households that fall far below the poverty line than
those near the threshold line:
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𝒅

𝟏
𝒛 − 𝒚𝒊 𝟐
𝑷𝟐 (𝒚 ; 𝒛) =
∑(
)
𝑵
𝒛
𝒊=𝟏

However, its practical application in poverty analysis and policy has been marginal. In this study,
we focus on the first concept and its implications in the analysis of poverty.
Growth in the average income of the poor and the aggregate economy without a
corresponding deterioration in the pattern of income distribution generate the most promising path
out of poverty. However, there are complex sets of issues that might hamper members of poor
households from benefiting and contributing to the growth of income, productivity and
employment in the economy. The capacity of an economy to address the challenges of poverty,
hence, depends on how much it can mobilize and invest in the productive capacity of its population
and generate employment opportunities to most of the economically active population and
especially for those from the poorest segment of the population. The elimination of poverty
apparently translates into pushing the average income of the poorest segments of households, y1
to yd, beyond the poverty line, z. The process of shared economic growth would have the best
chances of eliminating poverty on a sustainable manner, and yet in most cases, some form of social
safety net would be necessary to ensure that all families enjoy the basic necessities of life.
Nonetheless, there are possibilities in which national economies find themselves where the
poverty threshold line, defined within an acceptable level of bare necessities of life, might be
higher than the average income of households (𝑧 > 𝑦𝑚 ). This is a typical situation of generalized
poverty where chronic poverty is widespread and almost every family is in a poverty trap. This
situation calls for an entirely different approach in addressing the challenges of poverty and overall
economic underdevelopment. Even in such a dire situation, there would be a minority of
households that are rich and yet their relative prosperity would have limited impact on the overall
poverty situation of the national economy. Apparently, income redistribution policies would have
very limited influence on the dynamics of poverty in this situation since the overall population has
an egalitarian distribution of deprivation and poverty for its citizens. The challenge for policy here
is a radical and comprehensive reform that would change the very nature of how households and
their family members engage in productive economic activities and benefit from their endeavors.
It would take radical institutional, political, and social reforms that break away from the
bottlenecks and bad institutions that have deprived the population from earning a decent economic
life and participate productively in the economic activities of their country.
Poverty Exit Time
The accurate conceptualization and measurement of poverty is the first step in dealing
with poverty reduction efforts. The pace and extent of poverty reduction is dependent on a
combination of factors that involve overall economic growth of the national economy, the growth
rate of the average income of poor households, the distribution of income across households, the
growth rate of family size across the income distribution pattern, and the extent to which vertical
mobility is feasible for individuals from poor families to join the ranks of the non-poor.
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The concept of poverty exit time is used to describe what it takes in terms of the growth
rate of income for poor households to eliminate their income shortfall from the poverty line. Given
the poverty gap, growth rate of income for the poor would translate into closing the income gap
and joining the ranks of the non-poor. A concept of an average exit time that makes use of a
modified version of the Watts measure, sensitive both to distribution of income and decomposable
across subgroups of the population, is used for our analysis (Murdoch, 1998). The Watts index has
a common notation of:
𝑑

1
𝑊 = ∑[ln(𝑧) − ln(𝑦𝑖 )]
𝑁

(3)

𝑖=1

where there are i individuals in the population indexed from 1 to N in increasing order of income
and d captures the number of people with income yi below the poverty line z.
To develop a measure that captures the expected time for a poor household to exit poverty
if its income grows at an average rate of g per annum is depicted as the relationship between the
current income of the household, yi , and the target of the poverty threshold level, z. This could be
depicted as follows:
𝒊

(4)
𝒛 = 𝒚𝒊 𝒆(𝒕𝒈𝒈)
Taking the logarithm on both sides of the equation and solving for tig results in:
𝐥𝐧(𝐳) − 𝐥𝐧(𝐲𝐢 )
(5)
𝒕𝒊𝒈 =
𝐠
Given that there are d households with an income at or below the poverty line and (n-d)
households with an income at least equal to the poverty line, the average exit time for households,
Tg, is hence the average time for the entire population to eliminate poverty. It is given by:
𝑵

𝟏
𝑻𝒈 =
∑ 𝒕𝒊𝒈
𝑵

(6)

𝒊=𝟏

Note the fact that out of these households, n-d households have zero exit time because
they have already achieved the target level of the threshold income. Some households may be
barely above the threshold, and yet, they and their family members would be included in the class
of the non-poor. This would suggest that the effective average exit time is:
𝒅

[𝐥𝐧(𝒛) − 𝐥𝐧(𝒚𝒊 )]
𝟏
𝑻𝒈 = ∑
𝑵
𝒈

(7)

𝒊=𝟏

This is closely related to a class of Watts index above in that:
𝑾
(8)
𝑻𝒈 =
𝒈
The essential feature of this formulation is that provided that the income of the poor is
assumed to grow at an average rate of g per annum, the short fall of income of the poor from the
poverty line could be eliminated within a span of time that is equal to the total amount of the gap
divided by the growth rate of income of the poor. Therefore, if there are policies that promote the
growth of income of the poor, then the poverty in a nation could be reduced or eliminated within
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a specific period of time. This perspective, of course, assumes that income among the poor could
grow equally or that the poor have equal opportunities to improve their income. With this
qualification, the exit time provides an important point of focus for poverty policy.
Regarding a closely related issue particularly in terms of mobilizing the necessary
resources to address the problems of chronic poverty, it is important to estimate what would be the
cost of such an objective relative to national income. Since we can estimate the average income
shortfall of households below the poverty line, by aggregating the shortfall of the relative burden
to the size of the national economy, we get:
∑𝒅𝒊=𝟏[𝒍𝒏(𝒛) − 𝒍𝒏(𝒚𝒊 )]
(9)
𝑷𝒃𝒖𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒏 =
𝑮𝑫𝑷
This estimate provides the cost burden to the national economy to eliminate poverty from
the system, and it also serves as a yardstick by which households whose average income falls
below the poverty line could be directly supported. The cost of such support could be unaffordable
in economies where the majority of the households are poor, and the economy is rather weak.
However, countries with an HPI within a range of 5-10 percent of their population should be able
to mobilize the necessary funds domestically to absorb the financial burden of poverty alleviation
measures.
Analysis of Poverty Reduction in African Countries
The measurement of poverty and its dynamics over time depend on computing the
aggregate output of the nation and its growth rate, the distribution of income across households,
the size and growth rate of the population, and a realistic poverty yardstick. These factors in
isolation as well as in combination influence the level and dynamics of poverty of a nation over
time and across households.
Poverty has been deep and widespread across the developing countries of the world. This
is the manifestation of both the low level of income and productivity of national economies as well
as the inequitable access to productive opportunities and hence income. Low productivity and lack
of access to educational and employment opportunities in more productive sectors have reduced
the opportunities to realize the potentials of millions of poor people from earning decent living
standards and escaping from the poverty trap. This has also deprived economies from benefitting
from the potential productive contribution of poor people in improving the overall welfare of the
total population.
Table 1 summarizes the regional poverty indicators across African regions and over time.
It exhibits features that provide both the challenges and prospects of addressing poverty in the
context of African countries. First, there is a continental trend which indicates that both the
absolute number of poor and their share in the total population first rose and then started declining.
The headcount index of poverty first increased from 56.75% in 1990 to about 57.1% in 2002 and
then declined over the years to reach 40.99% in 2013. Second, chronic poverty is concentrated in
some countries and regions within the African continent. Increasingly, East and West African
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countries are where both economic and demographic forces are pushing up a higher concentration
of poverty indicators. Third, despite the overall tendency, there are significant variations in terms
of the scope and rate of poverty reduction across countries.
Table 1
Poverty Indicators in Sub-Sahara Africa
1990
2002
2013
HPI
Poor
HPI
Poor
HPI
Poor
(%)
(mil.)
(%)
(mil.)
(%)
(mil.)
42.01 1840.1 30.04 1588.12 12.55 766.01
Developing Countries
Sub-Sahara Africa
54.28 276.08 55.58 391.28 40.99 388.72
East Africa
62.94 130.6
58.53 160.4
40.90 159.1
West Africa
56.34 101.4
59.28 147.0
43.19 145.6
Central Africa
56.46 39.5
67.38 68.7
54.46 75.3
Southern Africa
32.81 13.8
36.05 19.1
17.88 10.9
Source: World Bank, 2017. Poverty Database and World Development Indicators.
Note: HPI measures the share of the population with less than $1.90 per day poverty line in terms
of adjusted 2011 PPP. Author’s computation on the basis of data source.
Fourth, the poverty reduction performance of countries has been highly influenced by
demographic forces. Whereas the overall tendency of the demographic transition is manifest in
several African countries, there are countries that face considerable demographic pressure. The
demographic challenge expressed in terms of high and stable growth rate of the population has
made the task of addressing poverty more daunting. Fifth, whereas the number of poor people has
declined across the continent in recent years, there are more Africans in poverty now than in 1990.
In total, there are still nearly 389 million Africans living in chronic poverty, which is about 113
million more poor people than in 1990. Sixth, whereas the successes in reducing the number of the
poor and their share in the population is widespread across the continent, those countries that have
failed to make a significant reduction in poverty are dominant in terms of population and economic
size which increases their influence on the overall assessment of the poverty situation in the
continent.
Understanding variation in terms of the poverty reduction process and drawing policy
lessons for those countries and regions that still face considerable challenges in addressing the
problems of chronic poverty requires examining the forces behind variations in performance.
Figure 1 depicts the average growth performance of Sub-Sahara African countries since 1960. It
is notable that not only has economic growth been modest, it also has been very erratic and
unsteady over time. Growth in real per capita income is also constrained significantly by the steady
and rapid population growth rate of the region. As the figure graphically depicts, it is the struggle
between the growth efforts of the economies and the power of the demographic forces that have
shaped how economies have managed to generate sustainable or weak economic growth over time.
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It is indeed a big deal to cope with the growth of the population, and yet steady improvement in
the standard of living necessitates the growth of economic activity faster and more steadily than
population.
Figure 1: SS Africa-Average Real GDP and Population Growth Rate
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Figure 1. Sub Saharan Africa – Average real GDP and population growth rate.
Source: World Bank, 2018
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Figure 2. Africa: Economic Growth-Poverty Nexus
Figure 2 relates graphically the relative performance of 35 African countries for which
comparable data could be secured both on poverty, growth rate in real income, and demographic
indicators. The growth rate and poverty nexus reflect a clear tendency, and yet there are more
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forces in operation that affect the degree of poverty reduction in the sample countries. Whereas
economic growth remains the main force that enable countries to address the problems of chronic
poverty on a sustainable basis, economic growth does not necessarily translate to poverty
reduction. Economic growth is only a potential power that could be used for effective and sustained
reduction in poverty.
It is evident that countries with robust economic growth have registered significant
reduction in poverty. Countries with a fast growth rate in real per capita income on average
managed to reduce the share of their population living in chronic poverty. On the other side,
countries with contracting economies could not reduce poverty even in a seemingly egalitarian
situation. It is also clear that countries in our sample are concentrated in the low-growth-lowpoverty reduction loop. This suggests that without robust economic growth, economies find it very
difficult to make a sustainable dent in chronic poverty.
A number of countries registered positive growth in average income and yet failed to
translate that into tangible poverty reduction. This phenomenon tends to prevail in countries where
growth is not shared broadly, and income distribution deteriorates. These features suggest that
economic growth is necessary and critical for poverty reduction but without enabling a pattern of
income distribution economic growth does not necessarily translate into steady poverty reduction.
Table 2 below summarizes the descriptive statistics of the data on variables under
consideration in our sample of 35 African countries. The data reported here is only a conservative
estimate of the problems of poverty and other attributes of life in Africa. Countries for which data
is not available are usually with deeper poverty problems and failed economic growth. Whereas
the 35 countries in the sample provide some picture of the situation in the sub-continent, the
missing data is partly a symptom of deeper economic, political, and social problems.
Table 2
Sub-Sahara Africa- Descriptive Statistics on Poverty Indicators
Variable
Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Change in HPI
35 -.6779 1.1791
-3.1783
1.8575
Population growth
35 2.5555 0.6698
0.9126
3.8022
GDPc growth
35 2.1256 1.8701
-2.7092
5.9836
ChangeinIncomeshare
35 -.4402 2.2846
-6.49
3.21
GDPc2000
35 854.47 1148.78
136.6
4854.5
HPI2000
35 53.51
20.62
19.64
91.21
Population 2000
35 16.692 23.791
.137164 122.87
Bottom40%share2000
35 26.298 2.955
17.53
30.88
Poor Population2000
35 9.696 15.507
.04047
78.026
Poor Population2012
35 11.52
18.323
.06315
94.896
Change in # Poor
35 1.825 4.558
-6.545
16.86
Source: World Bank. 2016. World Development Indicators and Poverty Database.
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It is evident from the performance of the countries in the sample that overall poverty has
declined by a modest rate, but intra-continental variations have been such that there is a net
increase of about 113 million chronically poor people in the region since the year 2000. This is
particularly true in countries where per capita income was extremely low to begin with, economic
growth was modest, and population growth was fast. In the year 2000, for instance, only 10 out of
the 35 countries in our sample had an income per capita higher than the poverty threshold level
which suggests that technically, these countries were in generalized poverty. By the year 2012, the
situation improved modestly so that 16 out of the 35 countries registered a level of per capita
income beyond the threshold level of chronic poverty. In effect, more than half of the countries in
the sample are still in generalized poverty, and under such a situation, sustainable poverty reduction
would be practically impossible unless radical reforms are undertaken that break away from
structural and systemic bottlenecks for economic activity and productivity of factors of production.
Table 3
SS Africa- Regression Result on Poverty Index 2000-2013
Variables
Coefficient Std. Error
GDPc growth rate
-0.1579
0.0864
Average change in Bottom 40% -0.2169
0.0716
Income share
Population growth rate
0.2938
0.2036
HPI 2000
-0.02286
0.008911
Dependent Variable: Average annual change in HPI
Observations: 35
Adj. R-Squared= 0.4919

P-value
0.077
0.005

[95%Conf. Interval]
-0.334 0.0183
-0.363 -0.0709

0.159
0.015

-0.121 0.709
-0.041 -0.0047

Incorporating the different attributing factors in shaping the outcome in poverty indicators
in the sample countries, Figure 3 portrays concisely the various channels by which progress in
poverty reduction, as measured by change in the HPI, is influenced or related to the variables that
are discussed in the conceptual framework section. Whereas economic growth is an important
force that countries can use to address the problems of chronic poverty, the nature and
inclusiveness of the growth process is found to be an important element in translating economic
growth into robust poverty reduction.
This aspect of the growth process is closely linked with the pattern of income distribution
and the extent to which the share of income goes to the relatively poor segment of the population.
Even if there are various indicators of inequality and a pattern of income distribution, for the
purpose of this research, we make use of the share of national income that goes to the bottom 40
percent of the income quintile. Economies that manage to improve a share of the bottom segment
of the income distribution and hence enabling more and more of the population to benefit from the
growth process have made significant strides in poverty alleviation efforts.

98

https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad/

SSAfrica: Poverty-Growth-Inequality Nexus
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Figure 3. Spectrum of Influences in Poverty Reduction Process
It is clear from the cross-country observation that a number of countries failed to translate
economic growth into poverty reduction because of a deteriorating pattern of income distribution
that effectively excluded the poor from improved income. Such economies have also failed to
reduce the poverty index on a consistent manner even though they had the opportunity and capacity
to address the problems of poverty through their improved economic growth performance.
Countries seem to find that changing the pattern of income distribution is very difficult to
accomplish without undertaking fundamental changes in their political economy and institutional
environment. This constraint, in turn, has influenced the extent to which countries can translate
economic growth into a corresponding poverty alleviation outcome.
Growth, Inequality, and Poverty Nexus
The situation and change in poverty indicators are highly influenced by the growth rate of
national income and the pattern of income distribution which effectively determine who benefits
from the growth process. Whereas economic growth is a necessary condition for sustainable
reduction in poverty and improvement in standard of living, it is not a sufficient condition for such
an outcome. It takes more than economic growth to bring about sustainable growth of job
opportunities, employment of the labor force into more productive and growing sectors, and
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assurance that the next generation of the labor force is getting the necessary training and
preparation to move to a higher career ladder in the production process. This would create
economic growth that is shared, comprehensive, and sustainable in that an increasing share of the
labor force and the population would become both the source and beneficiaries of the improved
economic growth process.
It should be noted, however, that the process of economic growth does not follow sector
neutral, economic agent neutral, or policy neutral pathways. The process of economic growth
involves creative innovation of entrepreneurs and the policy and institutional environment in
which economic decisions are made. This usually leads to sequential changes in economic
activities, first in limiting industries or sectors and then eventually in reaching the entire economy.
Entrepreneurs allocate their limited investment resources in areas that promise the most in terms
of risk-adjusted real return which involves a selective approach towards areas of investment to be
provided with priorities. Those sectors and activities receive the initial investment allocation and
employ the factors of production in the flow of sequential economic activities. In this framework,
growth in employment and income accrues to those ready and able to benefit from the initial
investment process and translate their employment into higher output and income. Economic
growth hence is characterized by such discontinuous processes that reshape the scope and intensity
of utilization of economic resources in the system.
If national economic growth is driven by industrial sector growth, it is natural that
investment resources and employment opportunities expand in the industrial sector attracting more
resources from the rest of the economy and eventually reallocating these factors towards the sector.
Those who are actively employ and engage in the industrial sector would be the first beneficiaries
of the process with subsequent effects on the rest of the economic sectors. In the meantime, income
and employment opportunities grow relatively faster in the industrial sector which leads perhaps
to changes in the pattern of income distribution in favor of the industrial sector and workers,
followed by those economic sectors that have direct and strong links with the industrial activities.
In this way, the growth process disrupts the prevailing pattern of economic activities as well as the
distribution of employment and income across economic sectors. The challenges and efficiency in
economic policy making in the context of developing countries revolve around identifying the
potentials of the economy and redirecting collective efforts towards such endeavors, and in the
process, benefiting those involved in the growth of the new opportunities. Countries that have
managed to generate sustained, steady, and inclusive economic growth were able to register drastic
reduction in chronic poverty and set the stage for further development of their national economies.
The experiences of such successful developing countries clearly indicate that addressing the
challenges of poverty requires combining both the growth and income distribution approaches
along with continuous effort to balance the two forces.
Concluding Remarks
The contours of success in poverty alleviation across African countries are closely related
to economic growth performance, the initial level of income, the level and changes in the
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distribution of income, and the extent to which the political-economy of these countries facilitates
the opportunities for sustainable and shared economic growth. While African countries have
registered modest progress in their fight against poverty, the challenge remains daunting, and those
who escape chronic poverty are still vulnerable to fall back into the poverty trap. Generalized
poverty is prevalent in a number of African countries where aggregate output of these economies
is simply not large enough to provide the necessities of life for their population. In such a situation,
the first order of priority is to enable the economy to break away from the structural bottlenecks in
which it finds itself due to hostile policy, institutional, demographic, and environmental pressures.
The improvements in recent years both in growth rate and poverty indicators are mainly
driven by better economic growth whereas further progress highly depends on addressing
inequality concerns and improving the political-economy environment of the countries. Success
in poverty reduction in African countries has been very uneven and the overall picture conceals
critical challenges in a large number of countries that have limited capacity to initiate and sustain
economic growth. Inequality remains a serious challenge in a number of countries and reform
measures to address the problem have been moderate. With a few exceptions, there is an apparent
deterioration in the pattern of income distribution. The evidence suggests that improving the
pattern of income distribution in favor of the poor has significant impact on reducing the depth
and scope of poverty and sustaining economic growth.
The objective of eliminating chronic poverty within the framework of global sustainable
development faces its weakest point in the context of African countries and requires addressing
the remaining hurdles in these countries to sustain and create growth inclusive of the poor. Access
to education and health services to the poor generates long lasting human capital capabilities
among the poor that would enable them to earn decent standards of living. Addressing the problems
of inequality has considerable potential to moderate the problems of chronic poverty in Africa.
Building the political economic environment and institutions necessary for mobilization of support
for poverty alleviation are important to translate economic growth into sustainable poverty
reduction. It is therefore vitally important for African countries to focus their effort to initiate and
sustain shared economic growth so that an increasing share of their population escapes chronic
poverty.
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Who Is In the “We”? Interrogating the African Union’s Agenda 2063
and Youth Political Participation
Job Shipululo Amupanda, University of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia
Abstract
Most analyses of the African Union (AU) focus on the politics of the state and presidents.
There are very few analyses that focus on aspects such as youth development. This article
departs from that tradition. It argues that although the youth were always part of important
historical developments in Africa, they have remained on the periphery. In recent times,
particularly since the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the AU in
the 2000s, the youth development agenda has begun to receive attention at the policy level.
In 2015, the AU through Agenda 2063 went a step further by elevating youth matters to
the mainstream continental policy framework. While these developments are all welcome,
it emerges clear that in the arena of youth political participation, the continent remains
hesitant. Where the AU and its member states adopt the language and grammar of youth
inclusion, of which youth political participation is often limited, such is not met with fitting
institutional and practical policy arrangements. This article finds that the African elite is in
for a rude awakening, as we have witnessed since 2011, given the discovery by the African
youth of new methods of political participation in post-colonial Africa. It advocates for the
adoption of the African community outlook to a youth state policy, argues for linking youth
to the project of economic freedom, and implores the African elite to embark upon the
decolonial project to resolve the bearings of coloniality of being, power and knowledge.
Introduction
Although the youth played an important role in the fight against colonialism in Africa, the
liberating generation upon taking office did not see the need of placing youth development at the
center of state policy in the liberated zones. The youth were to regard themselves as beneficiaries
of an independent Africa which must be grateful to the fearless freedom fighters who freed the
continent from colonial rule. 24 years after Namibia attained independence, former President of
Namibia Hifikepunye Pohamba gave this warning to the youth of Namibia on 26 August 2014:
“this [liberation struggle] was not easy as some of you want to believe. It was hard, long and bitter
and we, the old freedom fighters, fought to the end and liberated the country and the people. Some
of us lost our lives because of this right cause (Shivute, 2014).
In some extreme cases, the expectations of the youth to sing praises to liberating heroes led
to dictatorships. In Malawi, President Kamuzu Banda ensured that everything in Malawi had been
revolved around him. As Malawian academic Professor Wiseman Chijere Chirwa explains
“throughout the 1960s, political songs reflected Banda's consolidation of power and his emerging
dictatorship. Because of his heroic triumph, everything in the country belonged to him” (Chirwa
2001, p. 8). African liberation leaders even created concepts and philosophies that were forced
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down the throats of the citizens as national philosophies and concepts. South African political
scientist Prince Mashele explains such an occurrence in Kenya:
In Kenya, during the reign of Daniel Arap Moi… citizens were obliged to follow in the
footsteps of Moi. To entrench his despotism, Moi introduced a philosophy called Nyayo
(footstep) projecting himself as a pathfinder and the rest of society as followers. Political
commentators who dared not to follow in Moi’s footsteps faced one of two hard realities:
you disappear or flee to exile. So serious was Moi about his Nyayo philosophy that he
could replace a vice-chancellor of any university with someone prepared to follow in the
correct political footsteps. (Mashele, 2011)
The continent is, therefore, nourished with many examples illustrating how African
liberation leaders perceived post-independent Africa as a personal trophy they obtained for
liberating the continent through their heroic deeds. The citizens, particularly the youth, must at all
time - it was made clear - be grateful and celebrate the freedom fighters and allow them to rule
undisturbed. Fast forward to 2017, Africa still has the world’s oldest leaders. Below is an
illustration of Africa’s top 20 oldest presidents for illustrative purposes;
Table 1
Rulers by country and age
Name
1. Robert Mugabe
2. Beji Caid Essebsi
3. Paul Biya
4. Abselaziz Bouteflika
5. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
6. Alpha Conde
7. Peter Mutharika
8. Hage Geingob
9. Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo
10. Jose Eduardo dos Santos
11. Alassane Ouattara
12. Jacob Zuma
13. Mohammadu Buhari
14. Denis Ngueso
15. Akufo Addo
16. Yoweri Museveni
17. Pakalitha Mosilili
18. Omar al-Bashir
19. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita
20. Ismail Omar Guelleh
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Country
Zimbabwe
Tunisia
Cameroon
Algeria
Liberia
Guinea
Malawi
Namibia
Equatorial Guinea
Angola
Cote d’ivore
South Africa
Nigeria
Congo
Ghana
Uganda
Lesotho
Sudan
Mali
Djibouti

Age
93
91
84
80
79
79
77
76
75
75
75
75
74
74
73
73
73
73
72
71
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To put Table 1 in fitting context and to understand how liberating leaders in Africa saw
themselves as the only ones to govern Africa, it is necessary to juxtapose the above table to Table
2 of Africa’s longest serving leaders. The table below shows that most of Africa’s oldest leaders
are also the longest serving leaders. Although it may appear obvious that the oldest would be
longest serving, it must be clarified, for example, that while Ghana’s Akufo Addo may be Africa’s
15th oldest leader, he only has been in office a few months, having assumed office only in January
2017. Namibia’s Hage Geingob is Africa’s 8th oldest leader but has only spent two years in office
since his inauguration in March 2015.
Table 2
Leaders by country and years in office
Name
1. Paul Biya
2. Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo
3. Jose Eduardo dos Santos
4. Robert Mugabe
5. Yoweri Museveni
6. Omar al-Bashir
7. Idris Deby
8. Isaias Afwerki
9. Paul Kagame
10. Denis Sassou Nguesso

Country
Cameroon
Equatoria Guinea
Angola
Zimbabwe
Uganda
Sudan
Chad
Eritrea
Rwanda
Congo

Years in office
42 years
38 years
38 years
37 years
31 years
28 years
27 years
26 years
23 years
20 years

This state of African leadership has not only generated an interest by foreign scholars, such
as Aguilar (1998), but from countries led by relatively younger leaders. African scholars and
researchers have also taken keen interest in this debate. This debate is captured around the concept
of gerontocracy. Nigerian academic, Omotade Adegbindin, explains that a gerontocracy “is a
political system, a form of oligarchical rule, whereby a small group of elderly individuals are in
control of power. Unpopular due to its peculiar nature, it is in short, a rule by old men”
(Adegbindin, 2011, p. 454). Drawing from other scholars to locate this concept in Africa,
Adegbindin (2011) captures Dei (1994) explaining that in African tradition a gerontocracy is seen
as occurring where “respect for the authority of elderly persons for their wisdom, knowledge of
community affairs, and ‘closeness’ to the ancestors… there is in Africa a general belief that ‘old
age comes with wisdom and an understanding of the world’” (Adegbindin, 2011, p. 13). Kenyan
academic Peter Onyango Onyoyo provides clarity in detail:
Gerontocracy is the rule by elders or a type of government that associates leadership with
elders. … Ipso facto in several African traditional societies in which customary law ruled
the lives of people, the role of elders was substantial and critical for order and harmony.
The elders are construed to be the custodians of customary law, its promulgators and

International Journal of African Development v.5 n.1 Spring 2018

105

enforcers… In the post-independent Africa, gerontocracy in the political sense has become
notorious as some elders cling on power to dominate and favour their next of kin.
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe is an example in which the leader sees his status as
elder to be the reason to cling on power. The late Muammar Ghedafi did the same in Libya,
President Paul Biye of Cameroon, and the late President Eyadema of Togo did the same.
Elders in political leadership in Africa have been associated with hunger for power other
than wisdom. (Onyoyo 2017, pp. 2-3)
It should, therefore, be no surprise that the entire structure of the OAU did not have a clear
and specialized function dedicated to a continental youth development agenda. The Pan African
Youth Movement (PYM) which later became the Pan African Youth Union (PYU) established in
1962 (a year before the founding of the OAU in 1963) was recognized by the OUA but never
integrated into its activities. Historically, the PYM consisted of the youth of African ruling political
parties in general and youth of former liberation movements in particular. After achieving
independence, the PYM lost currency in the eyes of the liberating leaders subsequently losing
momentum (Nueys, 2012). The African Union (AU), the successor of the OAU, established in
1999, only became concerned with youth development seven years after its formation. This is
confirmed by the AU 2011 State of the African Youth Report 2011 in no uncertain terms.
Africa’s commitment to youth development and welfare was amply manifested in 2006
with the adoption by African Heads of State and Government of the African Youth Charter.
The charter provides a framework for developing and implementing more tangible youth
policies and programmes. (AUC, 2012, p. VII)
In a foreword to the same report, Professor Jean-Pierre Ezin, the then Commissioner for
Human Resources, Science and Technology of the African Union Commission (AUC),
summarized what to him was continental commitment to the continental youth development
agenda.
The African Union Commission has come a long way in its efforts to promote youth
development and empowerment in Africa. It developed the African Youth Charter, which
was approved by African Heads of State and Government in 2006 and which entered into
force in a relatively short time. The Charter constitutes a continental legal framework that
seeks to re-position the challenges, potential, contributions and rights of young people in
the mainstream of Africa’s socio-economic growth and development. In 2009, the AU
Executive Council declared the years 2009-2018 as the Decade for Youth Development
and Empowerment in Africa. Subsequently, the AU Ministers in Charge of Youth Affairs
approved the Decade Plan of Action (DPoA) – a roadmap for accelerating the
implementation of the charter. By deciding to focus on the theme Accelerating Youth
Empowerment for Sustainable Development for the 2011 Summit of African Union Heads
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of State and Government, the AU demonstrates the importance it attaches to the role and
contribution of the youth in the development process. (AU 2012, p. VI)
The mindset of the liberation leaders – of youth to be grateful to political freedom fighters
– has extended to the technical staff of the AUC. How else does one explain AUC commissioner
Ezin’s conclusion that something as flimsy as a theme can be regarded as demonstrating the
importance that the AU attaches to the role and contribution of the youth in the development
process? In 2011, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) released its 2011
African Youth Report. Abdoulie Janneh, the then United Nations Under-Secretary-General and
Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, did not conceal the reality of the
exclusion and nonparticipation of African youth in decision making.
As argued in this report, young people need an enabling environment politically,
economically and socially to thrive in our countries. They need to be empowered so that
they can be represented and participate in decision-making processes that affect their lives.
Though Africa has made progress in providing education and skills for more young people
than ever before, youth unemployment and underemployment remain a major challenge.
Innovative approaches and in-depth analysis of youth issues at both the design and
implementation phases of policies and programmes are needed to ensure effective delivery
and better outcomes towards a great future for the young women and men of Africa.
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2011, p. VIII)
To its credit, the AU distinguished itself from the OAU by creating a youth division within
the structures of the AUC. According to the AU, the “youth division under the Department of
Human Resources, Science & Technology (HRST) is the division responsible for Africa’s Youth
Agenda in the African Union Commission (AUC)” (African Union Commission, 2017). Most
importantly, the AU’s language and articulation of the importance of the youth division is the most
telling in the subsequent sentences, “It [Youth Division] promotes youth participation such as
organizing youth forums and celebrating Africa Youth Day. By harmonizing and coordinating
member states as well as bringing together all relevant stakeholders, the youth division is mandated
to, among other functions, use the outcomes and recommendations from all sectors through
appropriate training frameworks to strengthen the African Youth” (African Union Commission,
2017).
What the above states is simply that the AU sees youth participation as represented by
flimsy things such as celebrating Youth Day. This mindset is similar to that of Kamuzu Banda of
Malawi, as discussed earlier, who saw the role of the youth and women as that of singing, clapping
hands and celebrating him. The AU makes it clear that the mandate of the division is not to ensure
that youth have input into decisions but merely to receive and accept outcomes and
recommendations. From the 21st-25th of May 2016, the AU held what was called the Banjul+10
Summit on the 10-year implementation of the African Youth Charter in The Gambia to review the
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progress made in regard to the African Youth Charter since its adoption in 2006. It was found that
most African states still did not ratify the Charter. In the outcome document, the AU set a target
of ensuring that there would be a “hundred percent ratification by the end of 2016” (African Union,
2016). Speaking on the future prospects for African youth, in Germany on 6 April 2017 at the
Potsdam Dialogues, the AUC Commissioner for Human Resources, Science and Technology,
Martial De-Paul Ikounga, disclosed that the wishful target of 100 percent ratification of the charter
that was previously set in Banjul was not achieved (Ikounga, 2017).
What emerges clearly from the above is that to both the OAU and its successor the AU, the
youth and the youth agenda are either a non-issue or peripheral issue. In response, the youth did
not sit idle. There have been a number of responses from the African youth. Although the PYU
enjoyed cordial relations with both the OUA and AU, it faced several challenges, particularly
financial challenges, given the somewhat ‘arm-chair’ approach of leadership of the continental
body. The continental youth body was forced to change its headquarters three times: from
Conakry, Guinea, to Algiers, Algeria in 1967; then from Algiers to Khartoum, Sudan, in 2008
(NUEYS, 2012). Speaking at the African Youth Day on 1 November 2012, the former chairperson
of the African Union Commission Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma admitted the serious challenges faced
by the PYU thus promising the AUC’s commitment to embark upon the revitalization of the Pan
African Youth Union (The Point, 2012). It does not require sophistication to note that revitalization
can only take place when faced with decline and weakening.
From the 1st to 4th of November 2013 in Tunisia, the AUC in collaboration with the New
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) coordinating Agency, the African Development
Bank and the ECA organized a youth consultative meeting on the envisaged Agenda 2063. This
meeting culminated in the establishment of the AU Youth Working Group (AUYWG). The
AUYWG later transformed itself into the African Youth Commission (AYC) that held its first
General Assembly and elected the founding leadership in January 2017 on the sidelines of the AU
Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The AYC, seeing itself as the youth version of the AUC, set its
objective as an organization where “all inspiring and capable young African leaders and African
Diaspora can organize themselves, take up their responsibilities, strengthen cooperation among the
youth and youth structures as a platform, speak up and promote youth voices in the context of
Africa’s development” (African Youth Commission, 2017). It further outlined its objectives as:
to organize all young people in Africa and Diaspora for the promotion of African unity and
development through linkage of youth and youth structures and mobilization of resources
(human, technical, technology and finance) to support the work of African youth, youth
structures, Pan African Youth Union and Youth Division of the African Union Commission
in their quest to effective service delivery and advocacy activities on the African Youth
Charter, other AU legal instruments and youth projects at national, regional and continental
levels for the advancement of Africa (African Youth Commission, 2017, p. 4).
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As it did with the PYU, the AU took an “arm-chair” approach to the AYC although it
played an indirect role in its creation. Towards the AYC General Assembly in January 2017, the
African Union Youth Division released a statement that was regarded as an attempt to either
sabotage or distance the continental body from the youth program. The statement, released on 13
January 2017, merely a week before the youth General Assembly, read:
With regards to the upcoming AYC Annual General Assembly on the 22-25 January 2017
in Addis Ababa, we wish to categorically state that we have not been involved in the
coordination of this event as has been erroneously reported across various
media. Unfortunately, this avoidable situation is a misrepresentation that has caused
confusion, particularly among prospective participants, and simultaneously hampered the
event’s credibility. (African Union Youth Division, 2017)
While making such damaging remarks, the division still went on to state that it would
encourage “pro-active initiatives of African youth in forming organizations, networks or think
tanks as a response to the prevailing challenges that affect them; whether it is at the national,
regional or continental levels” (African Union Youth Division, 2017). Be that as it may, the AYC
General Assembly went ahead and elected its leadership. This then meant that there were now two
continental youth organizations: the PYU and the AYC. One of the arguments used by those at the
forefront of AYC is that unlike PYU that is host to the National Youth Councils, the AYC
membership is open to individual youth and civil society organizations that would not get an
opportunity to engage in the continental youth development agenda under the PYU framework.
The other argument used against the PYU is that it appears to be too political and aligned to ruling
parties in Africa of which some are responsible for the suppression of the youth and
underdevelopment. In other words, the PYU, through its national youth councils, stands complicit.
There have been responses from African youth, responses to gerontocracies,
authoritarianism, corruption and underdevelopment, outside the PYU and AYC structures. One of
the well-known initiatives taken by the youth of Africa to ensure political participation is what has
come to be known as the Arab Springs - the popular grassroots protests that took place in North
Africa and toppled several African dictators. Ruge (2012) explains what underpinned the Arab
Spring.
At the heart of the Arab Spring was a disgruntled youth class seeking democratic
representation and economic participation. Remember Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian
street vendor whose self-immolation launched the uprisings? He didn’t set himself ablaze
because he had a smart phone. His self-immolation was his last desperate attempt to bring
attention to his economic exclusion. His peers in the region sympathized and, almost
overnight, Tunisia and the political landscape of most of Northern Africa changed. It was
a signal that Africa’s ruling class was under siege. On one end, Mr. Bouazizi, aged 26,
represented Africa’s emerging youth class, an impatient demographic eager to upend the
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status quo (he was only five years younger than the median Tunisian). On the other,
deposed dictator Ben Ali, age 76, stood as a breed of elder statesmen – disconnected from
the needs of populations, and facing extinction.
As dictators in North Africa were being toppled, their contemporaries in the rest of the
continent worked hard to control the youth and avoid similar uprising. Ugandan President Yoweri
Museveni is said to have deployed the military into the streets of Kampala to quell protests (Smith,
2011). Despite these attempts, the youth in the zones with long serving and authoritarian leaders
still managed to wage protests in one way or the other. Years later, in 2014, the long-serving despot
Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso was forced to flee the country. Pictures of youth jubilantly
jumping on top of seats in Burkina Faso Parliament went viral on social media (Berman, 2014). In
stable democracies, where corruption and underdevelopment were rampant, particularly in
Southern Africa, the youth formed radical social movements agitating for transformation, social
justice and equality. Consider the case of Namibia as explained by Namibian academic Phanuel
Kaapama (2016, p. 32):
Namibia reached her Fanonian moment… a new generation has entered the country’s
social and political scene and has forcefully asked penetrating new questions. So,
Namibia’s ‘Fanonian moment’ has come in the form of the [Affirmative Repositioning]
AR movement. Other issues that have come under the radar of AR’s fervent political eye
include the perceived/allege widespread nepotism and corruption among the political and
economic elite… The AR movement has ‘declared war’ on what it calls the “general
zombie tendency” and its politics of hand-clapping and singing for the satisfaction of
politicians, by working towards liberating the youth by converting them into active citizens
and upright activists.
In some parts of North Africa, the youth have taken serious risks such as attempting to
cross rivers and oceans into Europe in search of economic opportunities and political stability.
Consider the case that The Gambia reported, “for its size, Gambia is experiencing a
disproportionate number of people leaving the country. Its population is just under 2 million, yet
over the past two years, it has been ranked fourth and fifth in the International Organisation for
Migration’s league of the six main nationalities identified attempting to cross the Mediterranean
from Libya to Italy” (Hunt, 2015). In North, East and West Africa some youth resolved to join
armed military groups such as Boko Haram and others (Onuoha, 2014).
This account and survey of continental youth political participation and developmental
agenda was necessary to buttress the point that the scope of analysis should not only concern itself
with the center and the institutions within its reach but should also consider (a) the existence of a
periphery, (b) an understanding of why the periphery exists, and (c) the interaction, if any, between
the center and periphery. The fundamental question, therefore, remains - who is in? Who is
included in the center-led conversation and who do they represent? Indeed, who is out and what
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do they feel and what are they going to and willing to do about it? It is only when these questions
are answered that it can be determine how youth political participation can be improved.
Agenda 2063 - Who Is The “We”?
The Essence of Agenda 2063
Agenda 2063 is a program of the AU adopted by African Heads of State and Government
who assembled in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the 24th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the
Union in January 2015. In that session outcome, the African Heads of State and Governments
romanticized Agenda 2063 as
“[an] endogenous plan for transformation. It harnesses the continent’s comparative advantages
such as its people, history and cultures; its natural resources; its position and repositioning in the
world to effect equitable and people-centered social, economic and technological transformation
and the eradication of poverty. It seeks to fulfil our obligation to our children as an intergenerational compact, to develop Africa’s human capital; build social assets, infrastructure and
public goods; empower women and youth; promote lasting peace and security; build effective
developmental states and participatory and accountable institutions of governance; [articulate]
Africa’s vision and roadmap for sequencing our sectoral and normative, national, regional and
continental plans into a coherent whole; plus, be a call to action to all Africans and people of
African descent, to take personal responsibility for the destiny of the continent and as the primary
agents of change and transformation, and a commitment from citizens, leadership, governments
and institutions at national, regional and continental levels to act, coordinate, and cooperate for the
realization of this vision” (AU, 2015, p. 13).
And, as a policy framework that aims to provide a collective developmental path for
Africa’s development, Agenda 2063 is anchored on 7 pillars: (1) a prosperous Africa based on
inclusive growth and sustainable development; (2) an integrated continent, politically united and
based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance; (3) an Africa of
good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; (4) a peaceful
and secure Africa; (5) an Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values
and ethics; (6) an Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African
people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; and (7) an Africa as a strong,
united and influential global player and partner (AU, 2015).
Youth Content in Agenda 2063
While there might not be a specific aspiration that speaks to youth political participation,
it is important to note that aspiration 6 speaks of an Africa whose development is people driven
and relies on the potential of the African people, especially its youth. What Agenda 2063 does,
despite tokenism analysis, is to depart from a longstanding tradition of the OAU and AU of
peripherising youth development. In fact, the OAU Charter, in both Article II (purposes) and
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Article III (principles), makes no mention or inference to youth (Elias, 1965). The Constitutive
Act of the AU also does not change this state of affairs. Its Article 3 (on the Objectives of the AU)
and Article 4 (on the Principles of the AU) both fail to make mention of the youth (AU, 2000).
While some might argue that the youth do not necessarily warrant mentioning in these legislative
instruments, it must be noted that the AU Constitutive Act mentions in Article 4 the promotion of
gender equality (often a twin to youth empowerment/inclusion) as one of the principles of the AU.
Agenda 2063, therefore, departs from the AU tradition of placing youth at the periphery. The
policy framework admits that “no society can reach its full potential, unless it empowers … youth”
and sets an objective of having an engaged and empowered youth (AU, 2015). Furthermore, it
articulates and makes the following daring declarations on youth as part of Aspiration 6:
 The youth of Africa shall be socially, economically and politically empowered through the
full implementation of the African Youth Charter.
 All forms of systemic inequalities, exploitation, marginalization and discrimination of
young people will be eliminated, and youth issues mainstreamed in all development
agendas.
 Youth unemployment will be eliminated, and Africa’s youth guaranteed full access to
education, training, skills and technology, health services, jobs and economic
opportunities, and recreational and cultural activities as well as financial means and all
necessary resources to allow them to realize their full potential.
 Young African men and women will be the path breakers of the African knowledge society
and will contribute significantly to innovation and entrepreneurship. The creativity, energy
and innovation of Africa’s youth shall be the driving force behind the continent’s political,
social, cultural and economic transformation.
It is evident that Agenda 2063 has some content on the youth. As stated before, the decision
to place youth in a central/mainstream AU document is a serious departure from the policy
positions and approach of both the OUA and AU. In 2013, the AU started consulting the youth
regarding Agenda 2063. The consultations will later bear fruit if the content of Agenda 2063 is
taken into consideration. In November 2013 in Hamamet, Tunisia, the AU held consultation with
the youth on Agenda 2063. It was at this gathering that the youth immaculately presented to the
AU their desire to actively participate in the politics and governance of the AU, and its member
states. The youth went further to indicate that the Africa they want is one wherein they are involved
in the drafting of policies and take an active part in the implementation and monitoring process.
At that conference, youth political participation was invoked. Resultantly, a working group called
the African Union Youth Working Group (AUYWG) was established to ensure that the resolution
of the youth that gathered there was included in the African developmental way forward in general
and in Agenda 2063 in particular. Four years later, in 2017, the AUYWG transformed itself into
an independent continental youth organization, the AYC, whose primary purpose would be to
monitor the AUC and the AU and ensure that youth concerns would not be placed at the periphery
(Dhlamini, 2017). This development alone indicates not only the input youth made into Agenda
2063 but their determination to create their own independent spaces and ensure political
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participation. The other aspects of youth consultation and input into Agenda 2063 took place at
the state level. The AU policy organ, at its July 2014 meeting in Equatorial Guinea, had tasked
member states to embark upon domestic consultations with various stakeholders (youth, academia,
women, civil society and women) and submit the outcomes to the AUC by 31 October 2014. South
Africa, for example, held such consultation with the youth on 11 July 2014 (DIRCO, 2015).
‘It Is In But Not In’
In November 2015, the biggest daily newspaper in Namibia, The Namibian, ran a story that
President Hage Geingob had temporarily moved out of the State House to his mansion on the
outskirts of the capital city, Windhoek, to allow for expensive renovations that were in line with
his taste. The Presidential Affairs Minister, Frans Kapofi, was at pains in explaining as to whether
the President had moved out of the State House. In response to journalists, who were asking for
confirmation as to whether the president has indeed moved out, Kapofi flip-flopped stating the
following, “He [president] is here but he is not here” (Immanuel & Mongudhi, 2015). Kapofi’s
explanation is a fitting importation to explain youth political participation in Agenda 2063 or,
though slightly amended, to ‘it is in, but not in’. While there is considerable content and mention
in Agenda 2063 of youth, it is not clear as to whether this constitutes political participation. The
language and grammar of Agenda 2063 speaks to what the AU will do for youth and not what it
can do together with youth. It sees youth as mere subjects to benefit from the generosity of their
elders who have now mentioned them in their documents. It makes use of terms such as “support
young people” and many ‘othering’ terms when discussing the youth. The main version, called the
popular version of Agenda 2063, states the following as the actionable programs that speak to
youth (AU, 2015):
… support young people as drivers of Africa’s renaissance, through investment in their
health, education and access to technology, opportunities and capital, and concerted
strategies to combat youth unemployment and underemployment. Ensure faster movement
on the harmonization of continental admissions, curricula, standards, programmes and
qualifications and raising the standards of higher education to enhance the mobility of
African youth and talent across the continent.
It is evident that what is an envisaged and actionable program of the Agenda 2063 does not
include political participation. The language and grammar of Agenda 2063 make itself available
to the interpretation that reform and youth inclusion are limited to health, education, technology,
economic opportunities and education. Youth political participation is not conspicuously part of
Agenda 2063. They are thus perceived as readily available beneficiaries of the political generosity
of their elders who have now included their issues in key policy documents such as Agenda 2030.
The youth are, therefore ‘In but not in’ in Agenda 2063. Agenda 2063 is often paraded, and its
content so read, around the phrase of ‘The Africa We Want.’ Although it appears that youth are
indeed part of the we, or they might perceive themselves as part of the we, it appears, on closer
inspection, that the we is an exclusive imagery of the African Heads of State and Government. As
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will be further elaborated in the proceeding pages, youth political participation remains a
peripheral concern despite making an appearance in key policy documents of the AU.
African Political Elite Orientation towards Youth Political Participation
As has been explored and displayed earlier, youth matters have always been peripheral in
the imagination and discourse of African political leaders. If the youth matters are themselves
peripheral, one can only imagine how distant youth political participation would be in the minds
of African political leaders. To understand what and how African leaders perceive youth, one only
needs to study how the African governments conceptualize ministries dealing with youth affairs.
A short illustration is thus necessary.
Table 3
Country and youth participation
Country Name
Name of Ministry
Youth and Sport
Angola
Youth, Professional Education and Employment
Burkina Faso
Youth Affairs and Civic Education
Cameroon
Youth and Sports
DRC
Youth and Sports
Ethiopia
Youth and Sports
Gabon
Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs
Kenya
Gender and Youth, Sports and Recreation
Lesotho
Youth and Sports
Liberia
Youth and Citizenship Building
Mali
Youth, Sports and National Service
Namibia
Youth Development
Nigeria
Youth and ICT
Rwanda
Youth, Employment and Promotion of Civic Values
Senegal
Youth and Sports
Sudan
Youth and Sports
The Gambia
Basic Development, Crafts, Youth and Youth Employment
Togo
Youth, Sports, Women and Families
Tunisia
Youth and Children Affairs
Uganda
Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment
Zimbabwe
Table 3 represents a random selection of 20 African countries and indicates the following:
(a) most African leaders view the youth’s main objective and role as that of entertainment, chasing
footballs and dancing/singing during national events. It is for this reason that in most African
countries youth ministries are placed together with recreation, sports, national service or civic
education.; but (b) Zimbabwe sees youth in relation to economic empowerment and indigenization,
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Kenya links youth to planning, and Rwanda links youth to ICT which provides a new and fresh
perspective that departs from the orthodox linkage of youth to entertainment and sports. With the
exception of few cases, this illustrates that youth are perceived as peripheral issues. It is therefore
understandable that youth play a very small, if any, role in continental agenda setting.
As such, it can be argued that despite its predecessor the OAU that started off as a peoplecentered continental body that at one point assisted non-state actors fighting for national liberation,
the AU remains engaged in elite politics. It is therefore no surprise that, although Agenda 2063
speaks about fighting for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, the AU recently
resolved to admit Morocco to the African Union without a clear explanation and direction
(Kazeem, 2017). What is clear is that once an elite pact is concluded, the aspiration of young men
and women fighting with determination in Western Sahara does not matter (Akwei, 2017). The
youth, including those of Western Sahara, are to remain beneficiaries of the ‘generous’ elders who
have mentioned them in key documents such as Agenda 2063. When the African passport was
launched at the 27th Summit of the AU in Kigali, Rwanda, the first recipients where not youth to
symbolize a future-looking continent but the African elites, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and
Chadian President Idris Deby Itno, who already enjoy diplomatic privileges until death. Giving
these individuals African passports thus becomes irrelevant on close inspection (Adibe, 2016).
These are amongst the many reasons that support the argument that the AU prioritizes elite interest
dwarfing any elevation of matters such as youth political participation.
In a 2011 Afrobarometer’s working paper titled The Political Participation of Africa’s
Youth: Turnout, Partisanship and Protest, Danielle Resnick and Daniela Casale capture the
orientation of African youth as it relates to political participation:
Our findings suggest that Africa’s youth, particularly those residing in urban areas, operate
in broadly similar ways to their counterparts in other regions of the world. In comparison
with their older compatriots, the youth vote less and are more likely to demonstrate no
partisanship or an attachment to opposition parties rather than any affinity to incumbent
parties. Yet, the likelihood of their involvement in protests is not significantly different
from that of their older counterparts. Moreover, we find that the youth, unlike older voters,
tend to vote less the longer an incumbent party has been in office. In addition, poor
incumbent performance on job creation, compared with other socio-economic issues,
increases the likelihood of the youth to express either no partisanship or an affinity to the
opposition. In terms of protest activity, higher levels of education and economic
deprivation, as well as a lack of satisfaction with democracy, increase the likelihood that
the youth will protest while demonstrating a null impact on their older cohorts’ protest
activities. (Resnick & Casale, 2011, p. 2)
At the time Resnick and Casale (2011) published their paper, Africa had just experienced
the youth-led uprising in North Africa that toppled long-serving dictators and authoritarian leaders.
As stated in the introduction to this paper, a young Mohamed Bouazizi found himself in
circumstances that were confirmed by the studies of Resnick and Casale, which led him to setting
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himself alight and becoming a martyr of the youth-led revolution that spread fast and had as its
casualty some long-serving African authoritarian leaders. The marginalization of the youth and the
consequences thereto can be placed squarely at the doorstep of an unresponsive policy
environment and the ‘periphering’ of the youth from mainstream political participation. Indeed, it
is the failure of African states to engage the youth into activities that are aimed at influencing the
selection, constituting and general decisions of the government bureaucracy. As previously stated,
the marginalization of the youth from mainstream political participation and ‘periphering’ the
youth did not leave the youth idling. They found alternative forms of political participation at their
location - the periphery. To the surprise of many, as what happened with the Arab Spring and with
popular urbanized protests in southern Africa, the periphery found its way to the mainstream
forcing the political elite to either capitulate or engage those who were seen as ‘peripherised’
(Branch & Mampilly, 2015).
The AU in Agenda 2063 adopted a language and grammar that can be said to have
diagnosed the danger of ‘peripherising’ the youth. In what can be seen as either appeasement or
commitment to prevent the relapse of the popular protests, Agenda 2063 promised that “all forms
of systemic inequalities, exploitation, marginalization and discrimination of young people will be
eliminated, and youth issues mainstreamed in all development agendas” (AUC, 2015). Although
the AU documents, such as Agenda 2063, appear to suggest that the AU and its member states are
somewhat committed to bring about real political participation, its rhetoric does not seem to be
supported by credible institutional arrangements. Consider the Youth Division of the AU that is
responsible for Africa’s youth agenda at the AUC. The division explains that it promotes youth
participation by “organizing forums and celebrating Africa Youth Day” (AU, 2017). It goes further
to admit that its mandate is to use the outcomes and recommendations to strengthen the youth.
This is a clear indication of two things: firstly, like is the case amongst AU member states, the AU
understands the youth in the context of entertainment and celebration days like Africa Youth Day;
secondly, it is an admission that the mandate of the division is not to influence decisions but to use
the outcomes and recommendation (already made) to strengthen the youth. In other words, youth
are to be beneficiaries and recipients of the “generosity” of the elders. Had the AUC, its youth
division and member states been interested in genuine political participation, it would have
endorsed campaigns such as Not Too Young to Run, supported and spearheaded by the UN
Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth, Ahmad Alhendawi. This campaign aims at doing away with
restrictive practices, particularly in most African countries, where state policy prevents young
people from running for public office (Srour, 2016)
Conclusion – What Is To Be Done?
Make the Circle Bigger
If there is any lesson to be learned from recent popular and far-reaching events spearheaded
by the youth from the Arab Spring in North Africa to violent extremists in West and East Africa
and popular urbanized protests in southern Africa, it is this: it is in the interest of the African elites
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to engage the African youth and ensure that they facilitate political participation in mainstream
national politics in a genuine, inclusive and constructive manner. The African youth have proven
that they do not need permission and are capable of organizing their own independent forms of
political participation that often lead to their desired outcomes - destructive as it may seem
particularly to those profiting in an exclusive status quo. It is in the interest of peaceful coexistence
for the African leaders to create an enabling environment for political participation of youth. The
current leaders must, indeed, make the circle bigger.
Linking Youth to Economic Freedom
The underlying objective of the African liberation struggle against colonialism was not
only to bring about self-determination but also to solve the then contractions of political power.
The understanding and imagination of the liberating leaders, such as the likes of Kwame Nkrumah,
were that political freedom will lead to economic freedom for the oppressed masses on the African
continent. In fact, one of Nkrumah’s famous phrases has been one that states that you first seek
the political kingdom and the rest shall be added unto you. The ‘rest’ that Nkrumah was referring
to is seen as the economic kingdom. It is now a common understanding that Nkrumah’s dream was
not fulfilled (Mashele & Qobo, 2014). This dismal failure has not left youth idling. The youth have
understood the liberating generation as having failed economically thus necessitating the current
need for economic freedom fighters to emerge and fight for economic freedom (Shivambu, 2014).
Although the youth understands that their mission is to continue the incomplete struggle to solve
the remaining contradictions of economic power, the struggle was started by the liberating
generation, and it has become impossible to pursue this struggle without confronting the very same
fighters and victors of political freedom because of their positionality (Seibeb, 2016). For as long
as the AU member states continue to define youth from the perspective of entertainment, sports
and agents of celebration during national festivals and events, conflicts between these states and
the youth will continue to occur. As such, examples of Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Kenya who locate
youth in the context of economic freedom – viewing youth as an agency of solving the remaining
contradictions of economic power – must be emulated.
Appropriate African Community Outlook to Youth State Policy
Because of the conduct of the politics of the state, the liberation generation has often taken
an opportunistic approach to the appropriation of African tradition and culture. The African
political elites often resort to African tradition and practices such as respect of elders to
opportunistically escape from accountability and evade serious questions related to their political
conduct. There are several African practices and value systems that remain important and can assist
in bringing about the youth’s political participation in the mainstream national discourse. One such
African value system is the African outlook or conceptualization of a community. Africans have
always understood the community as consisting of (a) the dead, (b) the living, and (c) those yet to
be born (Kamalu, 2000). The dead are regarded as part of the community although may not be
visible to everyone. They are in the ancestry watching over, supervising and protecting the living.
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For their part, the living plays a dual role: firstly, they live their lives and lead society in adherence
in regard and observation of the values and norms that were left by the departed who are in the
ancestry and part of the community watching over them; secondly, the living leads their lives and
society in such a way that they preserve a good community for those who have yet to arrive on
earth. The community must be preserved in such a way that when the living takes their position in
the ancestry, they will be watching over the new living (the present unborn) who will preside over
a community that they left in good shape. The African elites opportunistically leave out this
outlook that has ensured accountability and self-regulation in the African traditional society
(Sesanti, 2011). An individual with this outlook would be hesitant of stealing the collective
resources for personal use because he/she is cognizant of the ancestors who are watching his deeds,
even those committed behind closed doors. He/She would be bothered by the thought of one-day
sitting in the ancestry witnessing the living scavenging and suffering because he/she looted and
squandered collective resources. Said differently and in the context of political participation, the
African political elite should ensure political participation of the young, fearing an eye-sore when
they are in the ancestry because they have left the unexposed and inexperienced to take over state
power without the requisite experiences because they were not given an opportunity to learn and
practice when they were young.
Decoloniality – Reimagining Africa
Related to the above discussion is the question of decoloniality, one of the many failures
of the liberating generation. The common mistake that the African elite have made over the past
decades of political freedom is to think that it is only them who are concerned about the African
perspective and the fight against colonialism. They have concluded that the generation of youth
born after independence has been influenced by western values. The African elites always see the
demands by this generation of youth as sponsored from outside, and thus concluded that the
growing dissent is the artwork of the underground of a ‘third force.’ The youth of southern Africa,
through popular radical protests against inequality, poverty, underdevelopment and neoliberalism,
have taken the African elites by surprise once it occurred that the discontentment is homegrown
and, in some instances, has strong Pan Africa, Black Consciousness and African communalistic
values (Mabhena, 2016). The demands on the state through radical protest actions for decent and
dignified housing for all and the demands for free quality decolonized higher education are all
prevalent in southern African as a case in point. The state and African elites must seriously
consider taking the decolonial discourse serious, and this includes dealing with the questions of
coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being. All these questions raised
by the youth of Africa speak to the deficit of their political participation.
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